Family settlement and widow's surrender do not defeat reversionary rights absent genuine compromise, dispossession, or legal necessity.

A purported family settlement will not bind a reversioner unless the transferee derives title through a genuine compromise of competing claims; where the transferee has no antecedent title and claims only through the widow, the settlement cannot defeat reversionary rights. A widow's 1859 arrangement was treated as a division of the estate, not a surrender, and limitation against the reversioner did not begin in the absence of proof of prior dispossession or hostile possession. The widow's alienations also failed for want of legal necessity, with concurrent findings below left undisturbed. The consolidated appeals accordingly failed and the decree for the respondent was upheld.

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Issues: (i) whether the 1867 arrangement constituted a family settlement binding on the reversioner; (ii) whether the 1859 arrangement amounted to a surrender by the widow so as to start limitation against the reversioner under Clause (1), Rule 12 of the Limitation Act, 1859; and (iii) whether the alienations made by the widow were supported by legal necessity.

Issue (i): whether the 1867 arrangement constituted a family settlement binding on the reversioner.

Analysis: A binding family settlement requires that the transferee derive title through a genuine compromise of competing claims. Here, the transferee had no antecedent title of his own and derived whatever interest he had only from the widow. On that footing, the compromise could not create a family settlement capable of defeating the reversionary right.

Conclusion: The 1867 arrangement did not bind the reversioner.

Issue (ii): whether the 1859 arrangement amounted to a surrender by the widow so as to start limitation against the reversioner under Clause (1), Rule 12 of the Limitation Act, 1859.

Analysis: The transaction was treated by the parties as a division of the estate rather than a surrender. The widow did not part with her entire interest, and the evidence did not establish that the mother had taken hostile possession before the arrangement. In the absence of proof of dispossession, no cause of action arose against the widow on that footing, and limitation did not begin against the reversioner during her lifetime.

Conclusion: The 1859 arrangement was not a surrender, and the suit was not barred by limitation on that basis.

Issue (iii): whether the alienations made by the widow were supported by legal necessity.

Analysis: The finding of both courts below was that legal necessity was not proved. No sufficient ground was shown to disturb the concurrent finding of fact.

Conclusion: The alienations were not justified by legal necessity.

Final Conclusion: The consolidated appeals failed and the decree in favour of the respondent was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A reversioner is not bound by a purported family settlement unless the transferee derives title through a genuine compromise of competing claims, and limitation against the reversioner does not begin merely from a widow's possession unless prior dispossession of the widow is proved; concurrent findings on absence of legal necessity will ordinarily not be disturbed.

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