Limitation amendment cannot revive a claim already barred under prior law; the suit remains unenforceable.

An amendment to limitation law does not revive a claim already barred under the prior law, because later enactments apply retrospectively only to pending or future proceedings where the right to sue was still subsisting. The court treated the earlier Limitation Acts and the General Clauses Act as reflecting the rule that a barred remedy is not restored by amendment, even if the underlying debt may continue in some other sense. The suit remained barred by limitation and could not be enforced in court.

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Issues: Whether an amendment to the law of limitation can revive a claim that had already become barred before the amendment came into force.

Analysis: The applicable principle was that limitation ordinarily governs proceedings by the law in force on the date of institution, and that a later change in the law may operate retrospectively on pending or future proceedings only where the right to sue had not already become barred. The earlier Limitation Acts and the General Clauses Act were treated as embodying the rule that a later enactment does not revive a right to sue or apply that was already extinguished by limitation under the prior law. The distinction between a barred remedy and subsisting debt did not assist the appellant, because the issue was enforceability in court, not whether the debt continued to exist in some other sense.

Conclusion: The amendment could not revive the already barred claim, and the suit remained barred by limitation.

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