Limitation period extension does not revive barred tax claims; reassessment invalid while remittances via agent remain taxable.

An amendment extending the limitation period was held not to revive or permit reassessment where the prior four year bar had already extinguished the right to proceed; accordingly the proceedings initiated after the amendment were invalid. Separately, amounts received by the assessee from her husband through an agent were treated as remittances by the husband for tax purposes, so such receipts fall within the remittance concept applied by the tribunal; that finding is confirmed but is consequential to the primary outcome on limitation which favours the assessee.

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Issues: (i) Whether proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act initiated on 25 July 1949 to assess Rs. 9,180 that escaped assessment in assessment year 1942-43 by failure to submit a return are valid in law; (ii) Whether the sum of Rs. 9,180 received by the assessee from her husband through an agent is assessable as a remittance under section 4(2) of the Income-tax Act.

Issue (i): Whether the amended limitation period in section 34 (Act XLVIII of 1948) applies to a case where the previous statutory four-year limitation had already expired before the amendment came into force on 30 March 1948.

Analysis: The Court examined the effect of the amended section 34 read with section 1(2) of the Amending Act XLVIII of 1948 and relied on established principles that rules of limitation are procedural and normally operate retrospectively but do not revive rights or liabilities that had already been extinguished under the prior law. The Tribunal's finding that under the unamended section 34 the four-year rule applied to failures to file returns was accepted. The Court distinguished prior authorities where the limitation period remained the same and applied the principle that a later enactment enlarging limitation does not apply to a case in which, at the date the enactment comes into force, the right to proceed had already become barred.

Conclusion: The amended eight-year limitation under the amended section 34 does not apply to the present case; the proceedings initiated on 25 July 1949 are invalid. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the amounts received by the assessee from her husband through an agent constitute remittances by the husband assessable under section 4(2) of the Income-tax Act.

Analysis: The Court noted the factual finding of the Tribunal that the monies were received by the assessee from her husband through his agent and considered the wording of section 4(2) as applied by the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's view is confirmed that the amounts, though paid through an intermediary, constitute remittances from the husband within the meaning of section 4(2); this conclusion would be against the assessee on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The Court answered the primary reference in favour of the assessee on limitation grounds, rendering the reassessment proceedings invalid; a confirmatory answer on remittance under section 4(2) was given but is consequential and does not affect the primary disposal in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment extending the period of limitation does not apply to revive or permit proceedings in a case where, on the date the amendment comes into force, the right to initiate proceedings had already been extinguished under the prior limitation law.

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