Acknowledgment of liability and limitation revival: payment endorsement failed to save the claim, and the later amendment could not revive a barred mortgage debt.

A mere payment endorsement on a mortgage bond does not amount to an acknowledgment of liability unless its language can reasonably be read as admitting that further money remains due; on the words used here, no subsisting liability was admitted, so limitation was not saved under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. An amendment to Section 20 by Act XVI of 1942 could not retrospectively revive a mortgage claim already barred under the earlier law, absent express legislative provision for revival. The claim therefore remained time-barred and could not be enforced.

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Issues: (i) Whether the payment endorsement on the mortgage bond amounted to an acknowledgment of liability under the Limitation Act; (ii) Whether the amendment to Section 20 of the Limitation Act by Act XVI of 1942 could revive a claim already barred under the earlier law.

Issue (i): Whether the payment endorsement on the mortgage bond amounted to an acknowledgment of liability under the Limitation Act.

Analysis: A mere endorsement recording payment does not amount to an acknowledgment unless the language can reasonably be read as admitting that a further sum remains due. The expression relied on was construed as meaning only that the amount was paid and endorsed, not that it was paid towards an outstanding debt. No implication of subsisting liability could be safely drawn from the words used.

Conclusion: The endorsement was not an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the amendment to Section 20 of the Limitation Act by Act XVI of 1942 could revive a claim already barred under the earlier law.

Analysis: Although limitation law ordinarily applies as it stands when the suit is instituted, an amendment cannot resurrect a right of action that had already become barred and unenforceable under the previous law unless the amending enactment expressly provides for such revival. The amended mode of interrupting limitation could not operate retrospectively to revive a mortgage claim that had already been barred before the amendment came into force.

Conclusion: The 1942 amendment did not revive the time-barred mortgage claim.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the endorsement did not save limitation and the subsequent amendment could not revive an already barred claim.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim barred under the existing limitation law cannot be revived by a later amendment introducing a new mode of saving limitation unless the amending statute expressly so provides.

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