Jurisdiction to grant Privy Council leave under Section 595 depended on a true appellate decree or original civil jurisdiction.

The High Court's power to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council under Section 595 of the Civil Procedure Code depended on whether the refusal to admit the appeal after limitation was a decree "passed on appeal" or a final decree made in original civil jurisdiction. The expression "passed on appeal" was confined to a decree actually made in appellate proceedings, so the refusal did not satisfy clause (a). The reference to "original civil jurisdiction" was read by reference to the Letters Patent, and the application before the Full Bench, acting as an appellate tribunal, was not an order made in original civil jurisdiction. As the case fell within neither clause (a) nor clause (b), leave could not be granted.

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Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council under Section 595 of the Civil Procedure Code on the footing that the order refusing to admit the appeal was a final decree passed on appeal or a final decree passed by the High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction.

Analysis: The expression "passed on appeal" was held to denote a decree actually passed in appellate proceedings, and the refusal to admit the appeal after limitation did not answer that description. The words "original civil jurisdiction" were construed with reference to the Letters Patent, and the application made to the Full Bench as the appellate tribunal was not an order made by the High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. Since the applicant relied only on clauses (a) and (b) of Section 595, and the order did not fall within either clause, the High Court lacked power to grant leave.

Conclusion: The High Court had no jurisdiction to grant the leave sought under Section 595 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the application failed.

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