Retrospective limitation rules cannot extinguish an accrued rent claim unless the statute clearly says so.

The Estates Land Act's three-year limitation period was not applied retrospectively to defeat a rent suit where the earlier limitation period had already expired before the Act commenced. The Court applied the principle that limitation is ordinarily governed by the law in force when suit is instituted, but a statute will not be read as extinguishing an accrued vested right unless that result is clearly expressed or necessarily implied. Because retrospective operation would have destroyed the landholder's existing cause of action, the general limitation rule under the prior law continued to govern. The suit was therefore not barred by limitation, and the lower courts' decree could not be sustained.

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Issues: Whether the limitation provision in the Estates Land Act could be applied to bar a rent suit where the pre-existing period of limitation had already expired before the Act came into force.

Analysis: The suit was instituted after the Estates Land Act came into force, but more than three years had already elapsed from the date the rent became due. The question was whether the new three-year limitation in the Act displaced the longer period previously available under the general law. The Court applied the settled principle that limitation is ordinarily governed by the law in force when the suit is instituted, but that a statute is not to be construed as retrospectively taking away or destroying an existing vested right unless such intention is expressed or necessarily implied. Applying the new limitation period to this case would extinguish a right of action that had already vested in the landholder before the Act commenced. The statutory language was held not to require such retrospective effect, and the general limitation rule under the earlier law therefore continued to govern the suit.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred by limitation and the decree of the lower courts could not stand.

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