Issues: (i) Whether the Bank Charges were taxable consideration or were exempt interest on discounting/reimbursable expenses; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty under Section 78 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the Bank Charges were taxable consideration or were exempt interest on discounting/reimbursable expenses.

Analysis: Notification No. 29/2004-ST exempts the value equivalent to interest on discounting of bills, bills of exchange or cheques where the interest is separately disclosed. The earlier departmental adjudication had accepted that cheque-discounting charges recorded as Bank Charges represented interest, and no change in the nature or accounting of the receipts was established for the relevant period. The ledger nomenclature alone could not establish taxability. The entries comprised cheque-related charges, realisation charges and amounts debited by banks, while no transaction-wise evidence established that the entire amount was consideration for a taxable service. Amounts representing interest on discounting were exempt, and actual bank expenses recovered from clients were not includible in taxable value for the relevant period.

Conclusion: The Bank Charges were not established as taxable consideration; the confirmed service-tax demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty under Section 78 were sustainable.

Analysis: The relevant entries were recorded in the books and ledgers, had been examined in departmental and CERA audit, and the same accounting practice had previously been accepted in adjudication. No deliberate suppression, wilful misstatement or concealment with intent to evade tax was established. The dispute concerned the interpretative taxability of the receipts, and the entire confirmed demand fell beyond the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, the demand was time-barred, and the penalty under Section 78 could not survive, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed levy, consequential interest and penalty lack legal basis because taxability was not proved and the extended limitation period was inapplicable.

Ratio Decidendi: A ledger description does not by itself establish service-tax liability; where the Department fails to prove that receipts are consideration for taxable service and prior disclosures negate suppression, the extended limitation period and suppression-based penalty cannot be invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether type-testing charges recovered from the buyer for ACSR conductors form part of the assessable value for central excise duty; (ii) Whether the equal penalty imposed for non-inclusion of such charges requires modification.

Issue (i): Whether type-testing charges recovered from the buyer for ACSR conductors form part of the assessable value for central excise duty.

Analysis: Type tests prescribed under IS 398 (Part II) were found necessary to ensure the quality and safety of ACSR conductors used in electricity transmission. The testing was mandatory rather than optional, and the sale could not occur without the requisite test certificate or report. The separately recovered charges therefore had a direct connection with the sale and formed part of transaction value. The plea of revenue neutrality was not accepted because excise liability and Cenvat credit entitlement arise under distinct provisions, with credit remaining subject to prescribed conditions.

Conclusion: Type-testing charges are includible in the assessable value of the conductors; the duty demand and consequential interest are sustainable against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the equal penalty imposed for non-inclusion of such charges requires modification.

Analysis: Earlier show-cause notices on the same issue showed that the dispute was not new to the assessee. Nevertheless, a lenient view was taken on the quantum of penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Rule 25 is reduced to Rs. 35,000, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The valuation demand remains unaffected, while relief is confined to restriction of the monetary penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered for testing that is mandatory and indispensable to the sale of goods form part of transaction value, notwithstanding that they are separately charged or that credit may potentially be available to the buyer.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee's entitlement to deduction as a developer of infrastructure facilities under Section 80-IA(4) gave rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260-A; and (ii) Whether the Tribunal's reliance on its earlier confirmed order gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee's entitlement to deduction as a developer of infrastructure facilities under Section 80-IA(4) gave rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260-A.

Analysis: Admission under Section 260-A is confined to a substantial question of law and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a different factual view. The concurrent findings that the assessee qualified as a developer of an infrastructure facility were based on the material on record. No perversity, absence of evidence, or application of an erroneous legal test was established.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose on the assessee's eligibility for deduction under Section 80-IA(4); this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal's reliance on its earlier confirmed order gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: The earlier order relied upon had been confirmed, and it involved the same assessee and identical findings on the same subject matter. Reliance on that order did not disclose any infirmity warranting appellate intervention.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from reliance on the earlier confirmed order; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent determination supporting the assessee's deduction remained undisturbed within the limited appellate jurisdiction under Section 260-A.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent factual findings cannot be reopened under Section 260-A absent perversity, lack of evidence, or erroneous application of law, and reliance on an earlier confirmed decision involving identical findings does not by itself raise a substantial question of law.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order was valid where it did not conform to binding directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel concerning exclusion of comparable companies.

Analysis: Section 144C(10) and Section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 make the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions binding upon the Assessing Officer and require completion of the assessment in conformity with those directions. The Dispute Resolution Panel had directed exclusion of specified comparable companies, but the final assessment order incorrectly recorded that all objections had been rejected and retained the transfer-pricing adjustment without giving effect to those directions.

Conclusion: The final assessment order, having been made in disregard of binding Dispute Resolution Panel directions, was invalid and was quashed.

Issues: Whether penalty for failure to furnish Form No. 3CEB could be imposed under Section 271BA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after clause (i) of Section 92BA of that Act had been omitted.

Analysis: The specified domestic-transaction requirement under Section 92BA(i), which formed the basis for the obligation to furnish Form No. 3CEB under Section 92E, stood omitted before the penalty notice and penalty order were issued. An omitted statutory provision is treated as having ceased to operate; absent a saving clause, proceedings founded on that omitted provision cannot be initiated or continued. The penalty proceedings were therefore not sustainable merely because the transactions had occurred when the omitted clause was in force.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271BA was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether recovery of the outstanding income-tax demand should be stayed pending disposal of the appeal.

Analysis: No merits of the transfer-pricing additions were adjudicated. Interim protection was granted upon deposit of 20% of the demand after excluding the proportionate demand attributable to the amount claimed as already offered to tax for services rendered to the associated enterprise.

Outcome: Recovery of the balance demand was stayed for 180 days or until disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier, conditional upon the stipulated deposit within four weeks.

Issues: Whether a non-resident individual was an eligible assessee requiring issuance of a draft assessment order before a prejudicial final assessment order could be made.

Analysis: Following the amendment effective from 01.04.2020, Section 144C(15)(b) includes a non-resident other than a company within the meaning of an eligible assessee. Where a prejudicial variation is proposed against such assessee, Section 144C(1) mandates forwarding a draft assessment order, enabling the assessee to accept the variation or file objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel. The direct issuance of a final assessment order deprived the assessee of that statutory remedy; the omission was a jurisdictional defect rather than a procedural irregularity.

Conclusion: The non-resident individual was an eligible assessee, and the final assessment order issued without a prior draft assessment order was without jurisdiction and was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether an Indian-registered vehicle used as a private conveyance and departing under Section 43(1) required a Section 51 export-clearance order for re-import duty exemption; (ii) Whether the petitioner could be required to file an electronic Bill of Entry with an IEC or GSTIN where the portal made such filing impossible.

Issue (i): Whether an Indian-registered vehicle used as a private conveyance and departing under Section 43(1) required a Section 51 export-clearance order for re-import duty exemption.

Analysis: Section 43(1), within the regime for conveyances, exempts private conveyances carrying only passenger luggage from cargo-report and departure-clearance requirements. Section 51 applies to commercial export goods under a distinct regime. The vehicle lawfully departed as a personal conveyance, and its subsequent placement in a maritime container for safe transit did not convert it into commercial cargo. The applicable circular clarifies that reference to Section 51 in the re-import exemption notification cannot deny substantive exemption where that provision was legally inapplicable when the vehicle exited India.

Conclusion: A Section 51 export-clearance order was not required for the vehicle, and the re-import exemption could not be denied for its absence.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner could be required to file an electronic Bill of Entry with an IEC or GSTIN where the portal made such filing impossible.

Analysis: The electronic filing system required an IEC or GSTIN despite the vehicle being a personal Indian-registered asset, rather than a commercial import. The proviso to Section 46 permits presentation of the Bill of Entry in another manner. Requiring compliance with an electronic condition that cannot be fulfilled would offend the principle that law does not compel performance of an impossibility.

Conclusion: The Bill of Entry may be filed without an IEC or GSTIN; if electronic filing cannot be processed, physical papers must be accepted for manual filing and release of the vehicle on the required bond.

Final Conclusion: Re-entry of the Indian personal vehicle is governed by the private-conveyance regime rather than commercial-export formalities, and the statutory filing process must accommodate the substantive re-import entitlement.

Ratio Decidendi: A private Indian conveyance lawfully departing under Section 43(1) cannot be denied re-import exemption for want of a Section 51 export clearance, and impossible electronic filing requirements must yield to an available statutory alternative.

Issues: Whether the ex parte assessment for the tax period 2019-20 should be restored for a fresh response and adjudication.

Analysis: The assessment had been confirmed without a reply to the show-cause notice. The petitioner stated that specified tax amounts had been paid and undertook to deposit 50% of the outstanding IGST and cess.

Outcome: The matter was remitted for fresh determination upon compliance with the stipulated deposit and reply requirements.

Issues: Whether an opportunity of personal hearing is mandatory before an adverse order is passed under Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, irrespective of a request for hearing or filing of a reply to the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 75(4) contains two independent contingencies separated by the word "or": a hearing must be granted when sought by the person chargeable with tax or penalty, and it must also be granted where the proper officer proposes to pass an adverse order. The latter obligation applies independently of whether the taxable person sought a hearing or filed a reply.

Conclusion: An effective opportunity of personal hearing is mandatory before passing an adverse order under Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether a faceless assessment and consequential demand and penalty proceedings could stand where, despite a specific request, no personal hearing was afforded and the final show-cause notice allowed less than the response period prescribed by the applicable SOP.

Analysis: Section 144B(6)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a personal hearing where it is specifically requested by the assessee. Paragraph N.1.3 of the SOP requires a minimum seven-day response period to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice, subject to justified curtailment for limitation. The requested hearing was not granted, and the curtailed response time was not supported by any reason. These defects constituted a breach of natural justice warranting judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The assessment order, demand notice, penalty show-cause notice, and consequential penalty order were invalid and set aside.

Issues: Whether interim protection was warranted against recovery of the refund withheld under Section 245(2) pending adjudication of the writ petition.

Analysis: The refund had already been credited to the petitioner's bank account, while the Department sought direct recovery from the bank on the basis of the Assessing Officer's satisfaction. To balance the equities, the existing fixed deposit was directed to remain intact pending further orders.

Outcome: Amendment to the writ petition was permitted, interim protection against recovery of the refund was granted, and the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, SIIB, was a proper officer competent to issue the show-cause notice under the Customs Act; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked at the show-cause-notice stage to determine the effect of the accepted CBI closure report and the factual allegations in the notice.

Issue (i): Whether the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, SIIB, was a proper officer competent to issue the show-cause notice under the Customs Act.

Analysis: Sections 2(34), 28 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 govern the identification and competence of the proper officer for issuance of a show-cause notice. The binding Supreme Court position has settled that the concerned SIIB officer was competent to issue such notice.

Conclusion: The Assistant Commissioner, SIIB, was a proper officer competent to issue the show-cause notice; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked at the show-cause-notice stage to determine the effect of the accepted CBI closure report and the factual allegations in the notice.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ordinarily not exercised where an effective statutory process is available, except in recognised exceptional situations. The impact of the closure report upon the notice and the allegations concerning exports, valuation, DEPB credit and transactions require factual determination and evidence before the adjudicating authority. After the jurisdictional challenge failed, no exception justifying writ intervention remained.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked at this stage to adjudicate the evidence-based disputes arising from the show-cause notice; decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The settled proper-officer position and the unresolved factual controversies must be addressed through the statutory adjudicatory process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the competence of the proper officer is settled and the challenge to a show-cause notice depends on disputed facts requiring evidence, pre-adjudication relief under Article 226 is unavailable.

Issues: Whether a demand for tax, interest and penalty exceeding the amount specified in the show-cause notice is valid under Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) restricts the amount of tax, interest and penalty in the determination order to the amount specified in the notice and prohibits confirmation on grounds outside the notice. The notice specified a substantially lower aggregate amount than the amount determined in the impugned order.

Conclusion: The demand exceeding the amount specified in the show-cause notice violated Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether a bank's Government securities held to maturity constitute stock-in-trade; (ii) Whether the loss on revaluation of such securities is allowable; and (iii) Whether bad debts relating to non-rural advances are fully deductible without adjustment against the provision for bad and doubtful debts.

Issue (i): Whether a bank's Government securities held to maturity constitute stock-in-trade.

Analysis: Government securities held by a bank constitute stock-in-trade notwithstanding that they are held to maturity.

Conclusion: Answered in favour of the assessee: the Government securities constitute stock-in-trade.

Issue (ii): Whether the loss on revaluation of such securities is allowable.

Analysis: Once the securities are stock-in-trade, their valuation must be made at cost or market value, whichever is lower. The resultant diminution on revaluation is therefore allowable.

Conclusion: Answered in favour of the assessee: the revaluation loss is allowable.

Issue (iii): Whether bad debts relating to non-rural advances are fully deductible without adjustment against the provision for bad and doubtful debts.

Analysis: The deduction for actual bad-debt write-offs is distinct from the deduction for provisions concerning rural advances. The proviso limiting write-off deductions operates only to prevent double deduction in respect of rural advances and does not restrict deductions for bad debts arising from non-rural advances.

Conclusion: Answered in favour of the assessee: bad debts relating to non-rural advances are fully deductible without being set off against the provision for bad and doubtful debts.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to treat its Government securities as stock-in-trade, claim the consequential revaluation loss, and obtain deduction for bad debts from non-rural advances independently of the rural-advance provision.

Outcome: The tax case appeals were disposed of without answering the substantial questions of law, with liberty to revive the appeals if necessary.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated on the basis of an alleged share transaction incorrectly mapped to the assessee's PAN were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The reassessment order under Section 148A(3) and consequential notice under Section 148 rested wholly on information alleging sale of shares by the assessee. The Revenue subsequently admitted that the information had been inadvertently mapped to the assessee's PAN and actually related to another person. The action had been initiated without verification of the assessee's particulars merely because the limitation period was about to expire. Such exercise, founded on admittedly incorrect information relating to a different person, lacked a valid factual basis and amounted to a colourable exercise of power.

Conclusion: The reassessment action against the assessee was held wholly unsustainable in law.

Issues: (i) Whether the second appeals were barred by limitation where the first appellate orders were received on 31.03.2025 and prior service did not comply with the prescribed statutory mode; (ii) Whether the first appeals filed on the next working day after the limitation period expired on a Sunday were maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the second appeals were barred by limitation where the first appellate orders were received on 31.03.2025 and prior service did not comply with the prescribed statutory mode.

Analysis: Section 37C of the Customs Act requires service through registered post or speed post with acknowledgement due. A Document Identification Number merely authenticates the appellate order and does not establish its electronic upload or service. The material did not establish service in the prescribed manner before 31.03.2025; the information regarding dispatch by speed post did not show that acknowledgement due had been sought. Limitation for the second appeals consequently ran from actual receipt on 31.03.2025, making the filing on 03.06.2025 timely.

Conclusion: The second appeals were within limitation, and the dismissal by the appellate tribunal as time-barred was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the first appeals filed on the next working day after the limitation period expired on a Sunday were maintainable.

Analysis: Where the final day for filing fell on a Sunday, Section 4 of the Limitation Act permitted institution on the immediately succeeding working day. The first appeals filed on 30.05.2022 were therefore within time.

Conclusion: The first appeals were maintainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demands have not been adjudicated on merits and require determination at the first appellate stage in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes a particular mode of service, limitation for challenging an appellate order commences only upon service effected in accordance with that mode; a Document Identification Number alone does not establish service.

Issues: Whether land classified as agricultural in revenue records and used for agricultural purposes is excluded from wealth-tax assets under the retrospectively amended definition.

Analysis: Explanation 1(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 with retrospective effect from 01.04.1993, extends the exclusion to land classified in revenue records as agricultural land and actually used for agricultural purposes. The agricultural use of the subject land was undisputed, and the relevant assessment year fell within the retrospective operation of the amendment. The earlier basis for denial, namely that construction was not legally impermissible on the land, did not govern the amended definition.

Conclusion: Agricultural land so classified in revenue records and used for agricultural purposes is excluded from the definition of taxable assets for wealth-tax purposes.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2017-18, initiated more than three years after the end of that year, were valid where approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under Section 151(ii).

Analysis: Section 151 prescribes the specified authority according to the elapsed period from the end of the relevant assessment year. Where more than three years have elapsed, approval must be granted by the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner, or Director General, as applicable. The approval dated 28 July 2022 and the consequential notice dated 29 July 2022 were issued after expiry of three years from the end of Assessment Year 2017-18, but approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner, who was not the competent authority for that period.

Conclusion: The approval was obtained from an incorrect specified authority; consequently, the order under Section 148A(d), the notice under Section 148, and consequential proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.