Speedy trial and closure of prosecution evidence upheld after repeated opportunities; cost direction to accused set aside

Costs imposed on the prosecuting agency in criminal proceedings could not be directed to be paid to the accused in the absence of a specific legal basis; the amount was instead required to be deposited with the legal services committee. Closure of the prosecution evidence was upheld because sufficient opportunities, including a final opportunity, had already been granted, and the accused's Article 21 right to a speedy trial justified refusing further delay. The allowance of an application under Section 311 did not relieve the prosecuting agency of its duty to produce witnesses. The challenge failed on the evidence issue and succeeded only on the limited question of costs.

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Issues: (i) Whether the order directing the prosecuting agency to pay costs to the accused persons could be sustained. (ii) Whether the closure of the prosecution evidence after grant of opportunities and an order under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 called for interference.

Issue (i): Whether the order directing the prosecuting agency to pay costs to the accused persons could be sustained.

Analysis: The order imposing costs arose in criminal proceedings, and there was no specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for directing such costs, when imposed on the prosecuting agency, to be paid to the accused persons. The parties did not dispute that the amount could instead be deposited with the legal services authority. In that situation, the direction to pay costs to the accused persons was treated as improper.

Conclusion: The direction to pay costs to the accused persons was set aside, and the amount was directed to be deposited with the legal services committee. This issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the closure of the prosecution evidence after grant of opportunities and an order under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 called for interference.

Analysis: The accused have a fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the complaint had remained pending for an inordinate period without completion of the prosecution evidence. Sufficient opportunities had been granted, including a final opportunity, and the fact that an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had been allowed did not absolve the prosecuting agency of its responsibility to produce the witnesses. The long delay, together with the belated challenge, supported the trial court's exercise of discretion in closing the evidence.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the closure of evidence. This issue was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded only on the limited question of costs, while the closure of the prosecution evidence was upheld, leaving the impugned orders substantially intact.

Ratio Decidendi: In criminal proceedings, a prosecuting agency cannot insist on indefinite opportunities to lead evidence, and the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 justifies closure of evidence when sufficient chances have been granted; a cost direction that lacks a proper legal basis cannot be made payable to the accused persons.

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