Limitation Act Section 5 applied to municipal compensation proceedings, and delay was condoned on a liberal sufficient-cause standard.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to an application under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act because the special statute fixed a different limitation period but did not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24, and the Chief Judge acted as a court rather than a persona designate. Delay was condoned because the explanation covered the entire period and showed bona fide pursuit of compensation, continued steps by the claimant, and no negligence or lack of good faith. The compensation claim was therefore to be heard on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to an application under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act; (ii) Whether sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay in filing the application.

Issue (i): Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to an application under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.

Analysis: Section 504 prescribed a period of limitation different from the Schedule to the Limitation Act, and there was no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court was appointed as the presiding judicial officer of an existing court and not as a persona designate. The statutory scheme also provided an appeal against his decision, showing that the authority functioned as a court and not as an individual statutory persona.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.

Issue (ii): Whether sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay in filing the application.

Analysis: The delay was explained by the claimant's bona fide pursuit of compensation, the Corporation's failure to respond for a long period, the related dispute over adjustment of property tax arrears, and the filing of a civil injunction suit in the meantime. The explanation covered the whole period of delay and disclosed continuous steps taken by the claimant. The expression "sufficient cause" was to be construed liberally where there was no negligence, inaction, or want of bona fides.

Conclusion: Sufficient cause was established and the delay ought to have been condoned.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court held that the delay should be condoned and the compensation claim should be heard on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a limitation period without expressly excluding Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and the statutory authority acts as a court rather than a persona designate, delay may be condoned on proof of sufficient cause to be construed liberally in the interests of substantial justice.

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