Doctrine of necessity and real danger of bias upheld for a society's disciplinary tribunal

A domestic disciplinary tribunal of a society may remain validly constituted where a required office-bearer recuses himself, if the governing rule is read flexibly and substitution is necessary to avoid a decision-making vacuum. The doctrine of necessity can support continuation of the committee in that situation. On bias, mere prior participation in institutional meetings does not by itself disqualify members of a domestic tribunal; disqualification arises only where there is a real danger of bias, not a bare apprehension or institutional association. The challenge to the committee's constitution and the plea of bias were rejected, and the disciplinary process was upheld.

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Issues: (i) whether the Disciplinary Committee was validly constituted when the President recused himself and another member was substituted; (ii) whether the members of the Disciplinary Committee were disqualified on the ground of institutional bias or apprehended bias.

Issue (i): Whether the Disciplinary Committee was validly constituted when the President recused himself and another member was substituted.

Analysis: The rule required a three-member Disciplinary Committee and contemplated the President as one of its members. The wording was treated as flexible enough to meet a situation where the President was unavailable because of a justified recusal. A society cannot be left without a disciplinary mechanism merely because the delinquent objects to the President. The rule was read as enabling substitution in the exigency created by recusal, and the doctrine of necessity was applied to prevent a vacuum in decision-making.

Conclusion: The Committee was held to be validly constituted, and the challenge to its composition failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the members of the Disciplinary Committee were disqualified on the ground of institutional bias or apprehended bias.

Analysis: The governing test was not a mere apprehension of bias, but a real danger of bias. Participation of the members in prior institutional meetings did not, by itself, disqualify them from serving on a domestic tribunal of the society. The objection was based on institutional participation rather than personal malice, and no material showed that a fair hearing or unbiased decision could not be expected. Extending the plea of bias on these facts would make ordinary internal disciplinary processes unworkable.

Conclusion: The plea of bias was rejected, and no disqualification of the Committee members was found.

Final Conclusion: The Court upheld the constitution and continuation of the disciplinary process and found no ground to interfere with the impugned orders.

Ratio Decidendi: In the context of a domestic disciplinary tribunal of a society, a rule requiring a particular office-bearer on the committee may be flexibly applied where recusal creates necessity, and disqualification on bias arises only when a real danger of bias is shown, not from mere institutional participation or apprehension.

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