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Issues: (i) Whether the Chief Election Commissioner was disqualified from participating in the decision on the disqualification reference on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias. (ii) Whether, after the Election Commission became a multi-member body, the doctrine of necessity required the Chief Election Commissioner to participate in the decision-making if the other Election Commissioners did not reach a unanimous opinion.
Issue (i): Whether the Chief Election Commissioner was disqualified from participating in the decision on the disqualification reference on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias.
Analysis: The opinion of the Election Commission under Article 192(2) is mandatory and decisive for the Governor's final decision, but the function remains subject to the requirements of fairness where the process is quasi-judicial in character. On the facts found by the courts below, the close association between the Chief Election Commissioner and the complainant, together with the surrounding circumstances, was sufficient to create a real and reasonable apprehension that the affected party would not receive an impartial hearing. In such a situation, the appearance of fairness had to be preserved and the participation of the person against whom bias was reasonably apprehended could not be treated as unobjectionable.
Conclusion: The Chief Election Commissioner was not fit to participate in the decision-making as long as the apprehension of bias remained operative; the finding of reasonable apprehension of bias was upheld.
Issue (ii): Whether, after the Election Commission became a multi-member body, the doctrine of necessity required the Chief Election Commissioner to participate in the decision-making if the other Election Commissioners did not reach a unanimous opinion.
Analysis: The constitutional scheme under Article 324 does not require that every decision of the Election Commission be taken by all its members acting together. The statutory framework also permits the business of the Commission to be regulated and, where necessary, decided by majority. Accordingly, if the two Election Commissioners can reach a unanimous opinion, the Chief Election Commissioner need not participate. If they cannot agree and a stalemate arises, the doctrine of necessity may operate to prevent frustration of the constitutional process and to enable a communicable majority opinion.
Conclusion: The Chief Election Commissioner need not participate if the other Election Commissioners reach a unanimous opinion, but if they disagree, the doctrine of necessity may require his participation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was substantially rejected on the bias issue, but the procedure to be followed by the Election Commission was modified so that recusal would operate unless a deadlock made participation necessary.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the decision-making body is capable of functioning through its other members, a member against whom a real and reasonable apprehension of bias exists should ordinarily recuse himself, but the doctrine of necessity will justify participation only to prevent a stalemate and preserve the decision-making process.