Bail and speedy-trial claims fail where grave allegations and trial progress justify continued custody despite delay.

Prolonged custody and delay in trial did not by themselves create a vested right to bail where the offence alleged was grave and serious, and the progress of the trial and adjournments were relevant to the Article 21 speedy-trial claim. The Court also held that the proviso to Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not confer an absolute right to bail on a woman; the nature and gravity of the offence, the manner of its alleged commission, and broader public justice considerations remained material. Bail was therefore refused.

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Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of prolonged custody, alleged delay in trial, and the benefit of the proviso to Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that she was a woman.

Analysis: The claim of breach of the right to speedy trial under Article 21 was examined against the facts of the case, including the progress already made in the trial and the extent to which adjournments had been taken. The Court held that the mere fact that the trial had not concluded within the period earlier indicated did not by itself create a vested right to bail. Reliance on the length of incarceration alone was found insufficient where the offence alleged was grave and serious.

The plea based on the petitioner being a woman was also rejected. The Court held that the proviso to Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not create an absolute or unconditional right to bail. The nature and gravity of the offence, the manner in which it was alleged to have been committed, and the broader considerations of public justice remained relevant in deciding whether bail should be granted.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to bail on the grounds urged, and the application was dismissed.

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