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Issues: (i) Whether the election petition presented after the last day of limitation but on the next working day after the court was closed was within time under section 81(1) read with section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; (ii) Whether the omission to supply copies of video cassettes or transcripts amounted to non-compliance with section 81(3) or rendered the petition defective under section 83(1) so as to attract section 86(1); (iii) Whether the pleadings disclosed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) or section 123(3A) sufficient to invalidate the election under section 100(1)(b); and (iv) Whether the absence of notice under section 99 before recording findings against persons other than the returned candidate vitiated the order.
Issue (i): Whether the election petition presented after the last day of limitation but on the next working day after the court was closed was within time under section 81(1) read with section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Analysis: The limitation under section 81(1) is computed up to the last day available to the petitioner. Since the court and its office were closed on the last day and on the following day, the question was whether section 10 of the General Clauses Act applied to permit presentation on the next day the court opened. The statutory context did not exclude that general rule of computation. To deny the benefit of section 10 would compel performance of an impossible act where filing on the last day was not possible because the court was closed.
Conclusion: The petition was within limitation and there was no non-compliance with section 81(1).
Issue (ii): Whether the omission to supply copies of video cassettes or transcripts amounted to non-compliance with section 81(3) or rendered the petition defective under section 83(1) so as to attract section 86(1).
Analysis: Section 81(3) requires a true copy of the election petition as presented in court to accompany service on each respondent. A distinction exists between a document that is incorporated by reference and becomes an integral part of the petition, and a document that is merely relied on as evidence of pleaded facts. Only in the former case does failure to supply the document with the copy of the petition constitute a fatal defect under section 81(3). Here, the video cassettes were not filed with the petition as presented, and the served copy was identical to the petition actually filed. Any deficiency in the fullness of pleading, if at all, fell within section 83(1) and not section 81(3), and section 86(1) could not be invoked on that footing.
Conclusion: There was no non-compliance with section 81(3), and the petition was not liable to dismissal under section 86(1) on that ground.
Issue (iii): Whether the pleadings disclosed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) or section 123(3A) sufficient to invalidate the election under section 100(1)(b).
Analysis: A corrupt practice under section 100(1)(b) requires clear pleading and proof of all constituent ingredients, including the candidate's or election agent's consent where the act is attributed to another person. General references to a political plank, speeches by other leaders, and alleged cassette material did not plead the necessary consent, nor did they plead the constituent facts with the required specificity. Those allegations could not be used to sustain invalidation under section 100(1)(b). The only surviving pleading was the candidate's own alleged statement that a first Hindu State would be established in Maharashtra. Even if proved, that statement was treated as an expression of a political hope and not as an appeal for votes on the ground of religion within section 123(3) or section 123(3A).
Conclusion: No corrupt practice was made out, and the election could not be declared void under section 100(1)(b).
Issue (iv): Whether the absence of notice under section 99 before recording findings against persons other than the returned candidate vitiated the order.
Analysis: Sections 98 and 99 require that all findings on corrupt practice and the naming of persons proved guilty be made at the conclusion of the trial and not piecemeal. A person not already a party cannot be named without notice and opportunity to show cause. Since no notice was given before the final order, the statutory safeguard was not followed. The omission was fatal where findings were entered against others on allegations of corrupt practice.
Conclusion: The order was vitiated by non-compliance with section 99.
Final Conclusion: The election petition could not stand on limitation, pleadings, proof, or procedure. The declaration voiding the election was set aside and the appellant's election was restored.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an election petition is filed on the next working day after the court closes on the last day of limitation, section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies unless excluded by context; a corrupt practice under section 100(1)(b) must be pleaded and proved with all constituent ingredients, including consent where required; and findings against persons other than the returned candidate cannot be recorded without compliance with section 99 at the conclusion of the trial.