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Issues: (i) Whether possession delivered under the agreement amounted to transfer within the meaning of Chapter XX-C before filing Form No. 37-I, so as to attract the statutory bar under section 269UC; (ii) Whether, on the facts, the appropriate authority was bound to act on Form No. 37-I and issue a no objection certificate under section 269UL(3); (iii) Whether the communication dated May 30, 1991 and the show-cause notice dated June 3, 1991 suffered from lack of authority or violation of natural justice.
Issue (i): Whether possession delivered under the agreement amounted to transfer within the meaning of Chapter XX-C before filing Form No. 37-I, so as to attract the statutory bar under section 269UC.
Analysis: The statutory scheme under section 269UA(f) treats as transfer not only sale, exchange or long lease, but also allowing possession to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract of the nature referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The agreement itself contemplated that the petitioner would use, occupy, hold and enjoy the specified portion, and the petitioner's own case was that possession of that portion was taken on March 7, 1991, before the statement in Form No. 37-I was filed. On those admitted facts, the transaction had already crossed the stage of mere intention to transfer and had resulted in transfer of part of the property for the purposes of Chapter XX-C.
Conclusion: The transaction constituted a transfer before filing Form No. 37-I, and the statutory prohibition in section 269UC was attracted against the petitioner.
Issue (ii): Whether, on the facts, the appropriate authority was bound to act on Form No. 37-I and issue a no objection certificate under section 269UL(3).
Analysis: Form No. 37-I under rule 48L is intended for a statement of intended transfer. Where the parties have already effected transfer in violation of section 269UC, the statement does not present a lawful basis for the exercise of the power of pre-emptive purchase under section 269UD(1). In that situation, the statutory machinery for granting a no objection certificate is not attracted, because a party cannot rely on its own breach to compel the authority to ignore the violation and issue clearance. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the only alternatives were purchase or issue of a no objection certificate.
Conclusion: The appropriate authority was not bound to issue a no objection certificate and was justified in declining to act on the invalid statement.
Issue (iii): Whether the communication dated May 30, 1991 and the show-cause notice dated June 3, 1991 suffered from lack of authority or violation of natural justice.
Analysis: The Deputy Commissioner acted as an appropriate authority within the meaning of sections 269UA(c) and 269UB, and no material showed want of competence. The objection based on natural justice was also rejected because no pre-emptive purchase order had been passed against the petitioner; the communication merely informed the petitioner that the statement could not be acted upon, and the show-cause notice was issued for alleged non-compliance with section 269UC. The cited authority on hearing requirements in pre-emptive purchase cases was held inapplicable on these facts.
Conclusion: The impugned communication and show-cause notice were valid and did not violate natural justice.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed on merits because the petitioner had already effected transfer before compliance with the statutory filing requirement, and the impugned departmental action was upheld as lawful.
Ratio Decidendi: For the purposes of Chapter XX-C, a transfer is complete when possession is delivered in part performance of the contract before filing Form No. 37-I, and in such a case the authority is not obliged to issue a no objection certificate merely because no pre-emptive purchase order has been passed.
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