Article 14 and severability: residential-only eviction restriction under rent control law was held unconstitutional in part.

A statutory classification under the Delhi Rent Control Act that confined bona fide requirement eviction to residential premises was found to lack a continuing rational nexus with the object of the law under Article 14, because the historical basis for the distinction had disappeared with changed conditions. The restriction was therefore treated as unconstitutional insofar as it excluded non-residential premises. The objectionable words were then severed, since the remaining text could operate independently and still preserve a complete ground of eviction based on bona fide requirement and absence of reasonably suitable accommodation.

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Issues: (i) Whether the restriction in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 confining bona fide requirement eviction to premises let for residential purposes only was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) could be severed while leaving the balance of the provision intact.

Issue (i): Whether the restriction in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 confining bona fide requirement eviction to premises let for residential purposes only was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The classification between residential and non-residential premises was examined in the light of the doctrine of reasonable classification under Article 14. The Court noted that although the Act generally treated premises uniformly, Section 14(1)(e) created a distinction that was originally justified by historical conditions. It further held that the rationale supporting the distinction had ceased to exist with the passage of time and the changed housing and tenancy scenario, while the legislative pattern in later enactments had moved away from such a distinction. The Court therefore found the differential treatment to be arbitrary and lacking a continuing rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

Conclusion: The restriction was held unconstitutional insofar as it confined bona fide requirement eviction to residential premises and excluded non-residential premises.

Issue (ii): Whether the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) could be severed while leaving the balance of the provision intact.

Analysis: The Court applied the principle that an offending part of a statute may be severed if the remaining part can operate independently without doing violence to the legislative scheme. It held that the objectionable words could be removed without affecting the workable core of the provision, and that the explanatory portion tied to the struck-down discrimination also became unnecessary. The remaining text continued to express a complete ground for eviction based on bona fide requirement and lack of reasonably suitable accommodation.

Conclusion: The discriminatory words were severed and the remainder of Section 14(1)(e) was sustained in modified form.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the writ petitions were allowed, the impugned provision was partly struck down, and the eviction ground was retained in a narrowed form applicable without the residential/non-residential distinction.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory classification that once had a rational basis may become unconstitutional if, by lapse of time and changed conditions, its foundation disappears and the distinction no longer bears a real nexus to the object of the law; in such a case, the offending portion may be severed if the residue can stand on its own.

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