Statutory commencement by notification: courts cannot compel enforcement, and general assent-based commencement rules do not apply.

Where a statute expressly leaves commencement to notification by the Central Government, courts cannot compel notification by mandamus when Parliament has vested that timing in executive discretion without objective standards. The Court also held that section 5 of the General Clauses Act did not apply because the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 was not framed to commence on assent but on a date appointed by notification. Accordingly, the Act could not be treated as having come into force on presidential assent, and the challenge to its non-commencement failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to direct the Central Government to notify the commencement of the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 under section 1(3). (ii) Whether section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to treat the Act as having come into force on presidential assent.

Issue (i): Whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to direct the Central Government to notify the commencement of the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 under section 1(3).

Analysis: The power to appoint the commencement date had been expressly vested by Parliament in the Central Government. The Court held that where the legislature leaves the time of enforcement to executive discretion without prescribing objective standards, the Court cannot compel the Government to bring the statute into force. The Government had considered representations, constituted committees, and was pursuing amendments before notification; on those facts, it could not be said that the executive was ignoring Parliament's will.

Conclusion: No mandamus could be issued to compel notification of commencement under section 1(3).

Issue (ii): Whether section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to treat the Act as having come into force on presidential assent.

Analysis: Section 5 applies only where a Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day. The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 specifically provided that it would commence on a date appointed by notification of the Central Government. That express delegation displaced section 5, and the Act could not be deemed to have commenced merely on receiving presidential assent.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 had no application.

Final Conclusion: The challenge failed because the Court declined to compel commencement of the Act and rejected the plea that the Act had already commenced by operation of the General Clauses Act.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute expressly leaves commencement to a notification by the executive, courts cannot substitute their own judgment by issuing mandamus to enforce commencement, and the general rule of commencement on assent under the General Clauses Act does not apply.

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