Special trial procedure in disturbed areas ends with the notification; continuing it later can vitiate the trial.
A territorial classification for trial of specified offences in dangerously disturbed areas was upheld under Article 14 because it rested on intelligible differentia and had a rational nexus with public safety, public order, and speedy trial. Once the notification declaring the area dangerously disturbed ceased to operate, the special summons procedure could not lawfully continue for pending cases; the ordinary warrant procedure then applied, and continuation under the summons procedure was beyond delegated power and prejudicial to the accused. The resulting procedural defect vitiated the trial, leading to setting aside of the convictions and sentences and direction for a de novo trial in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether the provision requiring specified offences in dangerously disturbed areas to be tried by summons procedure was unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether, after the relevant notification ceased to operate, the trial could validly continue under the summons procedure instead of the warrant procedure. (iii) Whether the conviction and sentence could stand or a retrial was required.
Issue (i): Whether the provision requiring specified offences in dangerously disturbed areas to be tried by summons procedure was unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The impugned provision created a territorial classification between dangerously disturbed areas and other areas. A classification under Article 14 is valid if it rests on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The object of the enactment was public safety and maintenance of public order, and speedy trial of specified offences in disturbed areas had a direct nexus with that object. The procedure prescribed for summons cases was simpler and speedier, and the legislative choice to treat disturbed areas differently was not arbitrary.
Conclusion: The challenge under Article 14 failed and the provision was held valid.
Issue (ii): Whether, after the relevant notification ceased to operate, the trial could validly continue under the summons procedure instead of the warrant procedure.
Analysis: Once the area ceased to be validly notified as dangerously disturbed, the special summons procedure under the Act could no longer apply. The later notifications attempting to preserve the summons procedure for pending cases were beyond the delegated power conferred by the statute, because the authority could declare an area disturbed or not disturbed, but could not split the same area by reference to past or pending cases. After the special notification lapsed, the ordinary warrant procedure became applicable at the stage then reached, and the accused was entitled to the procedural safeguards attached to that procedure. The continuation under the summons procedure deprived him of a valuable opportunity of cross-examination and caused prejudice.
Conclusion: The continuation of the trial under the summons procedure after the area ceased to be disturbed was invalid.
Issue (iii): Whether the conviction and sentence could stand or a retrial was required.
Analysis: The procedural defect vitiated the trial and rendered the resulting orders unsustainable. At the same time, the charges were serious and the interests of justice required that the accused be tried afresh according to law.
Conclusion: The convictions and sentences were set aside and a de novo trial was ordered.
Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded because the special procedure could not be continued after the notification ceased to operate, and the defective trial was annulled with directions for fresh proceedings in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A special procedure confined to a notified disturbed area cannot survive once the statutory basis for that notification ends, and continuation under that procedure thereafter vitiates the trial where prejudice is caused.