Limitation for court-martial does not bar service termination where proceedings are inexpedient or impracticable under Army rules.

Expiry of the limitation period for instituting court-martial proceedings does not, by itself, bar termination of service under Section 19 read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules. The statutory scheme permits such action where the competent authority, on the material before it, finds court-martial to be inexpedient or impracticable and further retention undesirable; "impracticable" is not confined to physical impossibility and remains subject to judicial review for mala fides, irrelevant considerations, or abuse of power. The Court preferred Major Dharam Pal Kukrety and declined to treat Major Radha Krishan as laying down the correct rule on this point.

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Issues: (i) Whether expiry of the limitation period for court-martial proceedings under the Army Act, 1950, ipso facto barred recourse to termination of service under Section 19 read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954. (ii) Whether the view taken in Major Radha Krishan that action under Rule 14(2) could not be taken once court-martial proceedings became time-barred was correct in the light of the earlier three-Judge decision in Major Dharam Pal Kukrety.

Issue (i): Whether expiry of the limitation period for court-martial proceedings under the Army Act, 1950, ipso facto barred recourse to termination of service under Section 19 read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954.

Analysis: Section 19 and Rule 14 form part of a composite scheme permitting termination of service where, on consideration of the reports of misconduct, the authority is satisfied that trial by court-martial is inexpedient or impracticable and that further retention is undesirable. The power under Section 19 is not made subject to any limitation period, and the expiry of the period prescribed for court-martial under Section 122 does not, by itself, extinguish the power to proceed under Section 19 read with Rule 14. The Court held that impracticability is not to be given a narrow meaning confined only to physical impossibility; the expression may cover situations where court-martial proceedings are rendered incapable of being usefully pursued, though the exercise of power remains open to judicial review for mala fides, abuse of power, or irrelevant considerations.

Conclusion: Expiry of limitation for court-martial does not automatically bar action under Section 19 read with Rule 14; the contention to the contrary was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the view taken in Major Radha Krishan that action under Rule 14(2) could not be taken once court-martial proceedings became time-barred was correct in the light of the earlier three-Judge decision in Major Dharam Pal Kukrety.

Analysis: Major Dharam Pal Kukrety had already recognised that recourse to Rule 14 could be available where a fresh court-martial would be inexpedient or impracticable, including after prior court-martial proceedings had not culminated in a final effective verdict. The Court held that Major Radha Krishan adopted too narrow a construction of impracticability and laid down a proposition too broad to be sustained insofar as it treated the expiry of limitation as an absolute bar. The later decision was confined to its own facts and could not override the earlier three-Judge ruling.

Conclusion: Major Radha Krishan was not accepted as laying down the correct law on the point; Major Dharam Pal Kukrety was preferred.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's judgments were set aside and the writ petitions were dismissed, leaving the authorities free to consider action under Section 19 read with Rule 14 in accordance with law and relevant circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi: Limitation for commencing court-martial proceedings does not, by itself, bar termination of service under Section 19 read with Rule 14, and the expression "inexpedient or impracticable" must be construed in light of the statutory scheme and surrounding circumstances rather than as a narrow synonym for absolute impossibility.

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