Court-martial limitation bars administrative termination where Rule 14 cannot override an expired trial period.

Section 122 of the Army Act prescribed an absolute limitation for commencing court-martial, and Rule 14(2) could not be used to bypass that statutory bar once trial had become time-barred. The power to terminate service on the ground that a court-martial was inexpedient or impracticable presupposed that a trial was still legally possible; it could not rest solely on the expiry of limitation. The requisite satisfaction under Rule 14(2) had to be formed from the officer's misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, not from an extraneous reliance on time-bar. On that basis, the termination order was held unsustainable and restoration of service was maintained.

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Issues: (i) Whether termination of service under Section 19 of the Army Act, 1950 read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954 could be invoked after the period of limitation for court-martial under Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 had expired; (ii) whether the satisfaction that a court-martial was inexpedient or impracticable had to arise solely from the officer's misconduct and attendant circumstances, and not from the fact that the trial had become time-barred.

Issue (i): Whether termination of service under Section 19 of the Army Act, 1950 read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954 could be invoked after the period of limitation for court-martial under Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 had expired.

Analysis: Section 122 laid down an absolute limitation for commencing a court-martial and contained no provision for extension of time. Rule 14(2) could be used only where a court-martial was still legally possible, because the concepts of "impracticable" and "inexpedient" presupposed the possibility of trial. Once the statutory period had expired, the trial became legally impermissible and the administrative power under Rule 14 could not be used to bypass that statutory bar.

Conclusion: The power under Rule 14(2) could not be exercised after expiry of the limitation period under Section 122, and the termination on that basis was invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the satisfaction that a court-martial was inexpedient or impracticable had to arise solely from the officer's misconduct and attendant circumstances, and not from the fact that the trial had become time-barred.

Analysis: Rule 14(2) required the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff to form satisfaction after considering the reports on the officer's misconduct. The relevant factors were therefore the nature of the misconduct and its surrounding circumstances. A satisfaction founded on an extraneous ground, such as expiry of limitation, was outside the rule. The rule could be attracted where the misconduct itself made trial impracticable or inexpedient, but not where the only reason was that prosecution had become barred by time.

Conclusion: The requisite satisfaction had to be based on the misconduct reports and related circumstances alone, and not on the expiry of limitation.

Final Conclusion: The termination order could not stand, and the writ petitioner's service restoration ordered by the learned Single Judge was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute prescribes an absolute limitation for court-martial, an administrative power to dispense with trial on grounds of inexpediency or impracticability cannot be used to defeat that statutory bar, and the requisite satisfaction must be formed only on the misconduct and its attending circumstances.

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