Court-martial trial commences when the General Court Martial assembles; absconding accused cannot invoke limitation to bar proceedings.

For Section 123(2) of the Army Act, a court-martial trial commences when the General Court Martial assembles and begins the preliminary steps of examining the charge, including scrutiny of legality, objections, and arraignment; it is not confined to the later stage of recording evidence after plea. On that construction, the limitation period did not bar the proceedings because the respondent had absconded from military custody and could not rely on his own wrong to defeat the statutory time bar. The High Court's order was set aside and the court-martial was allowed to proceed in accordance with law.

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Issues: Whether, for the purpose of Section 123(2) of the Army Act, 1950, the trial of a person who has ceased to be subject to the Act commences only upon arraignment and oath, or whether it commences when the General Court Martial assembles and begins examination of the charge; and whether the respondent could invoke the six-month limitation after having absconded from military custody.

Analysis: The statutory scheme and the Army Rules show that the constitution of the court-martial, scrutiny of legality, consideration of the charge, objections to the members or charge, and arraignment are all integral steps in the trial process. The word "trial" in Section 123(2) was construed in the context of the Act and Rules, and not in a narrow sense confined to recording evidence after plea. The Court held that the trial begins when the General Court Martial assembles to consider the charge and proceeds to take the preliminary steps necessary to try the accused. On the facts, the respondent had escaped from military custody and thereby prevented the court-martial from proceeding in an orderly manner. A person cannot take advantage of his own wrong to defeat the operation of a statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The trial had commenced within the meaning of Section 123(2) when the General Court Martial assembled on 25 February 1987, so the bar of limitation did not apply; the respondent could not rely on his own absence to defeat the prosecution.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's order was set aside and the challenge to the court-martial proceedings failed, leaving the military trial to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of Section 123(2) of the Army Act, 1950, a court-martial trial commences when the General Court Martial assembles and undertakes the first substantive steps of examining the charge, including preliminary matters necessary to proceed, and a person who frustrates that process by absconding cannot invoke the limitation period to bar the trial.

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