State transport permits and constitutional challenge: special scheme did not exclude general permitting power, and competition by the State was permitted.

Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 preserved the ordinary power to apply for stage carriage permits, even though Chapter IVA provided a special scheme for a State transport undertaking to obtain permits as of right under an approved scheme. The Court held that the special procedure did not impliedly exclude resort to the general permitting provision, because Section 42(3)(a) remained clear and unqualified and expressio unius could not override the text. The constitutional challenge also failed: State participation in transport business was permissible under Article 19(6), and no Article 14 violation was established merely because permits were granted to the State and refused to the petitioner.

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Issues: (i) Whether the State Government could apply for stage carriage permits under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, notwithstanding the special scheme contained in Chapter IVA; (ii) Whether the refusal of permits to the petitioner and grant of permits to the State infringed Articles 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether the State Government could apply for stage carriage permits under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, notwithstanding the special scheme contained in Chapter IVA.

Analysis: The scheme of the Act showed two distinct sets of provisions. Chapter IV regulated permits generally, and after the 1956 amendment Section 42(3)(a) required even Government-owned transport vehicles used for commercial purposes to obtain permits under Section 42(1). Chapter IVA created a special route for a State transport undertaking to obtain permits as of right only when it proceeded under an approved scheme. The existence of that special procedure did not cut down the ordinary power to seek permits under Chapter IV, because the statutory language in Section 42 remained plain and unqualified. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius could not override the clear text, and the principle that a statutory power must be exercised only in a prescribed manner had no application where the statute conferred alternative powers.

Conclusion: The State Government was entitled to apply for permits under Chapter IV, and the petitioner's challenge on that ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the refusal of permits to the petitioner and grant of permits to the State infringed Articles 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The claim under Article 19(1)(g) failed because the statute permitted the State to enter the field of transport business and compete with private operators. Article 19(6) expressly contemplated State participation in trade or business, including competition with citizens. The challenge under Article 14 also failed. The alleged preference under Section 47 did not establish discrimination, because any error in the permit decision was at most an error in a quasi-judicial determination and did not by itself amount to a constitutional violation. The Court also rejected the contention that the State's financial strength made competition unconstitutional.

Conclusion: No infringement of Articles 19(1)(g) or 14 was established, and the petitioner's constitutional challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The statutory and constitutional objections were rejected, and the petitioner was not entitled to the reliefs sought.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory text clearly preserves an ordinary permitting power, the existence of a special scheme for obtaining permits does not by implication exclude resort to the general provision; and State participation in business, including competition with private operators, is permissible where the Constitution and the statute so allow.

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