Education is not an industry under industrial law, so employees' wage claims under section 33C(2) failed.

The Industrial Disputes Act was interpreted as a whole, with emphasis on the link between "employer", "industry" and "workman" under sections 2(g), 2(j) and 2(s). The Supreme Court reasoned that the core activity of an educational institution is imparting education through teachers, and that teachers are excluded from the statutory definition of workman. On that basis, subordinate staff and incidental activities could not alter the character of the institution into trade, business, manufacture or a comparable industrial undertaking. The work of education carried on by the University of Delhi and its affiliated college was therefore not an industry, and applications under section 33C(2) were held to be incompetent.

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Issues: Whether the work of imparting education carried on by the University of Delhi and its affiliated college was an "industry" within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so that the employees could maintain applications under section 33C(2) of that Act.

Analysis: The defining scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was read as a whole, especially the relationship between "employer" in section 2(g), "industry" in section 2(j), and "workman" in section 2(s). The Court held that the main function of educational institutions is the imparting of education through teachers, but teachers are not "workmen" under section 2(s). Since the essential and predominant activity of an educational institution is carried on through teachers, the exclusion of teachers from the statutory definition of workman was treated as significant. The Court further held that the presence of subordinate staff and incidental activities could not change the character of the institution, because the principal activity remained education, not trade, business, manufacture, or a comparable industrial undertaking. The Court also distinguished earlier decisions on the footing that the question whether a purely educational institution is an industry had been left open there and had not been finally decided.

Conclusion: The work of education carried on by the University of Delhi and the Miranda House college was not an industry under section 2(j), and the applications under section 33C(2) were incompetent. The decision was in favour of the appellants.

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