Mere transmission of complaints in pending proceedings does not constitute contempt absent real interference with justice.

Forwarding an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in relation to a pending section 145 proceeding, when done in the ordinary course of official duty, did not amount to contempt because it showed no real or substantial interference with the administration of justice. The Supreme Court also treated the District Magistrate's transmission of the matter for report as a proper exercise of supervisory power under section 528, since calling for the court's remarks and declining to act after the allegations proved baseless was administratively regular. The contempt proceedings were therefore misconceived and the conviction could not stand.

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Issues: (i) Whether forwarding to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate applications containing allegations relating to a pending proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure amounted to contempt of court; (ii) whether a District Magistrate acting in the normal discharge of supervisory powers under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be found guilty of contempt for sending such a matter to the court concerned for report.

Issue (i): Whether forwarding to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate applications containing allegations relating to a pending proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure amounted to contempt of court.

Analysis: The transmission of the applications was made in the ordinary course of official duty and not as an attempt to influence the pending proceeding. The mere forwarding of a complaint or counter-complaint to the court seised of the matter, or asking for a report in the normal administrative channel, does not by itself have a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Contempt jurisdiction is attracted only where there is real prejudice amounting to a substantial interference with the due course of justice, not on a mere question of propriety.

Conclusion: The forwarding of the applications did not amount to contempt of court.

Issue (ii): Whether a District Magistrate acting in the normal discharge of supervisory powers under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be found guilty of contempt for sending such a matter to the court concerned for report.

Analysis: The District Magistrate was entitled to consider whether the pending case should be withdrawn if the allegations were substantiated, and it was usual to call for the remarks of the court concerned. Sending the application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for report, and thereafter declining to act when the allegations were found baseless, was a proper exercise of administrative authority. There was no legal requirement that only extracts could be transmitted, and no material was shown to justify a finding that the act prejudiced or obstructed the pending proceeding.

Conclusion: The District Magistrate was not guilty of contempt of court.

Final Conclusion: The contempt proceedings were misconceived, the conviction recorded by the High Court could not stand, and the appellants were exonerated.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere transmission of an application to the court seized of a pending matter, in the ordinary discharge of official or supervisory duties, does not constitute contempt unless it is shown to have a real and substantial tendency to interfere with the course of justice.

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