Contempt jurisdiction over tribunal interference: pressure on judicial decision-making and unverified accusations can amount to criminal contempt.

Article 129 gives the Supreme Court contempt jurisdiction beyond its own proceedings, extending to interference with the functioning of subordinate courts and tribunals such as the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Communications that question a judicial order, rely on unverified allegations, demand action against members, and convey administrative pressure may amount to criminal contempt because they interfere with judicial independence and the administration of justice. Administrative supervision does not permit control over judicial decision-making, and a tendered apology need not be accepted where the conduct directly undermines a judicial institution.

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Issues: (i) whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Article 129 to take cognizance of contempt concerning interference with the functioning of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal; (ii) whether the letters written by the Law Secretary constituted criminal contempt by interfering with the judicial independence and decision-making of the Tribunal.

Issue (i): whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Article 129 to take cognizance of contempt concerning interference with the functioning of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: Article 129 confers on the Supreme Court the powers of a court of record, including the power to punish for contempt. That power extends beyond contempt of the Supreme Court itself and includes contempt of courts and tribunals subordinate to it. The Tribunal performs judicial functions and is within the protective reach of the Court's contempt jurisdiction. The statutory scheme governing criminal contempt and suo motu cognizance also supports that jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to proceed against contempt affecting the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (ii): whether the letters written by the Law Secretary constituted criminal contempt by interfering with the judicial independence and decision-making of the Tribunal.

Analysis: Criminal contempt includes any act that scandalises a court, lowers its authority, or interferes with or obstructs the administration of justice. The letters questioned the Tribunal's judicial decision, alleged impropriety on the basis of an unverified complaint, demanded action against members, and carried a peremptory tone that was bound to be perceived as pressure on judicial functioning. Administrative supervision over the Tribunal did not extend to criticising or controlling judicial orders. The apology was not accepted because the conduct went beyond administrative oversight and directly undermined judicial independence.

Conclusion: The conduct amounted to criminal contempt and the respondent was held guilty.

Final Conclusion: Interference with the decisional independence of a judicial tribunal by a superior administrative officer, especially through unverified accusations and demands for action on a judicial order, attracts contempt jurisdiction and may be punished even if an apology is tendered.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 129 empowers the Supreme Court to punish contempt of subordinate courts and tribunals, and any communication that tends to interfere with judicial decision-making or undermine confidence in a judicial institution constitutes criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

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