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Issues: (i) Whether a person in prior possession, though without title, can maintain a suit for possession against a later trespasser after the period for a summary possessory action has expired, and whether the defendant can defeat the suit by pleading title in a third party. (ii) Whether the appellate court should permit amendment of the written statement to rely on a subsequent grant obtained during the pendency of the suit. (iii) The consequential effect on possession, mesne profits, and improvements.
Issue (i): Whether a person in prior possession, though without title, can maintain a suit for possession against a later trespasser after the period for a summary possessory action has expired, and whether the defendant can defeat the suit by pleading title in a third party.
Analysis: The summary remedy under Section 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act and the corresponding Travancore provision was treated as a special, time-limited remedy for dispossession otherwise than in due course of law. The Court held that expiry of that short period does not extinguish the ordinary civil remedy based on prior possession within the longer limitation period. Prior possession was treated as a substantive right good against all except the true owner. A defendant who is himself a trespasser cannot resist the claim by setting up the title of an unrelated third party. The Court approved the principle that possession will prevail against a later wrongdoer unless the defendant can show a better title in himself or lawful authority from the true owner.
Conclusion: The suit for possession based on prior possession was maintainable, and the defence of jus tertii was not available against the plaintiff.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellate court should permit amendment of the written statement to rely on a subsequent grant obtained during the pendency of the suit.
Analysis: The subsequent grant was a material event occurring after institution of the suit and could affect the parties' rights. The Court held that later events may be noticed where they shorten litigation and enable complete justice. Although the request for amendment was late, it did not introduce an entirely foreign controversy and the plaintiff would have an opportunity to meet the new plea. The Court also held that the grant could not be treated as retrospective from the date of the earlier grant.
Conclusion: The amendment was allowed insofar as it related to the later grant and the matter was remitted for trial on that basis.
Issue (iii): The consequential effect on possession, mesne profits, and improvements.
Analysis: The decree regarding one portion of the land was left undisturbed, while the other portion required reconsideration after amendment. The existing rate of mesne profits was not altered, but the ultimate liability for mesne profits and improvements on the amended plea was left open to be reconsidered by the trial court.
Conclusion: Relief was confirmed for one portion, while the controversy concerning the other portion was remanded for fresh decision.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part: the possessory decree was upheld for one portion of the land, but the defendant was allowed to amend its defence regarding the later grant, necessitating further trial on the remaining portion and connected consequential reliefs.
Ratio Decidendi: A prior possessor may recover possession from a later trespasser within the period of limitation without proving title, and the defendant cannot defeat such a claim by pleading the title of a third party; subsequent events materially affecting title may be allowed by amendment where they serve the ends of justice and avoid multiplicity of proceedings.