Temporary statute expiry and default bail: pending proceedings survived under a saving clause, and the Section 167(2) right ended after charge-sheet filing.

Expiry of a temporary statute does not abate pending prosecutions where the enactment contains an express saving clause preserving prior operations, liabilities, investigations and proceedings; those matters continue as if the Act had not expired. The right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be exercised during the subsisting period of default and before filing of the charge-sheet; once the challan is filed and cognizance is taken, that right does not survive. The challenge based on lapse of the special enactment therefore failed, and default bail was unavailable on the facts.

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Issues: (i) Whether the expiry of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 brought pending prosecutions and proceedings under the Act to an end. (ii) Whether the appellants could claim release on bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after the charge-sheet had been filed, when no bail application had been moved on the ground of default during the statutory period.

Issue (i): Whether the expiry of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 brought pending prosecutions and proceedings under the Act to an end.

Analysis: The Act was a temporary enactment, but its expiry did not automatically terminate pending investigations or prosecutions because Section 1(4) contained an express saving provision. That provision preserved prior operations, liabilities, penalties, investigations, and legal proceedings, and directed that they may be continued or enforced as if the Act had not expired. The effect of a temporary statute expiring was therefore controlled by the Act itself, and where the statute created a deeming fiction preserving pending matters, the proceedings remained alive notwithstanding expiry.

Conclusion: The expiry of the Act did not extinguish the pending proceedings against the appellants, and the prosecution could continue.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants could claim release on bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after the charge-sheet had been filed, when no bail application had been moved on the ground of default during the statutory period.

Analysis: The right to default bail under Section 167(2) read with the special detention provisions applied only until the charge-sheet was filed, and it had to be exercised by a timely application during the period of default. Once the challan was filed and cognizance was taken, the remand stood under other provisions of the Code, and the default-bail right did not survive. Since no application seeking default bail was made within the period when the right had accrued, the appellants could not invoke that right after filing of the charge-sheet.

Conclusion: The appellants were not entitled to bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Final Conclusion: The statutory challenge based on lapse of the special enactment failed, and the claim to default bail was unavailable on the facts, so the bail appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a temporary statute contains an express saving clause preserving pending investigations and proceedings, expiry of the statute does not abate them; and the right to default bail must be asserted within the subsisting period of default and before filing of the charge-sheet.

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