Default bail under Section 167(2) survives prior bail proceedings, and onerous monetary conditions cannot replace attendance-focused bail terms.

Section 167(2) creates an independent, indefeasible right to default bail once the statutory investigation period expires, and that entitlement is not extinguished by an earlier regular bail order under Section 439 or by withdrawal of an earlier challenge. A prior habeas corpus petition does not bar consideration of the default-bail claim, though the ordinary remedy against an adverse order under Section 167(2) is appeal. Bail conditions must be confined to securing the accused's presence at trial; onerous monetary deposits unrelated to attendance are impermissible. The accused was directed to be released on personal bond and sureties.

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Issues: (i) Whether an accused acquires an indefeasible right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on expiry of the statutory period even if a prior regular bail order under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not availed of; (ii) whether the pendency or rejection of a habeas corpus petition could defeat such right; and (iii) whether the conditions imposed for release on default bail could include a heavy monetary deposit unrelated to securing at trial.

Issue (i): Whether an accused acquires an indefeasible right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on expiry of the statutory period even if a prior regular bail order under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not availed of.

Analysis: Section 167(2) creates a distinct statutory regime for release on bail once investigation is not completed within the prescribed period. The right accrues on default and is not displaced by an earlier bail order under Chapter XXXIII. The Court treated the post-expiry period as a separate phase in which the accused is entitled to be enlarged on bail on application, provided bail is furnished. The earlier regular bail order and the fact that the petitioner's earlier SLP was withdrawn did not extinguish the statutory entitlement.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) notwithstanding the prior regular bail order.

Issue (ii): Whether the pendency or rejection of a habeas corpus petition could defeat such right.

Analysis: Continued custody after expiry of the statutory period was held not to be protected merely because a prior bail order existed, since the nature of custody changes once the default under Section 167(2) occurs. The Court accepted the writ petition in view of the liberty interest involved, while clarifying that the ordinary remedy against an adverse order under Section 167(2) is appeal and not habeas corpus. On the facts, the Court proceeded to decide the matter rather than reject it on maintainability.

Conclusion: The writ was entertained and did not bar relief on the default-bail claim.

Issue (iii): Whether the conditions imposed for release on default bail could include a heavy monetary deposit unrelated to securing appearance at trial.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that bail conditions must serve only to secure the accused's presence at trial and cannot operate as a means of recovery or punishment. Monetary deposits of the kind imposed earlier were treated as onerous and impermissible where they were not tied to attendance or trial participation. The proper course was to require a personal bond and sureties adequate to secure appearance.

Conclusion: The bail conditions were confined to a personal bond and sureties, and the monetary-deposit condition was not adopted.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to release on default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and was directed to be enlarged on bail on execution of a personal bond and sureties on terms aimed only at securing his presence at trial.

Ratio Decidendi: Default bail under Section 167(2) is an independent, indefeasible statutory right that survives any prior regular bail order and cannot be defeated by onerous monetary conditions unrelated to securing attendance at trial.

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