Cotton cess liability and recovery powers under old cess laws fail where the statute was not yet operative or the officer lacked authority.

Cotton cess could not be demanded for any period before the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 became operative in the erstwhile State of Mysore on 1 April 1951, so pre-1951 demands were without jurisdiction. The note also explains that the 1923 Act was not a temporary statute merely because it provided for repeal on dissolution of the Committee; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore continued to apply to saved liabilities arising after the Act's extension. It further states that officers appointed under the Produce Cess Act, 1966 could not retrospectively recover arrears under the 1923 Act, and demand notices on that basis were unsustainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether cotton cess could be demanded for any period prior to the extension of the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 to the erstwhile State of Mysore; (ii) whether the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 was a temporary enactment so as to exclude the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act on repeal; and (iii) whether officers appointed under the Produce Cess Act, 1966 in 1969 were competent to recover arrears allegedly due under the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923.

Issue (i): Whether cotton cess could be demanded for any period prior to the extension of the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 to the erstwhile State of Mysore.

Analysis: The Act originally operated only in British Indian provinces and did not extend to the princely State of Mysore. It became applicable to the Part-B State of Mysore only from 1-4-1951 by virtue of the Part B State Laws Act. Liability for cess could not therefore arise for any period before the Act became operative in that territory.

Conclusion: The demand for the period prior to 31-3-1951 was without jurisdiction and illegal, and thus against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 was a temporary enactment so as to exclude the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act on repeal.

Analysis: The Act contained no specified limited period of operation. The mere provision that the Act would be deemed repealed on dissolution of the Committee did not make it a temporary statute; it only effected repeal and transfer of the Committee's assets to Government. On repeal, the general saving provision could operate.

Conclusion: The Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 was a perpetual measure and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was attracted, though only for liabilities accruing after 1-4-1951.

Issue (iii): Whether officers appointed under the Produce Cess Act, 1966 in 1969 were competent to recover arrears allegedly due under the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923.

Analysis: The 1966 Act was an independent enactment and did not continue recovery proceedings under the 1923 Act. An officer appointed under the 1966 Act could not be treated as a Collector within Section 2(a) of the 1923 Act, and a statutory appointee cannot exercise power retrospectively before appointment.

Conclusion: The officers appointed under the 1966 Act lacked competence to recover the alleged arrears, and this issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand notices were unsustainable on multiple grounds and were quashed, with the rule made absolute and costs awarded.

Ratio Decidendi: A cess liability cannot be enforced for any period before a taxing statute is made operative in the relevant territory, and a later-appointed officer cannot retrospectively exercise recovery powers under an earlier statute unless the law expressly authorises such continuation.

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