Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice was validly issued within the prescribed limitation period with approval from the competent specified authority; and (ii) Whether the claimed deduction for donation to a political party was allowable as a genuine donation.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice was validly issued within the prescribed limitation period with approval from the competent specified authority.

Analysis: Under the proviso to Section 149(1), the period allowed to respond to the notice under Section 148A(b) was required to be excluded in computing the limitation period. On excluding the twelve-day notice-reply period, the notice issued on 11.04.2023 fell within three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Approval by the PCIT was therefore competent under Section 151(i).

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and approval were valid. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the claimed deduction for donation to a political party was allowable as a genuine donation.

Analysis: The investigation material, statements recorded during search, bank-trail analysis, and enquiry concerning the recipient political party established a systematic arrangement for routing donation funds through intermediary entities and returning funds to donors. Banking payment and a donation receipt did not establish genuineness where the surrounding circumstances demonstrated an accommodation-entry arrangement. The assessee did not rebut the adverse material with credible evidence establishing a genuine contribution.

Conclusion: The donation was not genuine and was not eligible for deduction under Section 80GGC. The finding is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge fails, and the disallowance of the claimed deduction remains sustainable.

Issues: Whether cash gifts received from relatives were liable to be assessed as unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 68 requires the assessee initially to establish the identity of the creditors, genuineness of the transactions and basic creditworthiness. Confirmations by the donors in response to statutory notices, gift deeds, income-tax returns and financial statements established the initial burden. The Revenue's doubts about the donors' actual sources effectively sought the source of source. Additions or adverse findings in donors' assessments could not, without independent material, establish that the gifts represented the assessee's own unexplained money. Mere comparison of returned income with the gift amounts and suspicion could not displace the evidence or rebut the donors' recorded gifts.

Conclusion: The cash gifts were satisfactorily explained and could not be added as unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the addition was deleted.

Issues: Whether interest earned by a co-operative credit society on deposits of funds not immediately required for lending with nationalised/scheduled banks is deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(a)(i) permits deduction of profits and gains attributable to the business of providing credit facilities to members. The expression "attributable to" has a wider scope than "derived from". Interest earned by a credit co-operative society by placing its own funds, not immediately required for lending to members, in short-term bank deposits is connected with and attributable to that business. The rule treating interest on deposits as income from other sources is inapplicable where the deposits do not represent amounts payable to members or other liabilities.

Conclusion: Interest earned from deposits with nationalised/scheduled banks was attributable to the assessee's business of providing credit facilities to members and was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether a notice initiating penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is valid where it does not specify whether the charge is concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

Analysis: Section 274 read with Section 271(1)(c) requires the assessee to be informed of the precise charge forming the basis of penalty proceedings. The notices retained both alternative charges without striking out the inapplicable limb, leaving the charge unspecified. Such defective initiation invalidates the consequential penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The penalty notices were invalid and the consequential penalty orders could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty notice that does not clearly specify the applicable charge under Section 271(1)(c) is legally defective and cannot sustain a penalty order.

Issues: (i) Whether Rs. 10,87,000 invested in property was unexplained investment under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether Rs. 24,840 invested in mutual funds was unexplained investment under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether Rs. 10,87,000 invested in property was unexplained investment under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The confirmation of the gift to the assessee's wife, the donor's bank records showing liquidation of fixed deposits, and the matching RTGS debit and credit entries established the source and genuineness of the funds used for the property investment. The explanation for the investment was therefore supported by documentary banking evidence.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 10,87,000 as unexplained investment under Section 69 was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Rs. 24,840 invested in mutual funds was unexplained investment under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The bank account reflected the mutual-fund debits. The investments comprised nominal recurring SIP payments ranging from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000, and the explanation that they were funded from salary income and savings was accepted in light of the account credits and the small scale of the investments.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 24,840 as unexplained investment under Section 69 was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The property and mutual-fund investments stood explained, and the corresponding unexplained-investment additions could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained investment cannot be sustained where credible documentary and banking evidence establishes the source of funds.

Issues: (i) Whether reclassification of compulsorily convertible preference shares from borrowings to securities premium pursuant to Ind-AS accounting treatment, without receipt of consideration during the relevant year, was taxable under Section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether a share-premium addition under Section 56(2)(viib) could be sustained by replacing a merchant banker's Discounted Cash Flow Method valuation with the Net Asset Value Method.

Issue (i): Whether reclassification of compulsorily convertible preference shares from borrowings to securities premium pursuant to Ind-AS accounting treatment, without receipt of consideration during the relevant year, was taxable under Section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(viib) applies where consideration is received for issue of shares at a price exceeding their fair market value. The credit to securities premium resulted from reversal of an earlier Ind-AS financial-liability classification after the buyback obligation was deleted; it did not arise from any receipt of money during the year. The accounting treatment, disclosures, and prior tax disallowances demonstrated that the credit was a reclassification of amounts relating to shares issued in earlier years. Treating that credit as fresh consideration would also result in a double addition. No colourable device was established.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 814.40 crore under Section 56(2)(viib) is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a share-premium addition under Section 56(2)(viib) could be sustained by replacing a merchant banker's Discounted Cash Flow Method valuation with the Net Asset Value Method.

Analysis: The assessee obtained a valuation from a qualified merchant banker using the Discounted Cash Flow Method, a method prescribed by Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Projections used in that method are necessarily estimative. Subsequent variance between projections and actual performance does not, by itself, invalidate the valuation or permit substitution of the Net Asset Value Method, where the prescribed method and the valuer's competence are undisputed.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 9,58,701 under Section 56(2)(viib) is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reclassification entries unsupported by a receipt of consideration fall outside the charge under Section 56(2)(viib), and a valid prescribed Discounted Cash Flow valuation cannot be displaced merely because later actual results differ from projected results.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 56(2)(viib) requires actual receipt of consideration for issue of shares, and a valid valuation under a prescribed method cannot be substituted by another prescribed method solely on the basis of subsequent financial performance.

Issues: (i) Whether exclusion of the appellant's representative from the residual proceedings of the 20th CoC meeting for want of written authorisation and a confidentiality undertaking was legally sustainable; (ii) Whether furnishing the resolution plan and connected documents only after receipt of a confidentiality undertaking was consistent with the right of suspended directors to access such material; and (iii) Whether the 20th, 21st and 22nd CoC meetings and the resolution plan approved pursuant to them warranted interference, and what costs were warranted.

Issue (i): Whether exclusion of the appellant's representative from the residual proceedings of the 20th CoC meeting for want of written authorisation and a confidentiality undertaking was legally sustainable.

Analysis: A suspended director has a non-voting right to attend CoC meetings, but participation through an authorised representative requires advance identification and written authority under the applicable framework. The meeting notice gave prior notice of the requirements. Earlier attendance by the representative without formal authority did not waive compliance when confidential resolution plans were to be considered. A confidentiality undertaking was a legitimate safeguard, and the appellant remained free to attend personally or through a duly authorised representative. The absence of such representative did not invalidate the meeting, particularly in the absence of demonstrated prejudice.

Conclusion: The exclusion was legally justified and did not invalidate the 20th CoC meeting. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether furnishing the resolution plan and connected documents only after receipt of a confidentiality undertaking was consistent with the right of suspended directors to access such material.

Analysis: The right of suspended directors to receive resolution plans and relevant material is subject to appropriate confidentiality safeguards. Obtaining a confidentiality undertaking before disclosure was consistent with that safeguard. The material was supplied after the undertaking and before closure of e-voting, affording an opportunity to review it and place views before the CoC; no substantive representation shown to have been prevented or disregarded was established.

Conclusion: Post-undertaking disclosure of the resolution plan and connected documents was lawful and did not contravene the applicable right of access. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the 20th, 21st and 22nd CoC meetings and the resolution plan approved pursuant to them warranted interference, and what costs were warranted.

Analysis: The record did not establish a denial of substantive opportunity or a procedural defect causing actual prejudice. The challenge to the 20th meeting failed, leaving no independent basis to invalidate the subsequent meetings. The approved resolution plan had also been implemented, and reopening the process would be incompatible with the time-bound, value-preserving insolvency framework. The original costs were nevertheless disproportionate in light of the nature of the challenge.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the CoC meetings or the approved resolution plan. The costs were reduced from Rs. 5,00,000 to Rs. 2,00,000.

Final Conclusion: The majority view sustains the validity of the CoC process and leaves the approved and implemented resolution plan undisturbed, while modifying the costs payable by the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: A suspended director's right to participate in CoC proceedings and access resolution-plan material may validly be conditioned on an authorised representative's advance written authority and confidentiality undertaking; non-compliance, absent demonstrated prejudice, does not invalidate the CoC proceedings.

Issues: Whether proceedings in a statutory appeal under Section 37(1)(b) against rejection of interim relief under Section 9 can, after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and by consent, be remitted to that Tribunal for treatment as an application under Section 17.

Analysis: Appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(1)(b) is vested exclusively in the competent Court contemplated by Section 2(1)(e). The Tribunal's power to grant interim measures under Section 17 is distinct in nature and source from the appellate power exercised over a Section 9 order. Remitting the appeal and requiring it to be treated as a Section 17 application would impermissibly transfer statutory appellate jurisdiction to the Tribunal. Following constitution of the Tribunal, liberty could instead be granted to independently seek available interim measures under Section 17, assessed on subsequent events and the relief then sought.

Conclusion: Statutory appellate proceedings under Section 37(1)(b) cannot be remitted to the Arbitral Tribunal or treated as an application under Section 17; the direction to that effect was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether cancellation of GST registration without deciding the registrant's request for time to furnish supporting documents violated principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether the revocation and appellate decisions could be sustained on grounds not contained in the original show cause notice and by combining registration-cancellation proceedings with input tax credit demand proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation of GST registration without deciding the registrant's request for time to furnish supporting documents violated principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The cancellation notice alleged that registration had been obtained through fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. The registrant sought 15 to 20 days to produce purchase and sale bills, e-way bills, transportation evidence and other material supporting its input tax credit claim. The cancellation order, passed within 12 days of the notice, neither addressed that request nor afforded an effective opportunity to produce the stated material before retrospectively cancelling registration. Such procedure was inconsistent with principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The cancellation action was invalid for denial of a meaningful opportunity to furnish evidence and was quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the revocation and appellate decisions could be sustained on grounds not contained in the original show cause notice and by combining registration-cancellation proceedings with input tax credit demand proceedings.

Analysis: The rejection of revocation relied on purchases from dealers said to have cancelled their registrations, although that allegation had not been notified to the registrant. It also required payment of tax, interest and penalty through GST DRC-03 without a notice proposing disallowance of input tax credit. Registration cancellation and demand proceedings concerning fraudulent availment or suppression under Sections 73 and 74 operate in distinct statutory domains; the appellate process could not cure the original denial of opportunity by introducing new grounds and demands.

Conclusion: The revocation rejection and appellate decision founded on unnotified grounds and conflated statutory proceedings were invalid and were quashed.

Final Conclusion: Fresh action may be initiated only through an appropriate show cause notice, after affording a proper hearing and opportunity to produce evidence; all merits remain open.

Ratio Decidendi: GST registration cancellation must comply with notice and hearing requirements, and cannot be supported by unnotified input tax credit allegations or by conflating cancellation proceedings with separate tax-demand proceedings.

Issues: Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred the Central authority from determining a consolidated demand insofar as it included financial years already covered by State GST proceedings.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) applies where two departmental proceedings overlap in respect of the same tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from a particular contravention; it does not apply merely because separate proceedings involve a similar liability arising from distinct infractions. The State proceedings covered FYs 2017-18 and 2018-19, whereas the Central order confirmed a consolidated demand from July 2017 to November 2022, including those overlapping years. The overlap was admitted in the affidavit-in-reply.

Conclusion: The consolidated demand could not include FYs 2017-18 and 2018-19. The impugned order was quashed and the matter was remitted for fresh determination excluding those financial years.

Issues: Whether interest awarded on enhanced compensation under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of compulsory acquisition of agricultural land, is exempt as part of compensation under Section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Interest awarded under Section 28 bears the character of enhanced compensation and forms part of the enhanced value of the acquired land, rather than constituting separately taxable interest. As the acquisition concerned agricultural land compulsorily acquired, the interest component receives the same exempt treatment as the compensation.

Conclusion: Interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is part of enhanced compensation and is exempt under Section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the addition made in respect of such interest cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 29,50,000 as unexplained cash credit for cash deposited during demonetisation was sustainable; (ii) Whether the enhanced tax rate under section 115BBE applied for assessment year 2017-18.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs. 29,50,000 as unexplained cash credit for cash deposited during demonetisation was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 68 requires a satisfactory explanation of the source of the credited amount. The cash deposits were reflected in audited books of account that were not rejected, and the withdrawals and deposits were verifiable from the bank records. The cash deposit of Rs. 26,50,000 was explained by withdrawals made before demonetisation, while the remaining deposit was also explained.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the enhanced tax rate under section 115BBE applied for assessment year 2017-18.

Analysis: The higher rate of 60% with surcharge under section 115BBE was held inapplicable for assessment year 2017-18.

Conclusion: The enhanced tax treatment under section 115BBE was held inapplicable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions relating to the cash deposit and its treatment as unexplained income could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Cash deposits recorded in unrejected audited books and supported by verifiable prior bank withdrawals cannot be treated as unexplained cash credits.

Issues: Whether the addition relating to alleged bogus purchases should be sustained by estimating the gross-profit element, and if so, at what rate.

Analysis: The sales were accepted and the books of account were not rejected. Consequently, the entire purchase amount could not be treated as non-genuine where purchases were required to support the accepted sales. The taxable addition was confined to the profit element embedded in purchases made through non-genuine suppliers. Having regard to the facts, the gross-profit estimate of 12.5% was considered excessive and was reduced to 5% of the disputed purchases.

Conclusion: The addition is restricted to 5% of the disputed purchases under the head business income, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D was sustainable where the investments neither yielded nor were capable of yielding exempt income and the Assessing Officer had not recorded valid satisfaction.

Analysis: Section 14A permits disallowance only of expenditure incurred in relation to income not forming part of total income. The investments concerned did not yield exempt income; further, dividend income was taxable in the relevant assessment year. The expenses recorded in the profit and loss account related to taxable income. The Assessing Officer applied Rule 8D without valid recorded satisfaction, and the disallowance was inconsistent with the assessee's own earlier years and the accepted position in the subsequent year.

Conclusion: The Section 14A disallowance was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Discounted Cash Flow valuation adopted for determining the fair market value of shares could be rejected and replaced with the Net Asset Value method on the basis of subsequent actual financial results; (ii) Whether the difference between expenditure recorded by the assessee and amounts confirmed by vendors constituted unexplained expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether Discounted Cash Flow valuation adopted for determining the fair market value of shares could be rejected and replaced with the Net Asset Value method on the basis of subsequent actual financial results.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with Rule 11UA(2)(b) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, permits valuation using the Discounted Cash Flow method. The assessee had furnished an independent valuation certificate and underlying valuation report containing projected cash flows, revenue and cost assumptions, and consideration of compulsorily convertible preference shares and employee stock options. Discounted Cash Flow valuation is inherently forward-looking and must be tested on information available at the valuation date. Subsequent actual cash flows or initial operating losses could not, by themselves, establish that the contemporaneous projections were unreliable or justify substitution of the Net Asset Value method. The same issue price had also been accepted for comparable prior issuances, and the Revenue did not establish that the adopted valuation methodology was demonstrably erroneous.

Conclusion: The rejection of the Discounted Cash Flow method and substitution of the Net Asset Value method was unsustainable; the addition under Section 56(2)(viib) was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the difference between expenditure recorded by the assessee and amounts confirmed by vendors constituted unexplained expenditure.

Analysis: Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies where the source of expenditure remains unexplained. The relevant expenses were recorded in audited books, payments were made through banking channels, and the Revenue did not dispute either the actual payments or their recorded source from business operations. A difference between the expenditure claimed and vendor confirmations, without an unexplained source of payment, did not attract Section 69C.

Conclusion: The expenditure was not unexplained, and the addition under Section 69C was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Share valuation based on projected cash flows must be assessed as of the valuation date and cannot be displaced solely through hindsight comparison with later results; further, a vendor-confirmation mismatch does not establish unexplained expenditure where the recorded payments and their source are undisputed.

Issues: Whether chewing gum is classifiable as "sweets and sweetmeats" under Entry 74A of Schedule II to the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003, or as an unclassified good under residuary Entry 87 of that Schedule.

Analysis: Entry 74A covers "sweets and sweetmeats", whereas Entry 87 is the residuary entry. Applying the common parlance test and binding precedent, chewing gum or bubble gum is not an eatable sweetmeat: it is chewed as a mouth freshener and discarded, and contains gum base and other ingredients in addition to sugar. Food-standard specifications, tariff classification, and departmental commodity coding did not displace this test; prior treatment of toffee or chocolate as sweetmeats did not establish that chewing gum falls within Entry 74A.

Conclusion: Chewing gum is not classifiable as "sweets and sweetmeats" under Entry 74A and is taxable as an unclassified good under residuary Entry 87 of Schedule II.

Issues: Whether provisional attachment orders under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 survive beyond one year and whether the Revenue's challenge concerning such attachments remained adjudicable.

Analysis: Section 83(2) provides that a provisional attachment ceases to have effect after one year. The statutory scheme contains no enabling authority for renewal, re-issuance, or revival of an attachment after its statutory expiry. The attachments in question had therefore lapsed, and no interim protection had been granted against the directions issued in respect of them.

Conclusion: The provisional attachments had ceased to operate by statutory lapse, and the Revenue's challenge concerning them had become infructuous.

Issues: Whether leasing digital cinema equipment comprising a projector, server, UPS and VSAT for a single rental constitutes a composite supply or a mixed supply, and the applicable GST rate.

Analysis: The equipment was supplied together for a single lease rental but was not naturally bundled in the ordinary course of business. The indicators of natural bundling, including customary industry practice, consumer expectation, ancillary character and integral dependence of the components, were not satisfied. Since the individual equipment could constitute independent supplies and the bundle was supplied for a single price without being a composite supply, it was classified as a mixed supply. Under Section 8(b), a mixed supply is taxable at the rate applicable to the constituent supply attracting the highest rate. The projector attracted the highest applicable rate among the equipment.

Conclusion: The leasing of the digital cinema equipment is a mixed supply and is taxable at the rate applicable to the projector: 28% GST up to 21.09.2025 and 18% GST thereafter. The GST rate applied by the applicant was correct.

Issues: Whether furnishing a bank guarantee could be insisted upon as a condition for provisional release of imported goods when the final differential duty had not been determined.

Analysis: Provisional release must prevent unnecessary detention of goods during investigation or adjudication while sufficiently protecting Revenue interests. Since the final duty liability remained subject to adjudication, payment of duty on the declared value and execution of a personal bond for any differential duty ultimately determined constituted reasonable and proportionate security. An additional bank guarantee was not justified.

Conclusion: The bank-guarantee condition for provisional release was set aside in favour of the assessee; release was directed upon payment of applicable declared duty and execution of a personal bond for the differential duty, if ultimately determined.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be sustained where the registered person did not respond to the show-cause notice or attend the hearing due to illness and no further hearing date was fixed.

Analysis: The registration was cancelled after only one notice. The explanation for the non-response and absence was supported by the asserted medical condition. In these circumstances, an adequate opportunity required fixation of another hearing date before passing an adverse order. The claimed filing of return after cancellation was also required to be verified in the fresh proceedings.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside in favour of the assessee, with a direction to afford an opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and pass a fresh order after hearing.