Denial of hearing required remand for fresh adjudication; setting aside without remand was an error of law.

Where an earlier order set aside an adjudication order only for denial of hearing and made no finding on merits, the proper course was to remit the matter to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision after affording hearing. An order that merely set aside the adjudication without directing remand was therefore treated as containing an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The plea that the matter had become infructuous was rejected, and the impugned order was recalled on rectification.

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Issues: Whether the impugned order suffered from a mistake of law apparent on the face of the record and whether it was liable to be recalled.

Analysis: The earlier order had set aside the adjudication order solely on the ground that the respondents were not given an opportunity of hearing, without recording any finding on the merits. In such a situation, the proper course was to remit the matter to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision after affording an opportunity of hearing. Since the impugned order had simply set aside the adjudication order without directing remand, a legal error was held to have crept into the order. The contention that the matter had become infructuous was rejected.

Conclusion: The impugned order was recalled and the rectification application was allowed.

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