Director liability under cheque dishonour law survives quashing where day-to-day control is specifically alleged; illness gives no immunity.

A complaint under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was not liable to be quashed where it specifically alleged that the accused was a director responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs. The High Court held that whether she was in fact a director, whether she was in charge of the business, and whether the offence occurred without her knowledge were disputed factual matters for trial, not for threshold interference. It further stated that illness or infirmity does not create any exemption from criminal prosecution under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complaints therefore disclosed a triable case and were allowed to proceed.

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Issues: (i) whether a complaint under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed against an who was specifically alleged to be a director in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company; (ii) whether illness or infirmity furnished a ground to quash the prosecution.

Issue (i): whether a complaint under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed against an accused who was specifically alleged to be a director in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company.

Analysis: The complaint contained a specific assertion that the accused was one of the directors and was responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company. Liability under section 141 arises where the company commits the offence and persons in charge of and responsible for its business are roped in by the statutory fiction. Questions whether the accused was in fact a director, whether she was in charge of the business, and whether the offence was committed without her knowledge are matters for trial and cannot be decided merely on assertions made in a quashing petition. The absence of documentary proof showing that she was not a director also weighed against interference at the threshold.

Conclusion: The complaint could not be quashed on this ground and the prosecution against the accused was maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether illness or infirmity furnished a ground to quash the prosecution.

Analysis: No provision in the Criminal Procedure Code exempts a sick or infirm person from prosecution. The asserted ailment, even if assumed to be true, did not create immunity from criminal proceedings.

Conclusion: Illness was not a ground for quashing the complaints.

Final Conclusion: The petitions failed because the complaints disclosed a triable case against the accused and no legal ground was made out for interference under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 specifically alleges that the accused was a director in charge of the company's affairs, the High Court should not quash the complaint at the threshold on disputed factual pleas that require proof at trial; personal illness does not by itself bar prosecution.

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