COMPOSITE APPEAL AGAINST THE JOINT PROCEEDINGS

Clubbing of proceedings is usually for the convenience of parties contesting the same so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, delay in adjudication as well as expenses incurred therein. The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘Code’ for short) Code does not specifically provide for consolidation of suits but the same could be done under the inherent powers of the Court flowing from Section 151 of the Code. The parties are relieved of adducing similar documentary and oral evidence in two suits but in different trials.

In BASSANNA SINCE DECEASED BY LRS. AND OTHERS Versus BHIMANNA AND OTHERS - 2026 (9) TMI 1748 - Supreme Court, the deceased Bassanna filed two civil suits-

• One for declaration that a registered sale deed executed by one of the defendants in favour of another is null and void;
• The second suit is for perpetual injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from interfering with the joint possession of the plaintiff.

The court clubbed the above said suits and a joint trial was conducted. The Court, after taking evidences from both the sides, dismissed the said two suits on 17.12.1990. The plaintiff filed a composite appeal before the Appellate Court. The certified copies of the judgment as well as the decrees passed in both the suits were filed. The Court fees payable on two separate appeals were also paid along with the memorandum of appeal. The appellate Court by its judgment dated 17.08.2007 allowed the said appeal and decreed both the suits. The defendants filed second appeals against the judgment of the appellate court before the High Court. The appeals filed by the defendants were allowed by the High Court, Karnataka. The High Court held that since two separate suits had been filed before the trial Court, it was necessary for the unsuccessful plaintiff to have filed two separate appeals under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code (‘Code’ for short).

The appellants filed appeals before the Supreme Court, challenging the judgment of High Court allowing a common judgment of the trial Court rendered in two civil suits filed by the same plaintiff would be maintainable, especially when certified copies of the decrees passed in both the suits were filed along with the said appeal, a prayer for dispensing with filing of more than one certified copy of the common judgment was made and the court fees payable for challenging both the decrees was also paid.

The appellants submitted the following before the Supreme Court-

• The High Court gave more importance to the technical requirement of filing of two separate appeals without taking into consideration the fact that the composite appeal as filed was accompanied by certified copies of both the decrees along with requisite court fees required to be paid, assuming that two separate appeals would have been filed.
• The trial Court having consolidated both the suits as a result of which parties led common evidence and the suits having been decided by a common judgment, there was no reason, whatsoever, for the High Court to have non-suited the appellants on the technical ground that two separate appeals had not been filed.
• The impugned judgment of the High Court left the appellants remediless inasmuch as the judgment of the first appellate Court allowing the appeals preferred by the appellants was set aside without any further direction.
• There was no adjudication of the appellants’ claim on merits as the second appeals were allowed on technical grounds.

In view of the above the appellants prayed for setting aside the impugned order and to remand the matter back to the High Court for its fresh consideration.

The respondents submitted the following before the Supreme Court-

• Even though the trial Court decided both the suits through a common judgment, the plaintiff ought to have filed two separate appeals under Section 96 of the Code.
• It could not be said that any error was committed by the High Court when it held that a singular appeal in such circumstances was not tenable.
• There was no merit in the present appeals and the same were liable to be dismissed.

The Supreme Court considered the submissions of the appellants and the respondents and perusal the documents on record. The Supreme Court was of the view that the composite appeal preferred for challenging the common judgment of the trial Court deciding two suits filed by the same plaintiff was rightly entertained on merits. The judgment of the first appellate

Court could not have been set aside on the ground that two separate appeals had not been filed. The lacuna, if any, of not filing a separate memorandum of appeal was curable in nature and could not be held to be fatal as the composite appeal was accompanied by both decrees passed by the trial Court.

From the matrix of the cases, the Supreme Court observed the following-

• The plaintiff in both the suits was the same.
• While one defendant was common in both the suits, one suit had an additional defendant.
• At the request of the common defendant in both the suits, the proceedings in both the suits were clubbed together. As a result, common evidence was led in both the suits.
• Though the plaintiff preferred a composite appeal challenging the dismissal of both the suits through a common judgment, the court fees payable on separate appeals raising challenge to the common judgment of the trial Court were paid.
• A specific prayer seeking setting aside of the common judgment in both the suits was also made. Certified copies of both the decrees were also filed along with the memorandum of appeal.
• No objection, whatsoever, was raised by the defendants to the filing of a composite appeal under Section 96 of the Code before the first appellate Court and they contested the proceedings on merits.
• Challenge to the filing of a composite appeal was raised by the defendants only in the second appeals preferred by them.

The proviso to Order XLI Rule 1(1) of the Code empowers the appellate Court to dispense with the filing of more than one copy of the judgment of the trial Court whenever two or more suits are tried together and a common judgment is delivered. The objective of this provision is to avoid extra expenses where more cases than one are disposed of by a common judgment by empowering the appellate Court to dispense with the necessity of filing more than one copy of the judgment.

The Supreme Court held that all necessary requisites for challenging the common judgment of the trial Court were satisfied by the unsuccessful plaintiff. The requirements of Order XLI Rule 1 (1) and (2) of the Code were fully complied with and the composite appeal as filed was complete in all respects. All statutory requirements were satisfied by the plaintiff while preferring an appeal under Section 96 of the Code.

The Supreme Court observed that there could be various other situations requiring an aggrieved party to specifically challenge a common judgment and decree passed in the matter. However, in the present case, the plaintiff in both the suits is one and the same. In the view of the Supreme Court, the composite appeal preferred by the plaintiff was liable to be entertained on merits. The defect was not of such a nature so as to entail setting aside the judgment of the appellate Court without any adjudication on merits.

The Supreme Court considered the following judgments-

• Nahari and others v. Shankar and others - 1950 INSC 24.
• Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhul -iAIR 1927 Lah. 289.
• CHARAN SINGH Versus RAM SAROOP  - 2025 (2) TMI 2003 - SC Order
• SHRI RAMESH CHAND, SMT. NIRMAL THAKUR, SHRI THAKUR DASS SHARMA, MOHAN SINGH AND OTHERS Versus OM RAJ, RANJIT SINGH, MANBHARI, JEEVANA, SMT. SURAJ NEGI, EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, SHIMLA ELECTRIC SUBDIVISION KHALINI DISTRICT SHIMLA H.P. AND OTHERS - 2022 (5) TMI 1722 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT

In view of the above said judgments, the Supreme Court held that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The question as framed is answered by holding that the composite appeal filed by the plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code was maintainable in the present appeals and the second appeals be decided by the High Court on merits.