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      MLI, PPT and Aircraft Leasing: Operating vs. Finance Lease and PE Risk in Aircraft Leasing: Reassessing Source Taxation of Aircraft Rentals under the India-Ireland Treaty

      21 November, 2025

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      Deciphering Legal Judgments: A Comprehensive Analysis of Judgment

      Reported as:

      2025 (8) TMI 1274 - ITAT MUMBAI

      Introduction

      The decision of the Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT)  addresses a cluster of appeals arising from a common fact pattern: Irish special-purpose lessor entities leasing aircraft to an Indian airline under dry operating leases for AY 2022-23. The assessments were framed u/s 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, following directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The Tribunal treated one appeal as the lead matter and applied its reasoning mutatis mutandis to the others.

      The case is significant on multiple counts. It is one of the first detailed ITAT pronouncements on the application of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) and the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) in the Indian context post the Supreme Court's judgment in Nestle SA. It also consolidates and extends jurisprudence on (i) characterisation of aircraft leases as operating vs. finance leases, (ii) the existence of a permanent establishment (PE) where aircraft are leased into India on a dry basis, and (iii) the scope of Article 8 of the India-Ireland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) concerning "operation or rental" of aircraft in international traffic. The Tribunal's ruling thus has far-reaching implications for cross-border leasing structures, interpretation of the MLI, and treaty application u/s 90 of the Act.

      Key Legal Issues

      The Tribunal crystallised the determinative issues into four principal questions:

      • whether Articles 6 and 7 of the MLI (embodying the PPT) could be invoked to deny treaty benefits under the India-Ireland DTAA in the absence of a separate domestic notification;
      • whether the aircraft leases were to be characterised as operating leases or finance leases;
      • whether the presence of the leased aircraft in India constituted a fixed place PE of the lessors under Article 5 of the DTAA; and
      • whether, in any event, Article 8(1) of the DTAA required that profits from rental of aircraft in international traffic be taxed exclusively in Ireland.

      These issues engage both interpretative questions (section 90, MLI implementation, treaty construction) and application of precedent (e.g. Nestle SA, Azadi Bachao Andolan, Vodafone, Formula One, Hyatt International, InterGlobe Aviation Special Bench, and various High Court decisions). They also involve factual characterisation of complex aviation leasing arrangements.

      Issue-wise Analysis

      1. Applicability of MLI PPT without a specific section 90(1) notification

      The Revenue's core contention was that, since both the India-Ireland DTAA and the MLI have been notified, and the DTAA is a "Covered Tax Agreement", the PPT in Articles 6 and 7 automatically overlays the DTAA. The Departmental Representative relied heavily on OECD "synthesised text" guidance to argue that no further notification was required.

      The Tribunal rejected this approach by placing primary reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Assessing Officer (I.T.) v. Nestle SA 2023 (10) TMI 981 - Supreme Court. There, the Court held that a notification u/s 90(1) is a mandatory precondition for giving effect not only to a DTAA itself but also to any protocol or subsequent instrument that alters its terms or affects domestic law. The Supreme Court expressly ruled that consequences of a subsequent treaty (or "trigger event") are not automatically grafted into earlier treaties; each such modification requires a distinct notification u/s 90(1).

      Applying this ratio, the Tribunal noted:

      • the India-Ireland DTAA was separately notified in 2002;
      • the MLI was separately notified in 2019; but
      • no notification had been issued u/s 90(1) to specify the impact of the MLI on the India-Ireland DTAA or to incorporate the PPT into that treaty for domestic purposes.

      The Tribunal treated this omission as decisive: the MLI undoubtedly modifies treaties at the level of public international law but, as per Nestle SA, such modifications are not self-executing in Indian domestic law without a section 90(1) notification specifying the consequences for the particular DTAA.

      The Tribunal also dismantled the Revenue's reliance on the "synthesised text", emphasising that:

      • by OECD's own guidance, synthesised texts are purely explanatory aids, not legal instruments;
      • they are expressly disclaimed as having "no legal value"; and
      • the only binding domestic instruments are the notified DTAA and any duly notified modifications u/s 90(1).

      In substance, the Tribunal held that permitting the PPT to apply solely on the basis of a general MLI notification would undermine the constitutional architecture and section 90(1) as understood in Nestle SA. Accordingly, Articles 6 and 7 of the MLI could not be invoked to deny DTAA benefits in the absence of a specific notification incorporating those provisions into the India-Ireland DTAA.

      2. PPT application on facts (in the alternative)

      Though the Tribunal had already negatived the PPT on jurisdictional grounds, it proceeded, ex abundanti cautela, to examine whether, assuming arguendo the MLI applied, the Revenue had discharged its burden under the PPT.

      The lessors relied on extensive factual material to show that Ireland was chosen for bona fide commercial reasons: Ireland's well-known status as the global hub for aircraft leasing; long-standing aviation ecosystem; Irish directors, bankers, and advisors; management by an Irish licensed corporate services provider; registration of aircraft in the lessors' names; and leasing operations spanning multiple jurisdictions (India, China, Korea). The Tribunal also noted that valid Irish Tax Residency Certificates had been issued.

      The Revenue, and the DRP, had placed primary emphasis on the fact that the ultimate parent was based in the Cayman Islands and that the lessors did not themselves maintain substantial staff or infrastructure. The Tribunal found this approach misdirected:

      • OECD BEPS Action 6 commentary and its examples (C, F, G, H, D, E) clearly indicate that choosing a jurisdiction for commercial efficiencies, including treaty network and sectoral expertise, does not per se trigger the PPT;
      • Indian jurisprudence (notably the Bombay High Court in Bid Services (Mauritius)) recognises that use of SPVs in tax-efficient jurisdictions is legitimate unless the Revenue proves sham or fraudulent purpose;
      • Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone uphold the conclusive evidentiary weight of a TRC in the absence of proven treaty abuse or fraud.

      The Tribunal criticised the DRP's implicit "ultimate parent residence" test as unsound, noting that it would disqualify otherwise genuine structures simply because the cartel of shareholders is resident in a tax-neutral jurisdiction. It reiterated the Supreme Court's view in Vodafone that holding structures and SPVs are legitimate commercial devices; the burden lies squarely on the Revenue to establish sham, circularity, or misuse, not merely to speculate based on ownership chains.

      On the facts, no such abusive pattern was discerned. The aircraft were genuinely owned by the Irish entities, leased on arm's-length terms, and operated by the Indian lessee under DGCA and RBI regulatory oversight. The Tribunal held that tax efficiency was, at most, an incidental consequence of selecting Ireland, not a principal purpose contrary to the object and purpose of the DTAA. In any event, since Articles 8 and 12 of the DTAA were consciously drafted to exempt aircraft leasing income from source taxation, claiming those very benefits could not be said to frustrate the treaty's purpose.

      3. Characterisation of leases: operating vs. finance lease

      The DRP had re-characterised the leases as "finance leases", largely on the basis that (i) risk and reward of use were with the lessee, (ii) the leases were non-cancellable, (iii) the lessee could sub-lease, and (iv) the aircraft could be depreciated to nil under Irish tax rules in 6-8 years, allegedly matching the lease terms.

      The Tribunal conducted a detailed contractual and regulatory analysis and found this reasoning untenable. Key clauses of the lease clearly established:

      • the agreements were expressly described as "dry operating leases";
      • ownership of the aircraft vested with the lessors throughout; the lessee was expressly prohibited from holding itself out as owner or having an ownership-equivalent economic interest;
      • nameplates on the airframes and engines were required to state that the aircraft were owned by the lessor and merely leased to the lessee;
      • on default, the lessor could terminate and repossess; upon expiry, the lessee was obliged to redeliver the aircraft in specified condition;
      • sub-leasing was limited and permitted only with the lessor's consent; and
      • risk allocation for operation, maintenance, and insurance was entirely consistent with standard industry dry leasing practice, focusing operational risk on the lessee but leaving residual ownership risk with the lessor.

      The Tribunal then aligned these terms with:

      • statutory definitions of "finance lease" in the SARFAESI Act and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, both of which require that the lessee become owner at the end of the lease or on payment of a residual price;
      • the RBI's 2002 circular distinguishing operating leases from finance leases, the latter requiring an embedded purchase option and prior RBI approval (absent here);
      • the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Shri Rajasthan Syntex Ltd., stressing transfer (or option to acquire) of ownership as the hallmark of a finance lease; and
      • the Special Bench decision in InterGlobe Aviation Ltd. and the Delhi ITAT's ruling in Celestial Aviation Trading 15 Ltd., both holding materially identical IndiGo aircraft leases to be operating leases, not finance leases.

      The Tribunal observed that the DRP's heavy reliance on Irish depreciation rules was conceptually flawed: depreciation is a consequence of ownership, not a determinant of it; Irish rules cannot recast the legal character of a lease under Indian law. Further, DGCA guidance on economic life (20 years or 60,000 landing/pressurisation cycles) belied the DRP's assertion of an 8-year economic life.

      On this basis, the Tribunal held that the leases were plain operating leases; lease rentals could not be re-labelled as "interest" under Article 11 of the DTAA or section 2(28A) merely because they involve periodic payments linked to capital cost.

      4. Existence of a Permanent Establishment in India

      On the PE question, the Tribunal adopted and applied its contemporaneous reasoning in another aircraft leasing case involving the same treaty. It relied on the Supreme Court's articulation of the "disposal test" and PE attributes in Formula One, E-Funds and Hyatt International.

      The essential conclusion was that, although the aircraft were physically located in India for significant periods, they were under the operational control and disposal of the Indian airline, not the Irish lessors. The lessors:

      • conducted their leasing business (negotiation, contracting, risk management, financing) from Ireland;
      • had no personnel or office in India; and
      • only retained protective rights to inspect and repossess, which are standard incidents of ownership and not indicia of carrying on business through a fixed place.

      The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's reliance on a shipping case where the foreign party effectively operated the vessels, and instead followed the Madras High Court in Van Oord ACZ, which held that bareboat/dry-leased equipment under the full control of the Indian operator does not constitute a PE of the foreign owner. It emphasised that conflating the situs of the asset with the locus of business activity would render any cross-border equipment lease into a PE situation, contrary to both treaty text and case law.

      Accordingly, no fixed place PE existed under Article 5(1) of the DTAA.

      5. Article 8(1) - "operation or rental" of aircraft in international traffic

      Having held that no PE existed, the Tribunal nevertheless examined the lessors' alternative reliance on Article 8(1). Crucially, the India-Ireland DTAA departs from the OECD Model by explicitly covering "operation or rental of ships or aircraft in international traffic"; rental is an independent limb, not merely ancillary to self-operation.

      The Tribunal held:

      • the wording of Article 8(1) in this DTAA must be given effect according to its plain meaning; it is impermissible to read back the OECD Model's narrower structure;
      • the definition of "international traffic" hinges only on whether the aircraft are operated solely between places in the other contracting State; once aircraft form part of a fleet deployed on both domestic and international routes, the "solely domestic" exclusion is not met;
      • modern airline operations involve rotational use of aircraft across networks; the treaty's "solely" formulation appears deliberately designed to avoid disputes about "predominant" use.

      On the undisputed facts that the lessee is an international carrier and that the leased aircraft were capable of, and actually used, on international sectors, the Tribunal held that rentals were "profits derived ... from the ... rental of ... aircraft in international traffic" and thus taxable only in Ireland. Article 8(1), being a specific rule, overrides Article 7 even if a PE existed.

      Key Holdings and Reasoning

      The Tribunal's operative holdings may be summarised as follows:

      • MLI PPT not applicable (ratio): In the absence of a specific section 90(1) notification incorporating Articles 6 and 7 of the MLI into the India-Ireland DTAA, the PPT cannot be invoked to deny treaty relief. This follows directly from Nestle SA and the constitutional framework of treaty implementation.
      • PPT not satisfied on facts (alternative ratio): Even assuming MLI applicability, the Revenue failed to show that a principal purpose of the incorporation of the Irish lessors or of the leases was to obtain treaty benefits contrary to the DTAA's object and purpose. The structures exhibited commercial substance, sectoral alignment with Ireland's aviation ecosystem, and genuine risk-bearing. The presence of an ultimate parent in Cayman Islands, absent more, is not evidence of abuse.
      • Leases are operating leases (ratio): Contractual terms, statutory tests, RBI circulars, regulatory practice and previous judicial decisions (including the InterGlobe Aviation Special Bench and Celestial Aviation) collectively establish that the leases are operating leases. There is no transfer of ownership or end-of-term purchase option; rentals cannot be re-characterised as "interest".
      • No fixed place PE in India (ratio): The aircraft do not constitute a "fixed place of business" at the disposal of the Irish lessors; the business of leasing is conducted from Ireland, and the lessee alone has operational control. Mere situs of income-producing assets in India is insufficient to establish PE.
      • Article 8(1) applies (ratio): Profits from rental of aircraft used in international traffic fall squarely within Article 8(1) and are taxable exclusively in Ireland. The DTAA's deliberate extension to "rental" must be honoured, and the "solely domestic" condition for exclusion is not met.

      Obiter elements include the Tribunal's broader reflections on the role of TRCs, treaty shopping, and the importance of industry practice (outsourcing to management companies, SPV structures) in assessing PPT and PE questions.

      The Tribunal followed or relied upon multiple precedents:

      • Nestle SA - for the mandatory requirement of a section 90(1) notification to give domestic effect to treaty modifications, extended here to the MLI;
      • Azadi Bachao Andolan, Vodafone, Bid Services - to uphold bona fide use of treaty and holding structures, and the evidentiary role of TRCs;
      • Formula One, E-Funds, Hyatt International - to articulate the "disposal test" and functional analysis for PEs;
      • Madras High Court in Van Oord ACZ - to distinguish dry leasing from wet leasing and deny PE where control over the asset vests with the Indian operator;
      • Special Bench in InterGlobe Aviation Ltd. and Delhi ITAT in Celestial Aviation - to characterise similar IndiGo leases as operating leases and to reject their treatment as interest under Article 11.

      Conclusion

      The Tribunal's decision provides a carefully reasoned and multi-layered analysis of several cutting-edge issues in international tax. It clarifies that the MLI, though transformative at the treaty level, does not self-execute in India; its provisions require specific section 90(1) notifications before domestic authorities may alter the application of existing DTAAs. This is a direct and logical extension of Nestle SA to the MLI context and will guide future controversies around BEPS implementation.

      On substance, the ruling reinforces earlier jurisprudence that legitimate, commercially grounded SPVs and leasing structures cannot be lightly impugned as treaty abuses merely because they yield favourable tax outcomes or have non-resident ultimate parents. The Tribunal adopts a principled reading of the PPT, rooted in OECD examples and Indian case law, that distinguishes between genuine structuring and abusive conduit arrangements.

      The judgment also consolidates the legal taxonomy of operating vs. finance leases in the cross-border environment, tethering it to contractual allocation of title and residual risk, statutory definitions, and domestic regulatory policy (RBI and DGCA). This provides welcome certainty to the aircraft leasing industry.

      Finally, the Tribunal's construction of Article 8(1) in the India-Ireland DTAA confirms that where Contracting States deliberately expand shipping and air transport articles to cover "rental" of aircraft in international traffic, those words will be given full effect. For Irish lessors of aircraft into India, the combined impact of the no-PE finding and Article 8(1) is that lease income from aircraft used in international traffic is not taxable in India under the DTAA as presently in force and notified.

      From a policy perspective, if the legislature or the executive wishes to narrow these outcomes-whether by effective MLI integration, renegotiated treaty terms, or domestic anti-avoidance rules-this judgment underscores that it must do so through clear, formally notified instruments rather than by stretching existing provisions beyond their text and structure.

       


      Full Text:

      2025 (8) TMI 1274 - ITAT MUMBAI

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