TaxTMI Login
TaxTMI 
Login
Loading...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
of 33 
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of 33 Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
of 33 Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of 33 Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
All TMI Notes
of 33 Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
All TMI Notes
Note
Bookmark
Share
Section 427 Fee for default in furnishing statements.
These documents reproduce two versions of Clause/Section 427 dealing with a fee for default in furnishing statements of tax deducted or collected at source. They matter because they impose a daily fee on persons who fail to deliver such statements within a prescribed time; taxpayers, withholding agents and the tax department are affected. The texts differ only in minor drafting aspects: a cross-reference to another section (393(3)(b) v. 397(3)(b)) and presentation of the amount (spelled out v. numeric). Effective date or enactment/notification timing: Not stated in the document.
Statutory hooks: both texts are labelled under the Income-tax enactment for 2025 and are described as dealing with the "Levy of fee in certain cases" for "Fee for default in furnishing statements." The provision applies "without prejudice to the provisions of this Act" and operates where "a person fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed" in a cross-referenced subsection. The obligation gives rise to liability to pay, by way of a fee, a daily amount for each day of continued failure; the fee is subject to an upper limit and must be paid before delivery of the statement. No definitions, threshold values other than the fee quantum, or procedural rules are contained in the text provided.
Both texts present the same two-subsection structure:
The only textual differences between the two documents are: (i) the cross-reference in sub-section (1) - Document 1 refers to section 397(3)(b), while Document 2 (old Bill version) refers to section 393(3)(b); and (ii) the notation of the fee quantum - Document 1 uses "Rs.200" and Document 2 spells out "two hundred rupees." Apart from these, the operative language is substantively identical.
The provision, as drafted, is a penal/fee provision collateral to other liabilities under the Act: it is expressly "without prejudice to the provisions of this Act," indicating that payment of the fee does not displace other statutory liabilities (such as interest, penalty or prosecution) unless other provisions provide otherwise. The two limits in sub-section (2) indicate a legislative intent to cap the fee at the quantum of tax deductible/collectible and to make payment of the fee a precondition to subsequent compliance (delivery of the statement). The text implies a daily accrual mechanism ("for every day during which the failure continues"), signalling continuing liability until compliance. No legislative intent beyond these textual indicia is set out in the documents.
No express exceptions or provisos beyond the two limitations in sub-section (2) are provided in the text. Specific carve-outs (for example, reasonable cause, force majeure, devolved liability) are Not stated in the document.
The provision cross-refers to another subsection which prescribes the time for furnishing the relevant statement: Document 1 cites section 397(3)(b); Document 2 cites section 393(3)(b). The precise interplay with the timeline and procedural rules in the cross-referenced subsection therefore depends on which cross-reference is operative. Interaction with other provisions that impose interest, penalty or prosecution for default is suggested by the opening phrase "Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act," but specific cross-references, rules or notifications governing filing formats, modes of payment of the fee, or exact enforcement mechanisms are Not stated in the document.
Identified differences:
Cross-reference: Old Bill (Document 2) cross-refers to section 393(3)(b); later text (Document 1) cross-refers to section 397(3)(b).
Practical impact
Cross-reference change (393(3)(b) -> 397(3)(b)): The practical significance depends entirely on the substantive content of the cited subsections. Since the documents do not state what section 393(3)(b) or 397(3)(b) contain, the precise impact (for example, who is captured, the time period for filing, or the triggering event) is Not stated in the document. However, at a drafting level, changing the cross-reference alters the statutory trigger and therefore can expand, narrow or otherwise modify the class of persons/timeframe to which the fee applies. Users should therefore treat the cross-reference change as potentially material to applicability and compliance timelines.
Full Text:
