Refund of application fee: advance ruling applications are not refundable even if the applicant withdraws the application.
There is no statutory or regulatory provision permitting refund of fees paid for advance-ruling applications; fees are retained and not returned on withdrawal, a position noted in the Service Tax Practice Manual and reflected in the Authority for Advance Rulings decision cited.

Advance ruling review barred except when ruling procured by fraud or misrepresentation, enabling annulment under law.
The Authority for Advance Rulings lacks jurisdiction to reconsider or review its own ruling absent a substantiated mistake of law or fact or a mistake apparent from the record warranting rectification or amendment under the procedural regulations; however, a previously announced ruling may be declared void ab initio if it is shown to have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation of facts.

Advance ruling jurisdiction excludes Board circulars; notifications by the government are distinct and control admissibility.
Advance ruling jurisdiction does not extend to Board circulars because the statute expressly contemplates government notifications for advance-ruling purposes while omitting circulars; the power to issue circulars is conferred on the Board under the Central Excise framework made applicable to service tax, whereas notification-making power in the service-tax provisions is vested in the Central Government, producing a statutory limitation on advance-ruling admissibility.

Government company eligibility for advance ruling confirmed; subsidiaries retain separate legal personality and may also apply.
A government company is eligible to apply for an advance ruling and a subsidiary of a government company may also file because the holding company and each subsidiary are separate legal entities with independent rights to apply; a step-down subsidiary falls within the definition of an applicant, rendering its advance-ruling application maintainable.

Writ remedy against advance rulings where no statutory appeal exists; seek High Court review under constitutional writ jurisdiction.
No statutory appeal exists against orders of the Advance Ruling Authority; the available remedial route is a writ petition invoking constitutional writ jurisdiction in the appropriate High Court. The Supreme Court has indicated parties should approach the High Court rather than seek direct original jurisdiction at the apex court, and courts are urged to allocate and expedite fiscal writ matters.

Appeal on new grounds barred where party lacks aggrievement; omitted issues may be raised later upon arising.
An appellant cannot maintain an appeal on entirely new grounds if the assessing or appellate authority has approved the assessee's classification or fully allowed the revenue's prayer, because there is no aggrievement; however, issues not considered by the tribunal may be agitated later when a cause of action arises.

Locus standi limits: only aggrieved private parties may challenge tax notices; third-party appeals are not maintainable.
Only the private operators against whom tax notices are issued possess the requisite standing to challenge those notices; third parties lack authority to prosecute appeals or writs on their behalf, and challenges must be instituted by the directly aggrieved parties through the statutory remedy, who may then raise all issues available to them in accordance with law.

Finality of tribunal orders bars fresh appeals, preventing restoration by filing a new appeal against the same order.
When an appeal has been rejected by the Tribunal there is no scope for entertaining an application for restoration by filing a fresh appeal in respect of the same order; similarly, once a Tribunal order has become final for lack of further appeal, the finality of orders precludes fresh appeals challenging that same order.

Finality of proceedings: tax assessments cannot be reopened due to another taxpayer's favourable decision without recall in the same case.
Reopening tax assessment proceedings based on a favourable decision in another assessee's case is ordinarily not permitted; a final order in an assessee's own case remains effective until it is specifically recalled or set aside in that same proceeding.

Finality of unappealed decisions: unchallenged jurisdictional rulings bind the parties until lawfully reversed.
A jurisdictional court's unappealed ruling, even if incorrect, becomes final and binding between the parties and remains so until reversed by a higher forum or other statutory remedy; thus unchallenged classificatory or determinative decisions must be obeyed in subsequent proceedings unless lawfully set aside.

Finality of administrative orders follows when no appeal is filed, and remand directions limit reconsideration scope.
An administrative order attains finality where an entitled party does not file an appeal against a Tribunal disposition; remand orders limit reconsideration to the specific issues directed by the Tribunal, and parties who do not contest merits before the Tribunal forfeit the ability to re argue those merits, so that authorities acting on remand cannot expand review beyond the remand directions.

Right of appeal is not inherent; it exists only when statute creates and defines it, including scope and procedure.
The right of appeal is not inherent but is a statutory construct: appellate existence, scope and procedure must be authorized by the creating provision; omissions in citation do not automatically bar an otherwise maintainable appeal; absence of an appellate provision does not prevent an order from becoming final.

Reason to believe requires subjective belief grounded in material evidence, preventing arbitrary or capricious searches.
The concept of reason to believe requires that a subjective opinion be based on material on the record, not arbitrary or whimsical; it must be held in good faith and courts may test whether the reasons have a rational and relevant connection to the formation of belief, excluding extraneous considerations.

Inclusive pricing does not establish passing on of tax burden; composite invoices alone do not prove unjust enrichment.
Showing a composite price on an invoice does not, by itself, establish that the supplier passed the tax burden to customers or realized unjust enrichment; where prices remained unchanged after a tax was imposed, inclusive pricing alone is insufficient evidence that any element of tax was added to the price, and proof of an added tax component is required to infer passing on of the tax.

Doctrine of unjust enrichment excluded where a refund arises only after finalisation of provisional assessment.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply to refund claims that arise after the finalisation of provisional assessments; refunds or recoveries consequent on the final determination of duty liability fall outside the interim statutory refund framework and are not barred by unjust enrichment objections.

Unjust enrichment doctrine not bar to refund of duty paid under protest; provisional assessments preserve refund entitlement.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not bar refund claims for duty paid under protest; recoveries or refunds consequent on final determination of duty liability fall outside bars that would deny restitution. Provisional assessments and unresolved price and classification lists render clearances provisional, supporting the taxpayer's entitlement to have refund claims adjudicated on the basis of final liability rather than dismissed as struck by unjust enrichment.

Admissibility of electronic records: computerised data on CD can support service tax refund claims and show no transfer of tax burden.
Data on compact disc (CD) can be admissible evidence for service tax refund claims where it constitutes computerised records recognised under the Information Technology Act and the Service Tax Rules. Such electronic records may also be used to prove that the incidence of service tax was not transferred to another party (absence of unjust enrichment), provided the data meets the statutory criteria for admissible computerised evidence and forms part of the assessee's maintained electronic records.

Limitation on refund filings: time-bar inapplicable where payments were not service tax and were excess realisations.
Limitation under Section 11B(1) applies only to refund claims of a duty of excise and interest; payments not constituting service tax or lawful excise levy are outside that bar and may be refunded. Judicial authorities (M/s Natraj and Venkat Associates; ITC Ltd.) recognise that excess realisations beyond what the statute permits are realisations outside the Act and thus not subject to the statutory limitation on excise refunds.

Limitation on service tax refunds: late claims are barred unless tax was paid under protest.
Refunds of amounts paid as service tax are governed by the statutory limitation provisions; where payments were credited to the service tax account and the claimant acknowledged applicability of the limitation rule, a refund claim filed after the limitation period is barred unless the tax was paid under protest.

Appellate authority power to increase penalties is limited; payment of tax and interest can justify mitigation of penalty.
Appellate authority does not have power to increase or impose a fresh penalty; payment of tax and interest that neutralises pecuniary advantage is relevant for mitigation, and taxpayer status and proportionality are material in assessing whether a revised penalty is unduly harsh under the statutory penalty framework.