TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (9) TMI 1895
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....5 issued by the Respondent No.1 for the Assessment Year 2022- 23 which bears the DIN viz., ITBA/PNL/S/271DA/2024-25/1075166789 (1) and enclosed as Annexure E1. c. Issue as writ of certiorari or any other suitable writ for quashing of the digitally signed and electronically communicated notice under section 156 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 28/03/2025 issued by the Respondent No.1 for the Assessment Year 2022-23 which bears the DIN viz., ITBA/PNL/S/156/2024-25/1075162087 (1) and enclosed as Annexure E2. d. Grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in this matter including but not limited to COST OF THIS PETITION." 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that this Court need not deal deep into the matter as the issue stands answered in the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax v. K.Umesh Shetty [2025] 170 taxmann.com 748 (Karnataka), wherein the co-ordinate Bench held as under: "6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the Appeal papers as also the written submissions, we decline indulgence in the matter, for the f....
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....discussion at Paragraph Nos. 14 to 19 as under: "The expression initiated is not defined under the Act and must be construed in its normal sense. The word 'initiated' is a past tense of the word 'initiate'. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the word 'initiate' as under: "to begin, commence, enter upon, to introduce, set going, originate." In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word 'initiate' has, inter alia, been defined thus: "to begin or set going: make a beginning of: perform or facilitate the first actions, steps, or stages of:" The Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) defines 'initiate' to mean: "an introductory step or action, a first move; beginning; start, and to initiate as meaning - to commence." In Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal & Anr.: (2000) 3 SCC 171, the Supreme Court had considered the meaning of the expression 'initiate any proceedings for contempt' by referring to the dictionary meaning of the said word. It is relevant to refer to paragraph 10 of the said decision, which is set out below: The expression-- "initiate any proceedings for contempt" is not defined in th....
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.....e., not as a consequence of action taken in another proceeding. [17.1] For the second limb, the legislature has provided a limitation of six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated. [17.2] It is apparent, that while a timeframe has been provided for the conclusion of penalty proceedings once initiated, there is no indication, as to when the period of six months ought to commence. In other words, can initiation of penalty proceeding be left to the whims and fancies of the revenue or it should be hitched to the dicta of "reasonable period" adopted by Courts in such situations, in the absence of a statutory provision?...However, we are inclined to agree with the submission made on behalf of the petitioner i.e., the assessee, and the reason for that is quite simple. If we were to accept the respondent/revenue's stand, then it could end up [as it has in this case] in a situation, where the revenue could decide the date when it could trigger a SCN to fulfil, as a mere formality, the principles of natural justice, which are engrafted under Section 274 of the Act. Section 274 of the Act, inter alia, mandates that no order imposing a pena....
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.... statute, but not to create a new one. Power to alter a statutory text belongs to the domain of its author, not of its interpreter. It hardly needs to be stated that in their non-interpretive capacities, Courts do go beyond just interpreting the text of a statute. Justice Felix Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in his article, 'Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes' [47 Colum.L.Rev 527, 543 (1947)] wrote: "Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy, is not drawn like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not to be led off the trail by rests that have overtones of subjective design." 6.6. Acceding to the contention of the Revenue Parliament has prescribed the limitation period for accomplishing penalty proceedings and that no such period is prescribed for initiating them and therefore they can be initiated at any time, would defeat the very purpose of such a prescription. On....