TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2002 (12) TMI 665
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.... the ends of justice. R.P. (Crl.) Nos. 626 and 627 of 2002 in Crl. A. No. 761 of 2001. 3. In this case, it is to be stated that appeal of the main accused Bihari Manjhi and others was allowed and were acquitted on the basis that there was no other evidence except the so-called confessional statement which was totally unreliable and faulty investigation. This is also a fit case for altering the death sentence and imposing sentence of imprisonment for life. 4. For this purpose, I would rely upon the dissent noted by Thomas, J. in Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan and Ors. v. State : 1999 CriLJ 4587 which is reproduced hereunder:- "17. The Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 1980 CriLJ 636 has narrowed down the scope for awarding death sentence to the extremely restricted radius of "rarest of rare cases" in which the alternative lesser sentence of imprisonment for life is unquestionably foreclosed. In the main judgment in the present case one of the three Judges found that sentence of imprisonment for life would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice as far A-1 Nalini. 18. In a case where a Bench of three Judges delivere....
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....ot in order. However, when it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicants that they had conceded to the position that their submissions with regard to the review application were restricted to the question of sentence at the threshold, it was submitted that a reference to the conclusions arrived at may be incidental and necessary. 7. The primary stand of the applicant in the review application as noted above is that as a matter of practice, this Court never imposed death sentence when there was an acquittal by the trial court or the High Court. It was also submitted that since one Hon'ble Judge in each case felt that either life sentence should be imposed or acquittal should be there, the judgments should be reviewed and the matter should be referred to a larger Bench to decide this issue. Reference was made to the minority view in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145 a and contended that in view of the irrevocable nature of the death sentence, in the facts situation as noted above, death sentence cannot be appropriate. Reference was made to several decisions where this Court had not imposed death sentence because of the acquittal by the trial court....
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....or should be heightened when life or liberty is in peril since civil penalties are often less traumatic. So, it is reasonable to assume that the framers of the rules could not have intended a restrictive review over criminal orders or judgments. It is likely to be the other way about. Supposing an accused is sentence to death by the Supreme Court and the 'deceased' shows up in court and the court discovers the tragic treachery of the recorded testimony. Is the court helpless to review and set aside the sentence of hanging? We think not. The power to review is in Article 137 and it is equally wide in all proceedings. The rule merely canalizes the flow from the reservoir of power. The stream cannot stifle the source. Moreover, the dynamics of interpretation depend on the demand of the context and the lexical limits of the test. Here 'record' means any material which is already on record or may, with the permission of the court, be brought on record. If justice summons the Judges to allow a vital material in, it becomes part of the record; and if apparent error is here, correction becomes necessitous. 35. The purpose is plain, the language is elastic and inter....
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....y to a ground analogous to "an error apparent on the face of the record" and secondly in a Bench of three Judges or of greater strength if a learned Judge is not inclined to confirm the death sentence imposed on a convict, the majority will be precluded from confirming the death sentence as that per se would become open to review." 12. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, appearing for the applicant-Devender Pal singh tried to distinguish the aforesaid view on the ground that the same related to question of life and death sentences, and not of acquittal and death sentence. When it was put to him as to the basis for making reference to a larger Bench, it is submitted that the same was in the background of Article 21 of the Constitution and after receiving the view of the larger Bench the review could be disposed of. On a query made as to whether that would not amount to creation of an appellate forum in respect of a decided case, his answer was in the negative. However, he submitted that even if it so, that would not to be material when the life of a person in the background of Article 21 was involved. 13. It was pointed out that whenever there is an acquittal by the trial....
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....h sentence for the person who is found guilty of murder is onerous indeed. But by sentencing a person to death, the court is giving effect to the command of law which is in public interest whereas in committing the murder or being privy to commit murder, even if it be a vengeance for another murder, the convict is violating the law which is against public interest." 16. This position was re-iterated in Ramdeo Chauhan's case (supra) in the following words: "This Court considered the scope of review and the limitations imposed on its exercise under Article 137 of the Constitution of India in Lily Thomas v. Union of India 2000 CriLJ 2433 and held: 52. The dictionary meaning of the word 'review' is 'the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement'. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a....
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....cies." Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to present irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard." Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualize the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And Clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court....
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....f an error apparent on the face of the record. (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceedings, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except "where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility": Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib 1975 (1) SC 674 54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: '1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by....
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....Court referred to its earlier judgments in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner U.P. 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [1966] 3 SCR 744 and Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. [1963] 1 SCR 778 and concluded that the citizens should not suffer on account of directions of the Court based upon error leading to conferment of jurisdiction. The directions issued by the Court were found on facts to be violative of the limits of jurisdiction resulting in the deprivation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant therein. It was further found that the impugned directions had been issued without observing the principle of audi alteram partem. 56. I follow, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature o....
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....ision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. It is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard to the highest court departing from its binding precedent are different from the grounds on which a final judgment between the parties, can be reconsidered. Here, we are mainly concerned with the latter. However, when reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought, the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to the decision made in the case, is normally brought under challenge. It is, therefore, relevant to note that so much was the value attached to the precedent of the highest court that in The London Street Tramways Company Limited v. London County Council 1898 A C 375, the House of Lords laid down that its decision upon a question of law was conclusive and would bind the House in subsequent cases and that an erroneous decision could be set right only by an Act of Parliament. 25. In Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation 1926 AC 155, Lord Shaw observed: "Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a pro....