2026 (8) TMI 269
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....-06, on the following grounds:- "1. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-XXXI, Mumbai [hereinafter referred to as the CIT(A)] erred in restricting the allowance of the head office (HO) expenses to the amount allowable under section 44C of the Income tax Act, 1961 (the Act) as against the appellants claim that the entire head office expenses of Rs. 15,043,330 and Rs. 52,742 paid to Head office for reimbursement of SWIFT expenses are allocated to the Indian branches is allowable as a deduction as per the provisions of Article 7(3) of the convention between the Government of U.A.E. and the Government of India (hereinafter referred to as the DTAA) as applicable for the year under appeal. 2. The CIT(A) erred in upholding th....
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..../11/2009 and the Cross Objection ought to have been filed by 11/12/2009. However, the assessee has explained that at the relevant point of time the issue relating to allowability of Head Office expenses stood covered against it by earlier orders of the Tribunal in assessee's own case for A.Ys. 1995-96 to 1997-98 and, therefore, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, no separate cross objection/appeal was filed at that stage. It is submitted that, subsequently, when the coordinate bench of this Tribunal in assessee's own case for A.Y. 1998-99 vide order dated 08/05/2015 held that the entire Head Office expenses allocated to Indian branches were allowable under Article 7(3) of India-UAE DTAA, the assessee filed the present Cross Obj....
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....t upon it to file the Cross Objection within the prescribed limitation and seek appropriate relief. The assessee consciously chose not to avail of the statutory remedy and, therefore, the delay is the result of a deliberate and informed decision rather than circumstances beyond its control. 2.2.3. The Ld.DR further submitted that the subsequent decision of the coordinate Bench in the assessee's own case for A.Y. 1998-99 dated 08.05.2015 cannot revive a remedy that had become time-barred several years earlier. A subsequent favourable judicial pronouncement does not constitute a fresh cause of action nor can it furnish sufficient cause for condoning an inordinate delay. Acceptance of such a plea would render the law of limitation otios....
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....od. According to the assessee, immediately upon the coordinate Bench rendering a favourable decision in its own case for A.Y. 1998-99 vide order dated 08.05.2015, the present Cross Objection was filed on 15.01.2016. 3.1. In our considered opinion, the explanation offered by the assessee does not constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation of such an inordinate delay. The law of limitation requires a litigant to diligently pursue the statutory remedies available under the Act. Merely because the issue was covered against the assessee by the prevailing judicial view at the relevant point of time could not have precluded it from filing a Cross Objection within the period prescribed under law, particularly when the assessee intended to con....
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....lly uncertain and contingent upon future judicial developments, thereby defeating the very object of limitation statutes, namely, certainty, finality and repose in litigation. The law does not contemplate a situation where limitation begins to run afresh every time a judicial pronouncement takes a different view on a legal issue. A subsequent change or clarification in the judicial interpretation of law cannot, by itself, constitute a "sufficient cause" to explain a delay that had already occurred much earlier. Were such a proposition to be accepted, the discipline imposed by limitation provisions would become illusory, enabling parties to revive stale claims solely on account of subsequent judicial developments, a consequence clearly imper....
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....re, exercised their discretionary jurisdiction in favour of condonation. In the present case, however, the delay is not attributable to any circumstance beyond the control of the assessee. Rather, it is an admitted position that the assessee consciously chose not to file the Cross Objection within the statutory period on account of the prevailing judicial position. Such a deliberate litigation strategy, followed by an attempt to invoke a subsequent favourable decision as a justification for the delay, stands on an entirely different factual footing. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the authorities relied upon by the Ld.AR are distinguishable on facts and are of no assistance to the assessee. 3.6. We also find that the princ....
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