TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (7) TMI 1459
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....ns of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. 2. The Informant is an Indian stainless steel market participant engaged in the downstream production and trade of stainless-steel products. The Informant has claimed confidentiality over its identity throughout the investigation process and any ensuing proceedings under the Act against the Opposite Parties. 3. As per the Information, OP-1 is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at O.P. Jindal Marg, Hisar, Haryana, India - 125005. OP-1 owns integrated operations to run stainless steel manufacturing and processing facilities in India and across the world. 4. As per the Information, OP-2 is a large-sized Chinese enterprise active in the stainless steel and nickel industry in Indonesia. It entered the Indonesian nickel industry in 2009. The board of directors of OP-2 is stated to govern four groups (including OP-2) and more than 100 subsidiaries. Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park ('IMIP'), a subsidiary of Tsingshan Holding Group through OP-2, is OP-2's overseas project located in Morowali in Central Sulawesi Province in Indonesia. The Morowali Park is recognised as the world's largest vert....
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....y OP-3 supplies SS Slabs to OP-1 alone, excluding other Indian importers. Further, when Ministry of Steel, Government of India ('MoS') adopted a stringent approach of not allowing SS Slab imports without a valid Bureau of Indian Standards ('BIS') license in 2023, OP-1 shifted to imports of SS HRC. OP-1 entered into similar restrictive arrangements with OP-4 and OP-5 for the supply of SS HRC, whereunder they refused to supply SS HRC to any other Indian CRSS manufacturer. Such agreements are in the nature of exclusive dealing and refusal to deal vertical agreements and in violation of Section 3(4)(b) and Section 3(4)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act. 10. The Informant has delineated the relevant market at two levels: (i) the broad market for CRSS products in India; and (ii) the narrower market for wide CRSS products in India. According to the Informant, CRSS products are classified into "wide" and "narrow" categories based on their width, with each category serving distinct applications and end-use industries. Owing to their differing characteristics and downstream uses, the Informant has contended that the two categories cater to different consumer segments and are not substi....
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....r eligibility, and provides for discounts and bonus incentives linked to procurement volumes. The Informant has alleged that these incentives increase progressively with higher levels of procurement, thereby encouraging exclusive sourcing from OP-1. 14. The Informant has contended that the aforesaid agreements and commercial arrangements have cumulatively resulted in the denial of market access to rival stainless-steel manufacturers, creation of entry barriers in the Indian stainless-steel market, a reduction in consumer choice, and the artificial elevation of prices, thereby distorting competitive conditions in the market. 15. The Informant has, inter alia, prayed that the Commission initiate an inquiry into the conduct and arrangements of the Opposite Parties under Section 26(1) of the Act by directing the Director General ('DG') to investigate the matter, direct the OPs to cease and desist from the alleged anti-competitive conduct with immediate effect, impose a monetary penalty equivalent to 10% of the average turnover of the OPs for the three preceding financial years ('FYs'), and exercise its powers under Section 28 of the Act by directing the divestment of OP-1's i....
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....ility of such inputs, particularly nickel-bearing grades. According to the Informant, Indonesia is the predominant source of SS Slab imports into India, accounting for approximately 581,000 tonnes, constituting a substantial share of total imports. The Informant has further stated that SS Slabs (used in the manufacture of flat CRSS) and billets (used in the manufacture of long CRSS) are also imported from countries such as Singapore (approximately 28,000 tonnes) and the United Arab Emirates (approximately 32,000 tonnes). The Informant has also submitted that Indian manufacturers may procure wide SS HRC from domestic integrated stainless-steel producers, including the Steel Authority of India Limited's Salem Steel Plant. However, owing to the limited domestic availability of certain grades, particularly nickel-bearing 300 series stainless steel used in the manufacture of flat CRSS products, manufacturers continue to rely on imports of SS Slabs and SS HRC. 17.3 In response to the Commission's query seeking data or analysis demonstrating that competing CRSS producers faced production constraints due to lack of access to SS Slabs or SS HRC, the Informant has submitted that a....
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....e end of FY 2021-22. The Informant has further submitted that OP-1's imports of SS Slabs, used in the manufacture of wide CRSS products, increased significantly, by nearly 100%, between calendar years 2024 and 2025, whereas imports of finished wide CRSS products increased by approximately 40% during the same period. Based on the foregoing, the Informant has alleged that the combined effect of the upstream supply arrangements and the downstream incentive schemes has resulted in foreclosure of competition and denial of market access. Submissions of OP-1: 17.5 OP-1 submitted that the Informant has incorrectly treated SS Slabs and SS HRC as the primary upstream inputs in the stainless-steel value chain. According to OP-1, the production process begins with raw materials such as stainless-steel scrap, carbon steel scrap and ferro-alloys (including ferrochrome and ferronickel), while SS Slabs and SS HRC are merely intermediate products generated at successive stages of an integrated manufacturing process. OP-1 further contended that the Informant's proposed delineation of the downstream market as "wide CRSS" is artificial, as it does not reflect distinct competitive conditi....
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....mpetitors or restrict their access to inputs. It has also submitted that the exclusivity and territorial provisions are ancillary to the joint venture, necessary to protect substantial capital investments and take-or-pay commitments, and operate only between the contracting parties without restricting third parties from sourcing inputs from alternative suppliers. OP-1 has further contended that nickel-rich raw materials, stainless-steel scrap, SS Slabs, SS HRC and CRSS are available from multiple domestic and international sources, including suppliers within Indonesia and outside the ET Group. Accordingly, OP-1 has argued that the Informant's allegation of input foreclosure is premised on the erroneous assumption that scarcity of nickel or participation in an upstream joint venture necessarily results in downstream foreclosure. OP-1 has also submitted that the Informant has failed to establish any denial of access to inputs, dependence on OP-1 for procurement, exclusion of competitors, or appreciable adverse effect on competition. It is submitted that the joint venture represents a commercially rational arrangement aimed at ensuring supply continuity and operational efficiency ....
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....rity, ensure traceability and prevent the mixing of non-JSL material with JSL-branded products. It has contended that participation in both arrangements is entirely voluntary, limited to a period of one year, and is not a precondition for procuring material from OP-1. OP-1 has further argued that the schemes are objectively justified on account of operational efficiencies, capacity utilisation requirements, and brand protection considerations, and are consistent with the principles recognised in the CCI v. Schott Glass judgment, 2025 INSC 668 (Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014). OP-1 has also submitted that the Informant has failed to produce any evidence demonstrating foreclosure of competition, exclusion of competitors, reduction in consumer choice or any appreciable adverse effect on competition, and has pointed out that a majority of pipe and tube manufacturers in India do not procure from OP-1 and remain free to source their requirements from alternative suppliers. 17.10 In regard to the Commission's query seeking an explanation of the structure and functioning of the market for CRSS products in India, including key participants, market shares, sources of supply, demand seg....
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....classification under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, wherein HS Code 7219 covers flat-rolled stainless-steel products having a width of 600 mm or more, while HS Code 7220 covers products having a width below 600 mm. According to OP-1, this classification is intended for customs and tariff administration and is not determinative for defining the relevant market under the Act. OP-1 has further contended that there is no material distinction between wide and narrow CRSS from a competition law perspective, relying on the observations of the Directorate General of Trade Remedies ('DGTR') in its 2015 anti-circumvention investigation that the cost differential between the two categories was minimal. OP-1 has also submitted that both wide and narrow CRSS cater to substantially similar customer segments and are used in common applications, including white goods, automotive components, fabrication and industrial uses, thereby indicating a significant overlap in demand conditions and competitive constraints. 17.14 As regards the Commission's query, seeking details of CRSS sales, segmented into wide and narrow categories, by OP-1 and its competitors in terms of volume and value, along wit....
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.... the last five FYs based on its published annual reports. Analysis 18. The grievances raised by the Informant primarily relate to the agreements and arrangements between OP-3 and OP-1 for the supply of SS Slabs, as well as those between OP-4 and OP-5 with OP-1 for the supply of SS HRC, which are alleged to constitute exclusive dealing and refusal to deal arrangements in contravention of Sections 3(4)(b) and 3(4)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act. The Informant has also alleged that OP-1 has abused its dominant position in the market for wide CRSS products in India in contravention of Sections 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(c) read with Section 4(1) of the Act. Further, the Informant has alleged that the conduct of OP-1 under its Jindal Saathi programme and the associated MoUs amounts to an abuse of dominant position in contravention of Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(c) read with Section 4(1) of the Act. Determination of Relevant Market and Dominance 19. The Commission notes that the relevant market proposed by OP-1, namely the market for procurement and supply of raw materials and intermediate inputs used in stainless-steel manufacturing in the global market including India, appears....
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....manufacturer, sought procurement of SS Slabs or SS HRC from OP-3, OP-4 or OP-5 and was refused supply. The allegations are therefore based largely on circumstantial indicators such as import patterns, strategic investments and Indonesia's position in the nickel value chain. 23. The Commission also observes that as per OP-1, it is not the only entity procuring such inputs from Indonesia, noting that Rimjhim Stainless also imports SS slabs from Indonesia, while companies such as Viraj Profiles procure billets from Indonesian facilities. OP-1 further states that SS HRC is routinely imported into India from several countries, including Sweden, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China and France, and that numerous BIS-certified suppliers are authorised to export such products into India. It is also submitted that OP-1, through its affiliates, supplies billets sourced from Indonesia to various domestic manufacturers In addition, OP-1 points to the presence of several domestic suppliers of SS Slabs, SS HRC and other intermediate products, including Salem Steel Plant, Rimjhim/BRG Iron & Steel, Lohia Alloys, Valley Iron/Bindal Stainless and Sambhav Stainless. 24. Further, the Commission also....
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....P-1 preferential access to the joint venture's output, the submission indicates continued availability of alternative domestic and international sources of supply. Further, no evidence has been produced demonstrating denial of access to competitors, foreclosure of upstream supply sources, or appreciable adverse effects on competition. Thus, the allegations against OPs in respect of exclusive dealing and refusal to deal arrangements leading to foreclosure of access to SS Slabs and SS HRC appear to be unfounded, and prima facie there appears to be no violation of Sections 3(4)(b) and 3(4)(d) of the Act. Analysis of Allegations pertaining to Section 4(2)(c) of the Act 27. The allegation under Section 4(2)(c) of the Act is premised on the assertion that the impugned arrangements have resulted in input foreclosure and consequent denial of market access to competing manufacturers. However, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Informant has not placed any evidence on record to demonstrate that it, or any other competing manufacturer, sought access to SS Slabs, SS HRC or other critical inputs and was denied such access. Likewise, no evidence has been adduced to show that any....
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....hat OP-1, through its Jindal Saathi programme and the associated MoUs, abused its dominant position by implementing a multi-tiered incentive structure that created de facto exclusivity and lock-in for downstream purchasers of CRSS. According to the Informant, the volume-based discounts, quarterly and annual bonuses, and MoU signing incentives were contingent upon meeting high State-wise procurement thresholds, thereby compelling purchasers to source most, if not all, of their requirements from OP-1. It was further alleged that the interlinked incentive structure effectively forced participants to renew MoUs year after year, foreclosing competitors. The Informant also contended that OP-1 coerced downstream entities into signing the MoUs through threats of delayed or discontinued supplies and used periodic audits, ostensibly conducted for anti-counterfeiting purposes, to monitor compliance and ensure maximum procurement from OP-1, thereby reinforcing its dominance and denying customers a meaningful choice. 32. The Commission notes from the submissions of OP-1 that it introduced the Jindal Saathi programme in July, 2019 as a co-branding initiative for pipe and tube manufacturers wi....