TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (7) TMI 811
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....as 'the 'ITAT') for the aforesaid assessment years rejecting/dismissing the Appellant- Assessee's appeals, filed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax, (Appeals) (for short 'CIT-A') dated 24th September 2025. The ITAT by its order dated 30th January 2026 upheld the order of the CIT-A on the ground that the Appellant-Assessee had filed the appeals belatedly before the CIT-A. 3. By the present appeals the Appellant-Assessee has raised the following questions of law: - (a). Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, was the Hon'ble Tribunal justified in dismissing the appeal of the Appellant in limine on the ground that such inordinate delay of 1797 days (987 days considering extension of limitation on account of Covid Pandemic) in filing an appeal before the CIT (A), NFAC cannot be condoned in absence of any sufficient cause shown by the Appellant by outrightly rejecting the affidavit of the Trustee of the Appellant filed during the course of hearing? (b) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, was the Hon'ble Tribunal justified in dismissing the appeal of the Appellant in limine, overlooking the fact that ....
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....exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act. However, on account of an inadvertent omission on the part of its Chartered Accountant (CA), the prescribed Form No.10B, which was required to be furnished for claiming the said exemption, was not filed along with the ITR. Consequently, in the assessment order passed under Section 143(1) of the Act, the benefit of the said exemption was not granted to the Appellant- Assessee. iv. The Appellant-Assessee intended to challenge the order passed under Section 143(1) of the Act by filing an appeal before the Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre (for short, "CIT(A), NFAC"). However, the appeal could not be filed within the prescribed period of limitation. The limitation for filing the appeal expired on 26th October 2019, as the order under Section 143(1) of the Act was passed on 26th September 2019. The appeal ultimately came to be filed only on 24th September 2024, resulting in a delay of 1,797 days. v. It is the case of the Appellant-Assessee that, in view of the extension of the period of limitation granted by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 Pandemic by its order....
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....ond the control of the Appellant-Assessee. ix. By the impugned order dated 30th January 2026, the ITAT dismissed the appeals preferred by the Appellant-Assessee. The ITAT held that there was an inordinate delay of 1,797 days in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) NFAC and that the Appellant-Assessee had failed to establish any valid justification or sufficient cause warranting condonation of the said delay. The relevant observations of the ITAT contained in paragraph 7 onwards of the impugned order are reproduced hereinbelow: 7. We have heard both parties on this preliminary issue of condonation of delay. We have also deliberated on the decisions relied on by the Id. AR. There was a delay of 1797 days in filing appeal before the CIT(A). The Ld. AR submitted that the appellant did not receive the intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act by post at its address. The tax consultant also did not provide him proper guidance regarding filing of appeal before CIT(A). It was also submitted that there was COVID-19 pandemic due to which the Government of India and Hon'ble Supreme Court had extended the limitation period for filing of appeals. After excluding such period, there woul....
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....he law on the subject issue by stating that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation of time, the applicant has to explain as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason, which prevented him to approach the Court within the limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. 9. We also find that in a subsequent decision pronounced on 28.04.2024, in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (dies) & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), in SLP (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to and discussed various decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court namely (i) Bhag Mal (Alias) Ram Bux & Ors vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs & Ors (2007) 11 SCC 285 (SC), (ii) Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji (supra) (iii) Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962) 2 SCR 762, (iv) Maqbul Ahmad and Ors vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, AIR 1935 PC 85 (v) Br....
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....or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." 11. After discussion on various cases in its order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Para 26, has summed up the law laid down by it as under: "26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justiceoriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; ....
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..... Since delay in filing the appeal has not been condoned, it becomes academic in nature to discuss the merit of the case and hence, they are not required to be adjudicated. 16. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. ITA No.7652/M/2025 (AY 2019-20) 17. Facts of the above appeal and grounds raised by the appellant are similar to those in ITA No.7651/M/2025 (AY 2018-19) decided above. Following the reasons given therein, this appeal is also dismissed. 18. In the result, both the appeals of the assessee are dismissed. Order is pronounced on 30.01.2026. 5. We have heard Mr. Pankaj Toprani along with Mrs. Krupa Shah, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the Appellant-Assessee, and Mr. Prathmesh Bhosale, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent-Revenue. 6. Mr. Toprani, learned counsel for the Appellant-Assessee, submitted that the ITAT failed to adopt an appropriate approach which the law would require while considering an application for condonation of delay. According to him, the Appellant-Assessee had placed on record sufficient and bona fide reasons explaining the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A)....
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....ed counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and have perused the proceedings with their assistance. In the facts of the present case, we are of the considered view that the ITAT, by the impugned order dated 30th January 2026, has adopted a pedantic approach. The record indicates that the Appellant-Assessee had explained the reasons for the delay before both the CIT(A), NFAC as well as the ITAT. In our considered opinion, such reasons assigned for the delay deserved due consideration in the facts and circumstances of the present case. We are, therefore, in agreement with the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant-Assessee that the delay in filing the appeals deserve to be condoned and the matter ought to be heard and decided on its own merits. 13. Our view is fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Inder Singh (supra), upon which reliance has rightly been placed by the learned counsel for the Appellant-Assessee. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has succinctly enunciated the governing principles relating to condonation of delay and has held that, in an appropriate case, the merits of the matter deserve to be ....
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....te Court) and of about a year thereafter for filing the Second Appeal before the High Court, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, which, at the cost of repetition relate to land claimed by the State as government land and in its possession, persuade us to not interfere with the Impugned Order. Relevantly, initially the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, which decision was reversed by the First Appellate Court. 16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 held: '10. ... There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse....