TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (6) TMI 515
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e GST Act"). 3. Sri Madhab Lal Agarwal, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that error in computation of period of limitation enshrined in Section 107 of the GST Act by the Additional Commissioner of State Tax (Appeal), Central Zone-I, Cuttack, ("Appellate Authority", for convenience) has given rise to the present dispute. Aggrieved by the adjudication order dated 15th October, 2025 passed under Section 73 of the GST Act pertaining to tax periods April, 2022 to March, 2023 by the Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, Cuttack-I City Circle, Cuttack, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 13th February, 2026 under Section 107 of the GST Act in Form GST APL-01 as prescribed under Rule 108 of the Odisha Goods and Services Rules, 2017/Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 (collectively, "the GST Rules"). 3.1. Sri Madhab Lal Agarwal, learned Advocate referred to sub-Section (1) of Section 107 of the GST Act to contend that the petitioner was required to present the appeal against order dated 15th October, 2025 within "three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated", i.e., 15th January, 2026 as the period of three months is to b....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....here can be no dispute as to the affimation of the petitioner that the date of adjudication order is 15th October, 2025 and date of filing of appeal is 13th February, 2026, which are borne on record. 4.1. Nonetheless, he raised objection that the petitioner has alternative remedy of appeal under Section 112 of the GST Act and having not exhausted such remedy available under the statute, the petitioner may be relegated to avail such opportunity in order to ventilate its grievance. 5. Heard Sri Madhab Lal Agarwal, learned Advocate representing the petitioner and Sri Sourav Tibrewal, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the Commercial Tax and Goods and Services Tax Organisation. Perused the record. 6. From the pleadings in the writ application and submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it transpires that the adjudication order under Section 73 of the GST Act was made on 15th October, 2025 and it is admitted by the petitioner that the same was communicated to it via common portal on the said date. The appeal was presented on 13th February, 2026 as is apparent from "Acknowledgment for submission of appeal" vide Form GST APL-02 (see Annexure-5). Therefore, it was....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....mmission of the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector. In that context, Andhra Pradesh High Court examined the meaning of the word 'month': whether it would mean 30 days in which case the complaint should be filed within 90 days from the date of knowledge. After referring to Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, it was held that the word 'month' would mean a calendar month and by extension the term 'three months' as appearing in Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 would only mean a period of three calendar months. 38. Again, in Bibi Salma Khatoon Vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 197 : AIR 2001 SC 3596, Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1961 which provided that benefits under the said act could be availed of if an application is made within three months of the date of registration of the documents of transfer. Posing the question as to what was meant by the word 'month', Supreme Court held that British calendar would mean Gregorian calendar. It was held that when the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date, the period of one month would expire upon the day in the succeeding m....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....y other period of time is to be excluded. But when the word 'to' is used, the last day in a series of days or any other period is to be included. Thus, Section 9 of the General Clauses Act statutorily recognizes that while computing the time period, the first date is to be excluded when the word 'from' is used and to include the last date when the word 'to' is used. 46. In Tarun Prasad Chatterjee Vs. Dinanath Sharma, (2000) 8 SCC 649, Supreme Court explained the principle contained in Section 9 and held that when a period is delimited by statute or rule which has both a beginning and an end, and the word 'from' is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word 'to' is to be used. It was held thus: 'In order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed "from" a particular point. When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 require to exclude the first day.' 47. This position was also explained by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Cour....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....024. 4.1. The last date for presenting the appeal within the specified period of two months from this date (13.04.2024) would fall on 12.06.2024 and the condonable period of one month would lapse on 12.07.2024. Concededly by counsel both the parties, the appeal was presented on 12.07.2024. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the Appellate Authority has misguided himself and his approach in computation of period of limitation is tainted. The Appellate Order dated 23.12.2024 is faulted with in view of Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 read with Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 4.2. The relevant provisions may be referred to, to have better comprehension of computation of period of limitation contained in Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994: (i) Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act: 'An appeal shall be presented within two months from the date of receipt of the decision or order of such adjudicating authority, made on and after the Finance Bill, 2012 receives the assent of the President, relating to service tax, interest or penalty under this Chapter: Provi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....on Act, the day from which the limitation period is to be reckoned must be excluded. In this case, the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 34 will have to be reckoned from 30.06.2022, when the appellants received the award. In view of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 30.06.2022 will have to be excluded while computing the limitation period. Thus, in effect, the period of limitation, in the facts of the case, started running on 01.07.2022. The period of limitation is of three months and not ninety days. Therefore, from the starting point of 01.07.2022, the last day of the period of three months would be 30.09.2022. As noted earlier, the pooja vacation started on 01.10.2022.' 4.4. It is apposite to refer to the principle of calculation of period of limitation as suggested in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi Vs. State of Gujurat and another, (2014) 11 SCC 759, wherein it has been observed as follows: '*** 12. The first question which calls for our answer is the meaning of the expression "month": whether it would mean only a period of 30 days and, consequently, whether six months wou....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... expires at the end of the latter month.' 22. Drawing a conclusion from the abovementioned authorities, we are of the opinion that the use of word "from" in Section 138(a) requires exclusion of the first day on which the cheque was drawn and inclusion of the last day within which such act needs to be done. In other words, six months would expire one day prior to the date in the corresponding month and in case no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous month. Hence, for all purposes, the date on which the cheque was drawn i.e. 31.12.2005 will be excluded and the period of six months will be reckoned from the next day i.e. from 01.01.2006; meaning thereby that according to the British calendar, the period of six months will expire at the end of the 30th day of June, 2006. Since the cheque was presented on 30.06.2006, we are of the view that it was presented within the period prescribed.' 4.5. Taking note of very many decisions, in M/s. Brand Protection Services Private Limited Company Vs. State of Bihar and others, 2025 SCC OnLine Pat 772 reference has been made to State of H.P. Vs. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 and the Patna High Court....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e of limitation would commence from the next date, i.e., 13.04.2024. This Court, therefore, hold that the next day of receipt of Order-in-Original, subject-matter of appeal, shall be construed to be the commencement date of limitation for the purpose of Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994. 4.8. To fortify such view, provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read with the interpretation set forth in decisions referred to supra unequivocally manifest that the delay in presenting the appeal under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be condoned for a further period of one month, if the same is presented beyond the period of two months reckoned on and from 13.07.2024." 7.3. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements on the issues: 'meaning of month' and reckoning the date of commencement of limitation period, it has to be held that the Appellate Authority proceeded erroneously in computing the period of limitation envisaged under sub-rule (1) read with sub-rule (4) of Section 107 of the GST Act, which is an error apparent. Therefore, it is held that the order dated 23rd March, 2026 passed by the Additional Commissioner of State Tax (Appea....