TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (5) TMI 440
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....emerges from the material on record, is summarised hereinbelow: A. The genesis of the present ECIR lies in an investigation pertaining to another ECIR/DLZO-II/05/2019 ["the 2019 ECIR"], related to Religare Finvest Limited. During the investigation in respect of the 2019 ECIR, it was found that one Ms. Aditi Singh had made certain financial transactions, on the basis of which she was summoned on 17.06.2021. Her statement was recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, and she tendered her mobile phone. B. After CDR and technical analysis of her phone, it was revealed that she was getting calls, purportedly from Government of India officers, specifically the Home Minister's office and the Prime Minister's office. It was also found that the calls were made through a mobile application, by which the caller can hide his/her real number and choose a number that he/she wants to reflect on the screen of the recipient. C. The caller was identified to be Sukesh Chandrasekhar @ Sukash Chandrasekhar [hereinafter, "Sukesh"], who was in judicial custody in Rohini Jail, in connection with unrelated criminal proceedings. Sukesh is the petitioner's husband. D. FIR No.....
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.... the total number of accused persons to eighteen. I. In respect of the predicate offence, a chargesheet has also been filed in FIR No. 208/2021, lodged at Police Station Special Cell. In the chargesheet, Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 ["MCOCA"] has been invoked, alleging that Sukesh and the petitioner were running an organised crime syndicate alongwith their associates. The petitioner has been named in four prior cases with Sukesh, details of which are as follows: i. FIR No. 186/2017, lodged at Police Station Crime Branch, Delhi, under Sections 201/120B of the IPC and Sections 7/12/13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. ii. Crime No. 24/2013, registered at Central Crime Branch Police, Chennai, under Sections 406/409/420/34 of the IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act. iii. Crime No. 33/2015, registered at Economic Offences Wing, Mumbai, under Sections 420/120B of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 19781. iv. Crime No. 64/2013 [RC 6E/2014/BSFC] registered at Central Crime Branch, Chennai, under Sections 406/409/420/120B of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the....
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....05.2023. The Sessions Court noted that the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA are not required to be fulfilled by the petitioner, on account of being a woman. However, the Court dismissed her bail application having regard to sufficiency of evidence, seriousness of allegations against the petitioner, possibility of tampering evidence, and the fact that efforts were already being made for early completion of trial. B. SUBMISSIONS BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES 5. Mr. Malik, in support of the application, submitted as follows: a. The petitioner, being a woman, falls within the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA, and therefore the rigours of the twin conditions prescribed under Section 45 would not apply to her. Reference in this connection was made to Supreme Court judgments in b. The petitioner seeks Shashi Bala @ Shashi Bala Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement Criminal Appeal No. 212/2025 decided on 15.01.2025 [hereinafter, "Shashi Bala"]. and Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2269 [hereinafter, "K. Kavitha"]., the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ["CrPC"]....
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.... pointed out that the petitioner did not abscond even after being served notice by the ED; in fact, she joined and cooperated with the investigation throughout. She has deep roots in society, and there is no likelihood of her evading the process of law, if released on bail. 6. Mr. Gurnani, on the other hand, submitted as follows: a. Women are not automatically exempted from the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA. It was argued that the proviso to Section 45 cannot be construed as mandatory in nature, as such an interpretation would risk enabling misuse, by allowing women to be used as conduits or scapegoats in money laundering activities. To this effect, Mr. Gurnani relied on Saumya Charausia v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) 6 SCC 401 [hereinafter, "Saumya Chaurasia"].. b. The petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS, as she is involved in multiple cases, at least four with coaccused Sukesh. In view of Section 479(2) of the BNSS, she cannot claim the benefit of prolonged incarceration. c. In any event, this is a fit case for invocation of the second proviso to Section 479(1), and detention beyond the provided period. d. It was also argu....
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.........." Emphasis supplied. 8. Although Section 45 provides for satisfaction of certain conditions for grant of bail in cases under PMLA, the proviso expressly vests discretion upon the Court, in case the accused is a woman. The Supreme Court, in K. Kavitha, while examining the scope and applicability of the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA, and after considering its earlier decision in Saumya Chaurasia, held as follows: "16. A perusal of the above proviso would thus reveal that the proviso permits certain category of accused including woman to be released on bail, without the twin requirement under Section 45 of the PMLA to be satisfied. No doubt that, as argued by the learned ASG, in a given case the accused even if a woman may not be automatically entitled to benefit of the said proviso and it would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. However, when a statute specifically provides a special treatment for a certain category of accused, while denying such a benefit, the Court will be required to give specific reasons as to why such a benefit is to be denied. xxx xxx xxx 22. We find that the learned Single Jud....
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....he rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA would not be applicable to a woman. 10. The import of the above decisions is that in the case of a woman accused, even under PMLA, discretion is vested in the Court with regard to bail, and she is not to be subjected to the rigours of Section 45, unless exceptional reasons are demonstrated. The benefit of the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA is available to all women as a class, and is not limited to "vulnerable women", to the exclusion of educated or sophisticated individuals. ED's case turns on the alleged involvement of the petitioner as a principal accused in the predicate case, and the quantum of proceeds of crime, which allegedly came into her hands, or passed through her hands. In my view, these factors are insufficient to oust the protection conferred upon the petitioner by statute. No such special circumstances have been shown in the present case. II. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 479 OF BNSS 11. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that she is entitled to the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS [corresponding to Section 436A of the CrPC], which reads as follows: "Section 479: Maximum period for which under-tri....
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....s of the Supreme Court: a. In Satender Kumar Antil, the Court held as follows: "63. Section 436-A of the Code has been inserted by Act 25 of 2005. This provision has got a laudable object behind it, particularly from the point of view of granting bail. This provision draws the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained. This period has to be reckoned with the custody of the accused during the investigation, inquiry and trial. We have already explained that the word "trial" will have to be given an expanded meaning particularly when an appeal or admission is pending. Thus, in a case where an appeal is pending for a longer time, to bring it under Section 436-A, the period of incarceration in all forms will have to be reckoned, and so also for the revision. 64. Under this provision, when a person has undergone detention for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence, he shall be released by the court on his personal bond with or without sureties. The word "shall" clearly denotes the mandatory compliance of this provision. We do feel that there is not even a need for a bail application ....
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.... period of sentence. In the case of a "first time offender", this threshold is reduced to one-third, by application of the proviso. However, an exception may be made in terms of the second proviso. The computation of the period of detention is to be made after deduction of any period for which the delay was found to be due to the accused, by application of the Explanation. Further, Section 479(2) creates an exception in the case of an accused facing inquiry, investigation or trial in many offences or multiple cases. 14. In the context of the present case, the applicability of Section 479 is thus dependent upon the following questions: A. Has the petitioner crossed the threshold period of custody under Section 479(1) and/or the first proviso thereto? B. Is the period required to be adjusted under the explanation to Section 479(1) on account of any delay attributable to the accused? C. In the petitioner's case, does Section 479(2) require bail to be refused, in view of multiple offences/cases pending against her, despite crossing the threshold period of custody? D. Do the facts of the case require an exception to be made under the second proviso....
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.... constitutes delay attributable to the accused, it is only such period that would be excluded from the computation of the period of custody, under the Explanation to Section 479 of the BNSS. In the present case, however, the petitioner had already completed more than half the maximum period of sentence by 23.04.2025, as she was arrested in connection with the subject case on 09.10.2021. It would thus be inappropriate to deny her the benefit of the provision on this ground. 19. The next aspect to be considered is whether the petitioner is to be deprived of the benefit of the statute by reason of Section 479(2) of the BNSS. 20. Mr. Gurnani submitted that the said provision, which was not part of Section 436A of the CrPC, but has been introduced in BNSS, makes an express exception in the case of individuals, who are subjected to investigation, inquiry or trial, in more than one offence or in multiple pending cases. It is submitted that in the petitioner's case, in addition to the present complaint proceedings instituted by ED, she is accused in three cases, enumerated in paragraph 3(I), as also in the predicate offence, i.e. FIR No. 208/2021 at PS Special Cell. It was, however, ....
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....offence. In Panna Lal Mahto @ Ganjhu v. Union of India Bail APP No. 9384/2022, decided on 06.12.2024. [also a PMLA Case], the Jharkhand High Court distinguished Badshah Majid Malik, on the ground that the accused therein was facing prosecution in several predicate and scheduled offence cases. 24. Relying upon these judgments, Mr. Gurnani submitted that, in cases to which Section 479(2) of the BNSS applies, the Court must consider the question of the petitioner's entitlement to bail in its discretion, without strict applicability of Section 479(1) of the BNSS. 25. As far as the interpretation of the section is concerned, I am of the view that a holistic interpretation, informed both by the statutory objective and constitutional context, must be favoured. As noted by the Supreme Court, in Satinder Kumar Antil and V. Senthil Balaji [in the context of Section 436A of the CrPC], the statute provides a safeguard against prolonged incarceration pending trial. While an exception can be made under the first proviso to Section 436A CrPC [now the second proviso to Section 479(1) of the BNSS], that exception must be sparingly invoked to further the constitutional guarantee of liberty. In....
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....who was allegedly involved in assisting Sukesh in laundering and layering the proceeds of crime. While granting bail, this Court had also extended to him the benefit of Section 436A of the CrPC. Bail was also granted by this Court to co-accused Avtar Singh Kochar [BAIL APPLN 1814/2022, decided on 29.11.2023.], who was alleged to be the principal hawala operator facilitating the movement of the proceeds of crime, though his age and medical ailments were also relevant considerations. Both Arun Muthoo and Avtar Singh Kochar were thus granted bail, despite the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA being applicable to them. 30. Co-accused Pooja Singh has also been granted bail by this Court [BAIL APPLN 79/2023, decided on 29.08.2023.]. She was alleged to be a salaried employee whose role was confined to handling of the alleged extorted amount. 31. Further, co-accused Jacqueline Fernandez, whose role was allegedly similar to that of the petitioner, being a beneficiary of the proceeds of crime, was granted bail by the Special Court vide order dated 15.11.2022. 32. Certain other co-accused have also been enlarged on bail by the Special Court, including Pradeep Ramdani, who was alleged....
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.... IV. RESULT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION 35. Having regard to the period of custody undergone, viewed in the light of Section 479 of the BNSS, the fact that the petitioner had joined the investigation prior to her arrest, the non-applicability of the stringent conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA, and the benefit of parity with similarly placed co-accused who have already been granted bail, I am of the considered view that the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail in the present case. 36. It may be noted that by a separate judgment delivered today, I have declined bail to the petitioner in the predicate offence [FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Special Cell, Delhi]. In my view, the present case, however, stands on a different footing, for the following principal reasons: A. First, the twin restrictions on grant of bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA are applicable to the petitioner, whereas Section 45 of the PMLA is not. B. Second, the maximum period of sentence under Section 3 of MCOCA is life imprisonment, whereas in the present case, it is imprisonment for a period of seven years, which leads to an entirely different consideration of the ....