1973 (5) TMI 106
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....n was non-payment of rent covered by clause (a) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act, the Rent Controller, on September. 16. 1964 passed an order as required by sub-section (1) of section 15 of the said Act, against the appellants to deposit areas of rent amounting to Rs. 3,700/- upto May 27, 1964 and then up to date rent at the rate of Rs. 300/- which was nixed as the interim rent within one month from that date and future rent at the same rate month by month by the 15th of each succeeding, month. It was not disputed that the arrears of rent and the interim rent were deposited by the appellants upto April, 1966. In another proceeding between the parties for fixation of standard rent, the Controller by his order d....
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....64 under subsection (I) of section 15 of the Act referred to earlier be modified and an order be made for deposit of rent in view of the circumstances mentioned in this application. 3. By order dated August 6, 1968, the respondent's application under sub-section (7) of section 15 of the Act was dismissed. By this order, the Controller condoned the appellants' default in depositing the rent and fixed a date for disposing of the appellant's application dated June 11, 1968 for modification of the order dated September 16, 1964 4. Being dissatisfied with the dismissal of his application under subsection (7) of section 15 of the Act, the respondent filed an appeal before the Tribunal. By order dated December 6, 1968, the Tribunal a....
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....assed. If the appeal against the order under sub-section (7) of section 15 which may be described as an interlocutory order or even as a preliminary order succeeds the final order even if passed in the mean time will have to be suitably modified. Reliance by the respondent on Durga Swaroop v. Murari Lal [(1964) 68 PLR 586], is misconceived. In fact this was a contrary case because it was decided in this case that when an order striking out the defence is made, the remedy of the aggrieved party lay in filing appeal against that order and where no such appeal is filed, the order becomes final and, therefore, cannot be challenged in an appeal against the final order of eviction. On the contrary, it is legitimate to apply the analogy of a preli....
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....r the appeal was brought before or after the passing of the final decree; and that the Court when setting aside or varying the preliminary decree can and should give directions for setting aside or varying the final decree if the existence of the final decree is brought to its notice as in all cases it should be." 6. In my opinion, these observations would apply with equal force to an appeal against an order under sub-section (7) of section 15 of the Act during the pendency of which a final order of ejectment has been passed following this order. The same idea is expressed by the well settled principle of law that certain orders and decrees which are subordinate and dependent upon earlier orders and decrees could only remain in force so ....
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....suspension of rent by reason of the fact that under section 108(e) of the Transfer of Properly Act the only option left to the appellants after the destruction of the tenancy premises was to treat the lease to be void and that the appellant's did not exercise such option and in fact continued to hold on to the tenancy premises. I, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission based on the word "may" and hold that the Tribunal was entitled to come to a contrary conclusion on the basis of law particularly in an appeal against an order which was appealable under the Act. On the second point on merits, it is contended that it was the appellants right to suspend payment of rent on the destruction of the premises and upon the refusal of....
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....dead with the property as he chooses. What is even more important is that a mere declaration of intention to treat the lease as void is not sufficient. The lessee must also yield up possession of the property to the lessor as required by the provisions of Section 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act. He cannot continue in possession and yet declare that he has treated the lease as void. That would obviously, be an inconsistent and impermissible position to adopt. So long as a lessee has not surrendered to his lessor the possession which he obtained from the latter at the time of the lease, he cannot rid himself of his obligations under the lease. His holding to the possession into which ha was inducted by his lessor will estop him to the....
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