TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1965 (5) TMI 53
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....d Judge held the election to be void was that the notification issued by the Government, dated 26th November, 1963 for inviting objections against the proposed delimitation of the wards did not conform to the mandatory requirements of Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), inasmuch as at least one month was not given to the electors to file their objections against the draft delimination order. The learned Judge in taking the view which he did followed his earlier decision in Ram Krishna v. State of Rajasthan, 1964 Raj LW 121. The only point that, therefore, arises for our consideration is whether the notification dated 26th November, 1963 fulfilled the requirements of Section 14(2) of the Act and whether Ram Krishna's case which was followed by the learned Judge laid down the law correctly. Section 14 of the Act runs as under: "14. Delimitation order--(1) The State Government shall by order determine- (a) the wards in which each municipality shall be divided for purpose of elections to the board; (b) the extent of each ward; and (c) the number of seats, if any, reserved for members....
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....ontext and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as "from such a day" or "until such a day" are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended- As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. Section 2. Period on expiration on which an act may be done. Exclusion of last day: When a period is fixed before the expiration of which an act may not be done, the person for whose benefit the delay is prescribed has the benefit of the entire period, and accordingly in computing it the day from which it runs as well as the day on which expires must be excluded and the act cannot be done before midnight of that day. On the other hand, in computing the ten days required for the notice of an appeal to the sessions, it has been held that, while the day of service should be excluded, the first day of....
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.... other cases, it would seem, the rule is to exclude the first and include the last day." 5. It will be thus seen from the above passages that there are two distinct categories of cases. In one category fall the cases where an act has to be done on or after the expiration of particular prescribed period and the other category comprises of cases where a thing is permitted to be done within a stated period. It has been held that where an act could be done only after the expiry of a stated period both the terminal days of the period are to be excluded. But in the second category of cases while the first terminal day is excluded the last day of the prescribed period is to be included and it is permissible to do the act only before the last day expires. In this light we may now examine the cases that have been placed before us. In Anokhmal v. Chief Panchayat Officer. Rajasthan, Jaipur, ILR (1956) 6 Raj 1044: (AIR 1957 Raj 388) a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the words "at least 7 days before the date of election" occurring in Rule 4 of the Panchayat Election Rules which runs as follows: "Rule 4 of the Rules is as follows: The Returning Officer shall....
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....by the electors against the proposed delimitation was that unequal wards with unnatural boundaries had been deliberately formed with ulterior motives. It will thus be seen that there was a violation of Section 14(2) inasmuch as clear one month was not allowed for filing objections and there was violation of Section 14(3) inasmuch as the objection which was filed within the time allowed under Section 14(2) was not considered." From the essentials of the reasoning of the learned Judge disclosed by the above passage it is not clear that he considered previous available authorities on the subject. In Harinder Singh v. Karnail Singh, (S) AIR 1957 SC 271 their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to ascertain the true character of the words "not later than fourteen days" and the words "within a period of fourteen days" in connection with the filing of an election petition, that is the time within which an election petition could be presented. Their Lordships observed that both the expressions meant the same thing. The observations made by their Lordships were as follows: "This argument proceeds on an interpretation of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act which, in our....
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....on 149 C. P. C. for doing a thing had to be computed. In that case by an order dated 15th May, 1953 a certain court fee was allowed to be deposited within a month from that date. Applying Section 9 of the General Clauses Act the first day, that is, 15th May 1953 was excluded and so excluding it the court fee could according to learned Judges be deposited upto 15th June, 1953. In Shri Nath v. Gopi Chand, AIR 1964 All 416 a notice to vacate certain premises "within thirty days" was given and a question arose whether this fulfilled the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument before the learned Judge was that the words "within thirty days' meant "less than thirty days". The learned Judge negatived the suggestion and held that the tenant did get "thirty days' time" to vacate and there was no difference between a notice asking a tenant to vacate within 30 days and in giving him 30 days' time. The above, cases, to our mind, come under the second category. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to Jai Bhagwan Sharma v. Matu Ram Bhola Ram, AIR 1964 Punj 135. In that case the election programme was published on 29th J....
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.... could have a genuine belief that the words 'within a week" could mean that the Accommodation Controller must have exercised his option before the expiry of the period. To cut the gordian knot the learned Judge reduced the fine on account of the legitimate ignorance of the law, according to him, on the part of the accused. 9. In Nagappa Chettiar v. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad. 831 (2) the question was about the holding of a meeting of shareholders of a company and the issue was whether the meeting was held after giving the requisite notice. This case also, in our view, fails in the first category of cases and is therefore no authority for dealing with a case like the present one. In D. Sangayya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 AP 462 the words that came up for consideration were "be made not less than 6 weeks" occurring in Section 57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act in connection with the making of an application for grant of permits in pursuance of a scheme of nationalisation. It was held by the learned Judge that 6 clear weeks, that is 42 days must elapse between the date of the application for permits and the date on which they are to take effect. In interpreting the w....
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....", and therefore he argues that both the terminal days have to be excluded. We find ourselves unable to agree to this proposition. Supposing one were to say that a certain figure should not be less than 'X', then 'X' plus something is certainly 'not less' than 'X'. In other words, whatever is more than 'X' is 'not less' than 'X'. But a thing which is just equal to 'X' is also not less than 'X'. In other words, a period of just one month is certainly 'not less' than one month though it is not more than one month. The problem therefore is one of computing this period. We have the statutory rule enacted in Section 10 of the General Clauses Act that in counting a particular period specified by law, we have to exclude the first day. The question whether the last terminal day is to be excluded is not governed by any statutory principle like the first day. But in the very nature of things the problem is one of finding the legislatures intention and for that the language of the statute alone is the safe guide. Consequently, we are of the opinion that for determination of the question whether in a particular cas....
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....the present case under Section 11(2) of the Act does conform to the requirements of the Section and the same is not rendered illegal. 15. As we have already observed the learned single Judge has not borne in mind the two distinct categories of cases and indeed Ram Krishna's case, 1964 Raj LW 121 on which he has placed reliance, does not lay down the law correctly on this point. 16. The result is that we hereby accept the appeals and while setting aside the judgment of the learned Judge dated 18th August, 1964 hereby dismiss the writ petition. ============= Document 1 "जयपà¥à¤° । नबमà¥à¤¬à¤° 26, 1963 संखà¥à¤¯à¤¾ à¤à¤« 4(34) à¤à¤®à¤¾à¤‡à¤²à¥‡à¤•à¤¾à¤¸à¥€ 1/63/4015 :-- जैसा कि राजसà¥à¤¥à¤¾à¤¨ मà¥à¤¯à¥à¤¨à¤¿à¤¸à¤¿à¤ªà¥ˆà¤²à¤¿à¤Ÿà¥€à¤œ à¤à¤•à¥à¤Ÿ । 1951 । à¤à¤•à¥à¤Ÿ स. 38 सन 1951) की धारा 14 की उप-धारा (2) à¤....