TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (4) TMI 1445
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...., Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai - 400 023; b) for costs of this Company Application and orders thereon;". 2. However, before adverting to the rival contentions, it is useful for context to set out the following facts: i. The Applicant is the owner and landlord of a flat measuring 1,100 square feet situated on the ground floor of a building known as Jayshree Chambers, 82 Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai 400 023 ("the said premises"). ii. It is not in dispute that the Bank of Karad ("the Bank") has been the tenant of the said premises since 1962 and that in the year 1985, a Suit for eviction was filed by the original owner of the said premises, i.e., one Smt Devi Narendra and others, against the Bank. The Applicant subsequently acquired the right, title, and interest in the said premises from Smt Devi Narendra in the year 1962 and is now admittedly the Plaintiff in the said eviction Suit which is pending in the Small Cause Court, Bombay. iii. Pursuant to the Orders dated 27th May 1992 and 20th July 1994 passed by this Court, the Bank was directed to be wound up, and the Respondent was appointed as Liquidator of the Bank. The Respondent therefore took charg....
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....espondent is not carrying out any other activity for the benefit of the winding up of the Bank; and (iii) the premises were not required for any other activity in connection with the Bank. He thus submitted that the circumstances that exist today are materially different from those that existed when the First Application was filed and when the First Order was passed. He submitted that these changed circumstances showed that the Respondent did not need the said premises or, at least, the entirety of the said premises. 5. Mr. Kamat then pointed out that when the First Application was filed, there were seventy-five pending cases concerning the Bank, however, the Respondent had, in the Affidavit dated 18th July 2024, set out the current status of the litigation, which was a list of only twenty cases. He pointed out that, out of those twenty cases, only eleven were pending. He, therefore, submitted that, on the Respondent's own showing, the number of cases had considerably reduced and, therefore, even the need to store the papers relating to those cases would have reduced. He then submitted that over a year had elapsed since the Affidavit-in-Reply was filed by the Respondent....
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....t submitted that the response of the Respondent to the Applicant's notice to admit was, to say the least, evasive and lacking in any detail. He therefore submitted that the Reply was entirely self-serving, and it was clear that the Respondent was treating the premises as a dumping ground, having taken no steps to digitise or appropriately store stale, dead, or disposed-of records. He reiterated that the Respondent was deliberately not doing so only to create a false justification to perpetually retain possession of the premises. He thus submitted that Respondent's requirement of the premises was not genuine or bona fide. 10. He then placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Jaikishan Narang HUF v. Surendra Engineering Corporation Ltd. [Bombay High Court] Order dated 12th March 2025 in Company Application No. 332 of 2015., to point out that the Liquidator's need for the premises is to be strictly construed and the genuineness of such a requirement must be examined by the Court. He submitted that if on examination it was found that the said premises were not needed by the Liquidator, the same would have to be surrendered or returned, as the case may be. 11. Mr. Kamat a....
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....lord-tenant relationship; and (iii) rent had in fact been duly tendered, though not accepted, and therefore the legal relationship between the parties remained unchanged. Mr. Kamat submitted that this stand of the Respondent was clearly an attempt to improve upon the case pleaded by the Respondent in the First Application since the Respondent was now attempting to assert perpetual rights over the said premises and monetise the same. He submitted that this stand now taken by the Respondent was not only an afterthought but also wholly untenable in law and unbecoming of a Liquidator. 15. Mr. Kamat submitted that the Respondent's contention that the said premises could be retained and monetised for inclusion in the liquidation process was contrary to, and in clear violation of, Sections 26 and 56 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 ("Rent Control Act"). He pointed out that Section 26 expressly prohibits a tenant from assigning or transferring its tenancy in the absence of a contract to the contrary, thereby imposing a clear statutory bar. He then placed reliance upon Section 56(ii) of the said Rent Control Act to point out that a transfer of tenancy was permitted only....
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....ld apply in the present case, particularly as the earlier order expressly granted liberty to the Applicant. He submitted that the present application was filed pursuant to such liberty, especially in light of the changed circumstances now prevailing as compared to those existing at the time of the First Order. He also submitted that, during the hearing of the First Application, the Respondent had led both this Court and the Applicant to believe that the original and sensitive documents were stored at the said premises to justify the Respondent's need to retain the same. He submitted that given what had been disclosed in the letter dated 12th February 2026, it was now evident that the original documents relating to the 1992 scam, as well as other sensitive records, had in fact been seized by the CBI as far back as 1992 itself. He reiterated that the information had not been disclosed to this Court during the earlier proceedings. In these circumstances, Mr. Kamat submitted that the Respondent cannot be permitted to invoke the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel, particularly when the present application is founded on material facts that were either suppressed or have subsequen....
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....plication, had therefore sought leave to file an Additional Affidavit to demonstrate the alleged change in circumstances. He, however, pointed out that the Additional Affidavit also merely reiterated the same grounds taken in the First Application without any significant addition. He then submitted that it was clear that there had been no substantive change in circumstances since the passing of the First Order, save and except a reduction in the number of cases. 24. Mr. Cama then from the order dated 23rd March 2001, pointed out that this Court had noted that (i) the premises were being used for the purposes of liquidation; (ii) there existed a genuine need for storage of records and material; (iii) the premises served as an official correspondence address with statutory authorities; (iv) it was primarily for the Respondent to determine the necessity of retaining the premises; and (v) the Court ought not to substitute its own assessment so long as the reasons furnished by the Respondent were reasonable. He submitted that since there had been no change in any of these other material factors which weighed with this Court when the First Order was passed the principles of res judica....
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....uidator requires the portion of the flat (now in his actual possession) for storing the company books, is certainly a relevant consideration. Mr Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the official liquidator does not require the said premises for storing the books and that he can store the books in his office or anywhere else. Maybe, the liquidator can do so, but we cannot force him to do so, so long as the reason given by him for continuing in possession is a relevant one. Secondly, the fact of the proposal of the Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, who are said to have formed an action committee of the Khandesh Mill Employees Industrial Production Co-operative Society, for revival of the said company was an equally relevant factor. Mr Sanghi states that the said proposal has come to nought. We do not know. Suffice it to say that the reasons for which the application filed by the appellant-landlord (and his appeal) have been dismissed cannot said to be irrelevant. We cannot, therefore, interfere with the said orders. The appeal is, accordingly dismissed. No costs." (Emphasis Supplied) 26. Mr. Cama then took pains to point out that the judgements in the case o....
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....d other office infrastructure at the premises and is actively using the same, as is evident from the photographs placed on record; and the Respondent has been paying rent for the said premises even after the First Application was dismissed in 2001. The Respondent's position as a tenant: 30. Mr. Cama submitted that the Respondent is admittedly a tenant of the said premises and was therefore entitled to protection as a tenant from eviction and the other rights enuring to the benefit of a tenant, including the right under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, which included the surrender of the tenancy or transfer the same for receipt of monetary consideration. He thus submitted that there was a vested statutory right in a tenant to potentially monetise the tenancy. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the following decisions: M/s. Veertag Investments and Finance Co. v. M/s. Premier Brass and Metal Works Ltd. AIR 2003 Bom 217, Tangerine Electronics System Ltd. v. Indian Chemicals & Ors. 2004 (2) ALL MR 551., Re: Kailash Financiers (Calcutta) Pvt. Ltd. (1982) 1 Comp LJ 100 (Cal)., and Kanubhai H. Prajapati v. Official Liquidator & Ors. (1999) 1 GLR 429....
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....n Jaikishan Narang was also entirely misplaced. He pointed out that in the case of Jaikishan Narang, the Liquidator had not even commenced using the flats in question and had taken possession of the flats only two years before the said order was passed. He pointed out that in the present case, the Bank had been the tenant of the said premises since 1962, and the fact that the Respondent was using the said premises was clearly noted in the First Order. He also took pains to point out that this Court had in the case of Jaikishan Narang specifically referred to and distinguished the First Order passed by this Court in the First Application. He thus submitted that the decision in the case of Jaikishan Narang would therefore not apply. 35. Mr. Cama thus summed up by reiterating that (i) the issue stands covered by the judgment and order dated 23rd March 2001, and no new or changed circumstances exist as would warrant taking a different view (ii) the premises are still being used by the Respondent and are very much required inter alia for the reasons set out above and in the earlier proceedings, which found favour with this Court when rejecting the First Application (iii) the reasons ....
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.... of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala Bafna. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in paragraph 25 of the decision in the case of Nirmala Bafna specifically held that what is to be considered when considering an application of the present nature is whether the reason furnished by the Liquidator for continuing the possession is a relevant reason and nothing more. Therefore, it is through this lens that the present Application must be viewed. D. In the present case, though the number of cases has undeniably reduced, it is not even the Applicant's case that the liquidation proceedings have come to an end. The reasoning adopted by this Court while dismissing the First Application was anchored in the context of the ongoing liquidation proceedings, as is plain from a reading of the First Order. Thus, the very circumstances that weighed with this Court while passing the First Order, continue to exist in material measure even today, despite the passage of considerable time. Furthermore and crucially, the Applicant has also, by making an offer to provide alternate premises to the Respondent, conceded to the fact that the Respondent is in need of and is ma....
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....f these decisions would apply. H. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the Respondent is in occupation of the said premises as a tenant. The proposal made by the Applicant is to provide alternate premises on a leave and licence basis. This would, in effect, require the Respondent to relinquish its vested tenancy rights and accept occupation under a materially different and less secure legal arrangement. In my view, this Court cannot, in the exercise of its summary jurisdiction, compel the Respondent to do so. As already noted in (C) above, the test in these summary proceedings, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala Bafna, is to assess whether the reason furnished by the Liquidator for continuing in possession is a relevant reason and nothing more. The scope of these summary proceedings cannot, therefore, be enlarged beyond anything but that. I. Also, for the reasons set out in (A), (D) & (G) above, I do not find that this is a fit case for this Court to exercise its powers under Order XXVI Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for the purpose of directing an appropriate investigation to identify bank records that a....