TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (3) TMI 1537
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.... out of a proceedings of IA (IBC) (Plan) No. 8 / 2024, resulting into approval of Resolution Plan. But, owing to the fact that the Company Appeal is accompanied with a Condone Delay Application being IA No. 1100 / 2025 and the same has been vehemently opposed by the Respondents Counsels, we will have to consider and answer the arguments that has been extended by the Ld. Counsels for the Appellant in support of the Condone Delay Application, before we venture into the Company Appeal itself, which we may not be required to, since the question of maintainability of the Appeal as against the order of approval of Resolution Plan will have to be decided first. 2. Few chronological dates, which would be relevant for the purposes of the instant Company Appeal would be that; (a) The order, which is under challenge was pronounced on 26.03.2025. (b) The Company Appeal was e-filed before the Registry of this Tribunal of 11.05.2025. (c) The impugned order of the Company Appeal was uploaded by the Tribunal on 27.03.2025. (d) The period of limitation i.e. 30 days as prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 61 of I & B Code, 2016, computed from the date....
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....s as provided under the proviso to sub-section (2) cannot be said to be the part of limitation period as prescribed under law. He submits that, additional time upto a maximum of 15 days beyond the period of 30 days can be granted to parties to file their Appeals at the discretion of the Appellate Tribunal, depending upon the circumstances of each Appeals, which cannot be claimed by the Appellants as a matter of right. Therefore, this period of 15 days would not be falling within the period of limitation as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 61 of I & B Code, 2016. 7. He submits that the benefit of Section 4 of Limitation Act, will only be available for Appeals filed under Section 61 of I & B Code, 2016, when the Court vacation commences during and before the expiry of the "prescribed period" of limitation of 30 days and that, it will not be available if the vacation commences during the 15 days period beyond the 30 days prescribed period, because the said 15 days period is not included in the prescribed period of limitation as per Section 61(2) of the Code. 8. In relation thereto, he has referred to a Judgment as reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1042, Tata Steel V. Raj K....
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....expired on 25.04.2025. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid Paragraph 4.1 has stated in categorical terms that Section 4 of the Limitation Act, will be applicable only when the prescribed period of limitation expires during the period of the closure of the Court and it will not be applicable in respect of the period extendable by the Court at its discretion. 12. The implication of the "prescribed period" of limitation, has been elaborated in detail in the aforesaid Judgment vide the observations that have been made in Para 10.1 and 10.2 of the said Judgment. Therein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained as to how would the term "prescribed period" of limitation, as defined under Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, is to be considered in the context of provisions contained under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides for the extension of the limitation period till re-opening of the Court, if the prescribed period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed. In Para 10.1, it has been held that the prescribed period under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, will have to be read with Section 2(j) which defines the "period of limitation", and t....
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....l or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation.-A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.' The above section enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day the court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. 13. The crucial words in section 4 of the 1963 Act, are 'prescribed period'. What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: '2(j) "period of limitation" (which) means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and "prescribed period" means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act;' Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned i....
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....he 1963 Act are "prescribed period". What is the meaning of these words ? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: "2. (j) 'period of limitation' which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and 'prescribed period' means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act." Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the "period of limitation" and, therefore, not "prescribed period" for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the "period of limitation" or, in other words, "prescribed period", in our opinion, section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the....
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....11 to 15 as under : (Assam Urban [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624; (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 68.] [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624; (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 68.] case)... 53. Therefore, as such the question involved in the present appeal is squarely answered against the appellant and the said issue is as such not res integra... 58. Therefore, in light of the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act and when section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 specifically excludes the applicability of section 10 to any act or proceeding to which the Limitation Act, 1963 applies and in light of the definition of 'period of limitation' as defined under section 2(j) read with section 4 of the Limitation Act and as observed and held by this court in Assam Urban [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624; (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 68.], benefit of exclusion of period during which the court is ....
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....he interpretation of the judgment put forth by Mr. Kaul during the hearings, a reading of the entire judgment does not indicate that the court in Assam Urban [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624; (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 68.] held section 4 of the Limitation Act, to be inapplicable. The wording of paragraph 9 of the judgment makes it clear that the Limitation Act, does not apply only to the extent that its applicability is excluded by an express provision in section 34(3). While the court did not explicitly deal with whether section 4 of the Limitation Act, was excluded, a reading of the entire judgment makes it clear that the court proceeded on the basis that section 4 applies. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept Mr. Kaul's submission that section 4 was held to be excluded in Assam Urban [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624; (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 68.] . His further submission that once the Limitation Act, is inapplicable, there was no occasion for the court to decide on the applicability of section 4 only t....
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....he Arbitration Act, specifically provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceeding in Court. However, as observed and held by this court in Assam Urban, the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to the matters of arbitration covered by the 1996 Act save and except to the extent its applicability has been excluded by virtue of express provision contained in section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.' (emphasis supplied) In paragraphs 55 and 56, it discussed Popular Construction [Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470; 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1186.] and Hindustan Construction [State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518; (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207; 2010 SCC OnLine SC 429.] on the inapplicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, and the mandatory nature of the 30-day time limit for condonation of delay, respectively. 29.3. Finally, in paragraphs 57 and 58, in light of the proviso to section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which specifically excludes its applicability to any act or proceeding to which the Limitation Act, applies, the court rejected the applicability of sect....
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....ndable by court in exercise of its discretion.'' 13. In elaboration to the rational of determining the period of limitation by virtue of a prescription under law, the Hon'ble Apex Court apart from the aforesaid fact has also considered the implication of the judgment of V. Nagarajan V. SKS Ispat & Power Limited in Para 10.3 of its Judgment, as to how the aspect of prescribed period has to be considered for the purposes of extension of benefit of limitation in the light of the provisions contained under Section 61 of I & B Code, 2016. Relevant Para 10.3 is extracted hereunder:- "10.3. In V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd. [(2022) 231 Comp Cas 284 (SC); (2022) 2 SCC 244; (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 741; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 959.], this court provided crucial clarifications regarding the computation of limitation periods under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It was held that under section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the limitation period for filing an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal commences from the date of pronouncement of the order by the National Company Law Tribunal, not from the date when the order is received or mad....
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....clusion can ensue. In fact, the Explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position that the time which is taken by the court to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said that the right to receive a free copy under section 420(3) of the Companies Act, obviated the obligation on the appellant to seek a certified copy through an application. The appellant has urged that rule 14 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules empowers the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal to exempt parties from compliance with the requirement of any of the rules in the interests of substantial justice, which has been typically exercised in favour of allowing a downloaded copy in lieu of a certified copy. While it may well be true that waivers on filing an appeal with a certified copy are often granted for the purposes of judicial determination, they do not confer an automatic right on an applicant to dispense with compliance and render rule 22(2) of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules nugatory. The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for....
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.... no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation. On the second question, rule 22(2) of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal, which continues to bind litigants under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. While it is true that the Tribunals, and even this court, may choose to exempt parties from compliance with this procedural requirement in the interest of substantial justice, as reiterated in rule 14 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, the discretionary waiver does not act as an automatic exception where litigants make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of their grievance. The appellant having failed to apply for a certified copy, rendered the appeal filed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal as clearly barred by limitation." 14. The ultimate conclusion has been drawn by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 11.1 of the Judgment in the matter of V. Nagarajan (supra). In the said Paragraph, Hon'ble Apex Court has ca....