TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (3) TMI 1250
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....ling with issues of condonation of delay, because of the fact as argued that an absolute restriction on extension of time as statutorily prescribed and upheld by the various judgments restricting the extension of limitation as contemplated under Section 61 of the I & B Code, the same principles or the preposition laid by precedents will not apply while we are considering the appeals under Section 42 of the I & B Code. Section 42 of the I & B Code reads as under: - "Section 42: Appeal against the decision of liquidator. *42. A creditor may appeal to the Adjudicating Authority against the decision of the liquidator 1[accepting or] rejecting the claims within fourteen days of the receipt of such decision." 3. Section 42 of the I & B Code in its strict sense, prescribes that it is a judicial remedial avenue prescribed for the Creditor to invoke an appellate jurisdiction before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority, as against the decision of the Liquidator rejecting their claim. 4. The aspect of limitation providing the cut-off period therein is self- contained within the provision, which prescribes for the appeal, as against the rejection of claims, a specific 14 days....
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....on 42 of the I & B Code because law contemplates that 14 days, has to be determined from the date of the receipt of the decision. And in that eventuality, the 14 days would be construed from 19.02.2020 onwards when the information of order was imparted to the Appellant, for a period of 14 days and not beyond the said period. 8. However, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that since the proceedings by way of Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No.23/2020 Sansar Investment & Finance Company Pvt. Ltd. versus Atlantic Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., was already pending consideration before this Appellate Tribunal and the aspect of rejection of the claim by the Liquidator, was also brought to the knowledge in the proceedings of appeal against CIRP order in itself. Hence, we could safely conclude that at least in the proceeding that was held before this Appellate Tribunal, on 24.02.2020, the Appellant was conscious of his right of preference of an appeal under Section 42 of the I & B Code, as against the decision of the Liquidator of rejecting his claim as informed to him by the email communication of 19.02.2020. However, the Appellant has chosen not to prefer an appeal despite....
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...., the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be." 12. The said provision prescribes that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply, "as far as may be" to the proceedings of appeal before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority. On a simplicitor reading of Section 238A, which deals with a general law of limitation which has been to be made applicable to the proceedings or an appeal before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority or the NCLAT. It relates to those proceedings where the aspect of limitation or an aspect of condonation of delay is not a self-contained provision as contained in the appellate provision, and that is why the lawmakers under Section 238A of the I & B Code, have made the provision of limitation applicable by carving out an exception by using an expression "as far as may be", that means it provides a generality to the application of this provision which in itself excludes its applicability to the special statute or provisions of law which itself contains a self-inscribed period of limitation. In that eventuality, the provision contained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be ....
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....ion 238A of the of the I & B Code, will not be attracted to override a specific bar of extension of time period in the absence of the same being prescribed under the provisions contained under Section 42 of the I & B Code. Thus, the argument extended by Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that he would be covered by Section 238A of the I & B Code, will not be attracted, owing to the aforesaid reasons, as we have already discussed in the preceding paragraph. 16. Besides that, even if we look into the factual backdrop of the instant case, the number of days of delay that has chanced in preferring the appeal under Section 42 of the I & B Code is too long period to be considered for condonation of delay because that deceives the very object of the preference of an appeal under Section 42 of the I & B Code, as there happens to be a delay of total 1616 days of delay and after exclusion of 895 days of delay, there would still be a delay of 716 days, which is much beyond the statutory object or frame work of law. 17. Under either of the circumstances, the number of days of delay that has been sought to be condoned would be much beyond the ambit of the condonation of delay as prescribed und....