TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (3) TMI 86
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....1.21 acres of land. 2. By the said judgment, the High Court also upheld the review order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer (hereinafter referred to as "B.L. & L.R.O."), Bharatpur-II, Murshidabad, West Bengal, as well as the Government Order dated 26.02.2008 issued by the Principal Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal. Consequently, the High Court directed the concerned authorities, including the Revenue Officer to accept land revenue and cess from the respondent-company in respect of 211.21 acres of land which it had been permitted to be retained pursuant to the order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the B.L. & L.R.O., Bharatpur-II, Murshidabad under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 ("the WBEA Act, 1953", for short) and Section 14Q(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 ("the WBLR Act, 1955" for short). FACTUAL MATRIX 3. The dispute has arisen from the respondent-company's claim to retain certain lands under the provisions of the WBEA Act, 1953, which was allowed by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The facts in brief essential for adjudication of....
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....procedure under which an intermediary entitled to retain the land under Section 6 (1) of the 1953 Act, can apply to the concerned authority i.e., Settlement Officer or Revenue Officer authorised by the Settlement Officer in this behalf before the expiry of 30.04.1958, a statement in writing in Form 'B' appended to Schedule 'B' appended to these Rules. 7. In exercise of this right conferred under Section 6(1)(j) of the 1953 Act, after the State Government issued the notification under Section 4 of the WBEA Act, 1953, as claimed by the respondent-company, it submitted the duly filed Form 'B' on 14.08.1956 claiming entitlement to retain the entire extent of land measuring about 239.71 acres under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 on the ground that the respondent-company was engaged exclusively in farming, which according to the respondent-company was permitted by the concerned Revenue Officer. However, according to the appellants, the respondent-company failed to produce any copy of the alleged order of retention said to have been passed by the Revenue Officer, at any stage in any of the proceedings before the High Court, or prior to it. It may also be noted that the High Cour....
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.... Court's order dated 03.12.1971 declining to extend the status quo order by filing an appeal bearing FMAT No. 3241 of 1971 (later re-numbered as FMA 686 of 1971). In the said appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court passed an order dated 14.12.1971 directing the maintenance of the status quo. 11. Subsequently, the Civil Rule issued in the main writ petition, being C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971, wherein the order of the Revenue Officer was challenged, was discharged by the High Court, on 23.09.1975, due to nonappearance by the respondent-company. 12. Later, the respondent-company filed a separate application seeking restoration of the main writ petition, C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971, which was dismissed for default on 23.09.1975. The said restoration application, however, was rejected by the High Court on 11.03.1987 on the ground of inordinate delay of nearly twelve years. Against the said dismissal of the restoration application, the respondent-company filed an appeal, FMAT No. 791 of 1987, which also came to be dismissed for default by the High Court on 07.02.2002. 13. Consequently, the order of the Revenue Officer dated 07.10.1971, whereby the respondent-company was denied th....
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....rit petition was disposed of as withdrawn, as the same would have a direct bearing on the decision in this appeal. 17. During the pendency of the above-mentioned writ petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001 before the High Court, it appears that the respondent-company submitted a proposal to Chief Minister of the State of the West Bengal, seeking an amicable settlement of the vested land in its favour, for setting up an eco-friendly agro-based industry, and sought review of the order dated 07.10.1971, passed by the concerned Revenue Officer. Consequently, as claimed by the respondent-company, the then Minister-in-Charge made a note on the file as "Please discuss". The erstwhile Minister-in-Charge then recorded the following comments on the file: "Discussed. This will be possible only when the company first withdraws all the cases". Accordingly, the respondent-company submitted an affidavit on 22.02.2008 to withdraw all pending court cases, including the aforementioned writ petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001, pending before the High Court. 18. Acting on the aforesaid proposal of the respondent-company which was apparently accepted by the State government, the Land Reforms Commissioner-cu....
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....s may like to follow. There is a possibility of employment generation for nearly 500 people in the said project; And whereas said company's project has already been approved by The Small Industry Services Institute' under the Ministry of Small Scale Industries, Govt. of India vide report dtd. 6.6.2007. The Deptt. of Food Processing Industries & Horticulture', Govt. of West Bengal has also requested for the clearance of the said company's land within the provision of law vide their memo no. 568/FPI & H/0-1/580 dtd. 19.9.2007. The District Industries Centre-Murshidabad' has also approved the aforesaid project vide their memo no. 356/1 (1) dtd. 15.6.2007. The Principal Agricultural Officer-Murshidabad' has also inspected the Trial cultivation of 'Menthal Arvensis' plants on the said land by the said company and found it to be very vigorous and satisfactory as certified vide his memo no. 245/Dev dtd. 28.2.07; And whereas the 'Local Gram Panchayat' has already issued 'no objection certificate in favour of the said company vide their letter dated 25.4.2007 recommending that the experimental plant set up so far to extract Mentha oi....
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....pondent-company to retain a total of about 211.21 acres of land and vesting nearly 28.50 acres in the State. In furtherance of the review order, the respondent-company furnished a cheque to the Revenue Officer towards payment of land revenue, which was eventually returned by the Revenue Officer. Aggrieved by the non-acceptance of the land revenue, the respondent-company filed an application, being OA No. 1463 of 2009, before the Tribunal seeking a direction to the concerned authorities to accept the said land revenue and provide the certified copies of the record of rights. The Tribunal, by its judgment dated 31.03.2010, dismissed the respondentcompany's application and quashed the review order dated 07.05.2008 by holding that the concerned Revenue Officer was incompetent to undertake the review proceedings as no such power of review was specifically given. 20. Assailing the said judgment of the Tribunal, the respondent-company filed a writ petition, being WPLRT No. 43 of 2010, before the High Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 17.05.2012 allowed the said writ petition and directed the concerned Revenue Officer to accept the land revenue and cess from the respond....
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....shi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur [(2010) 11 SCC 159], that the doctrine of estoppel cannot override statutory provisions. Fourthly, the review order dated 07.05.2008 was passed on irrelevant considerations. As submitted by the appellants, the respondent-company had been granted adequate opportunities to establish its entitlement under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, which it failed to do. It was further claimed that the documents relied upon by the respondent-company, i.e., a resolution of 25.01.1951 and a certificate dated 12.10.1979, were never produced during the earlier vesting proceedings. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 22. In response, the respondent-company has advanced the following submissions: Firstly, it was submitted that the respondent-company had always engaged exclusively in 'agricultural farming', as authorised by Clause 13 of its Memorandum of Association (MOA). To support its claim that it was engaged exclusively in 'agricultural farming' as on 1st January 1952, the respondent-company relied upon various documents, i.e., a certificate of the agricultural income tax officer, audited balance sheets of the resp....
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....Court case and handed over 28.50 acres of land, relying on the terms of the amicable settlement. In support of the contentions, reliance was placed on M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of UP [(1979) 2 SCC 409]. Ninthly, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by going beyond the scope of prayers, as it quashed the review order dated 07.05.2008, without any prayer or application for the same. The respondent-company placed its reliance on Akhil Bhartvarshiya Marwari Agarwal Jatiya Kosh & Ors. v. Brijlal Tibrewal & Ors. [(2019) 2 SCC 684] and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors [(2010) 1 SCC 234] in this regard. Tenthly, the conferment of the power of review upon the B.L. & L.R.O. under Sections 57A and 53 of the WBEA Act, 1953, was in accordance with law. Lastly, it was submitted that under Rule 19 of the Rules of Business of the Government of West Bengal framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, decisions relating to a particular department are required to be taken by the Minister-in-charge. Moreover, any omission to make or authenticate an executive decision strictly in the form contemplated under Article 166 does....
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....e Officer to review its earlier order by relying on Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, and the order of the State Government of 26.02.2008 directing the Revenue Officer to review the earlier order. Section 57A of the Act reads as follows:- "57A. The State Government may by order invest any authority referred to in section 53 with all or any of the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908." The Authorities referred to under Section 53 are as follows: "53. (1) There shall be the following authorities for the purposes of this Act, namely:- (a) The Board or Revenue; (b) Director of Land Records and Surveys; (c) Settlement Officers; (d) Assistant Settlement Officers; (e) Compensation Officers; (f) Revenue Officers; (ff) Officers appointed by the State Government for the purposes of sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of subsection (I) of section 16; (g) Mining Experts for the purposes of sections 32, (2) The State Government may appoint any person as a Compensation Officer or a Revenue Officer or may vest any officer with the powers of a Compensation Officer or a Revenu....
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....ree-judge Bench of this Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji [(1971) 3 SCC 844] had observed as follows: "4. ...It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it would be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order...." 32. In the same vein, it was held by the Supreme Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [(2010) 9 SCC 437] that, "12. It is settled legal proposition that, unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction..." 33. This Court has time and again, through various judgments, including in Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khan....
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....e, a concept crucial to modern democratic Constitutions like ours. His theory finds acceptance in the aforesaid doctrine of basic structure propounded by this Court. Montesquieu said the following in The Spirit of Laws: "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals." 39. Closely and intrinsically linked to the aforesaid idea is the concept of the independence ....
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.... legislature and in no case can claim the same status as High Courts or their judges or parity or as substitutes of the same. It was, however, emphasised that as the personnel appointed to hold those offices under the State are called upon to discharge judicial or quasi-judicial powers, they must have a judicial approach and also knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of constitutional, administrative and tax laws. The Court accordingly underscored that it is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these matters should have legal expertise, judicial experience and a modicum of legal training. 43. Subsequently, the seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others24, held that the High Courts' power of judicial superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals within their jurisdiction forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court held that although Tribunals cannot exercise judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of the High Courts or the Supreme Court, they may perform a supplementary, though not a substitutive, role in this regard. Further, the Court held Article 323A(2)(d) and Article ....
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....f review to such administrative authority in the exercise of quasi-judicial power. 49. Seen from the above judicial perspective, this Court must be circumspect and ought not countenance any blanket investing of all powers of the Civil Court, which would include the power of review on such non-judicial administrative functionaries like the Revenue Officer in terms of Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, as the respondent-company would insist. In our view, Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, cannot be construed to include vesting of power of review in the absence of a clear statutory provision to such quasi-judicial authority manned by an executive functionary like the Revenue Officer, bereft of any judicial training or judicial qualification, as it would run contrary to the aforesaid judicial position adopted concerning Tribunals. 50. In spite of the aforesaid provision under Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, that the legislature did not intend to confer the power of review to the authorities provided under the said Act is evident from the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 57B of the 1953 Act which provides that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section, the Revenue Offic....
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....ng a dispute under this subsection, the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act. (4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. (5) A decision made by an Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) shall be final. Explanation ----In this section, ----- (i) suit includes an appeal, and (ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an appeal." 51. Having regard to the above-mentioned proviso in Section 57B (3) of the 1953 Act, it can be said that the 1971 vesting order passed by the Revenue Officer after full inquiry and adjudication, constitutes such a determination which also attained finality after it was unsuccessfully challenged before the Court of law. The concerned Revenue Officer thus stood barred from re-opening, revisiting, or redeciding its earlier vesting ....
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....SCC OnLine Cal 228], the Calcutta High Court held that the successor Revenue Officer has no power and/or jurisdiction to reopen the finding of the earlier Revenue Office under the WBEA Act, 1953. It was held that: "14. But firstly, since the writ petitioners have a "strong prima facie case". In their favour that the "successor Revenue Officer" has no power and/or jurisdiction "to reopen" the finding of the earlier Revenue Officer, having "concurrent jurisdiction", the impugned order of reopening and/or review was wholly unwarranted since the very beginning and should be set aside by issue of an appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari. 15. Secondly, in my view, as there is no provision for "review" of the order passed under s. 5A(3)(ii) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, pari materia to the provisions of s. 14T(3a) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, which has been inserted by way of legislative amendment, by the West Bengal Legislature in 1978, and as such, in the absence of any such enabling provision a "Successor Officer" in any event is incompetent to exercise such power of review as, such power is not "inherent" in the Officer. ....
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....verning law of review or not. 60. As regards the scope of review, it is well settled that it is of a limited and narrow one, unlike the case of appeal, where the appellate Court could revisit the entire facts and could re-hear the complete matter on merits. On the other hand, the purpose of a review is to rectify manifest or exceptional wrongs. It is not for reappreciating facts or seeking a different conclusion. Thus, a review could not be an appeal in disguise by reappreciating the evidence and grounds which have already traversed or come to a conclusion. 61. Review is essentially to strike a balance between the rule of finality, which is crucial for maintaining legal certainty and to avoid irremediable injustice caused by patent mistakes, fraud, failure of natural justice or similar exceptional situations, as was held in M/s. Northern India Caterers Limited v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167]. It is for this reason that the Courts have emphasised from time to time that review must be exercised with great caution and only when the requisite limited criteria are satisfied, in which the error must be evident and not one which requires elaborate arguments to dis....
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....n before the vesting authority (Revenue Officer) in the earlier proceedings in 1971 under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. Hence, it was not granted the benefit of exemption from vesting in the vesting order dated 07.10.1971. Highlighting the same, the concerned Revenue Officer in the said vesting order rightly observed: "The representative of the company has not produced any evidence whatsoever to show that the company after its creation adopted any resolution for carrying on business exclusively connected with agricultural farming. The papers produced merely show that the company has some agricultural lands and it is paying agricultural income tax and others on account of the incomes that it might have derived from such lands. These papers do not prove that the company is not engaged with any other business or trade in terms of memorandum and articles of association." 66. A careful examination of the 1971 vesting order reveals that, although the respondent-company sought to rely on its MOA - particularly clauses 7, 8 and 13 - to demonstrate that it was engaged in agricultural activities, the Revenue Officer rightly declined to treat these clauses as con....
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...., disposed of turn to account or deal in all or any part of the property and rights of the company and to do agriculture farming and agri business." 70. The aforementioned Clause does not establish that the respondent-company was established exclusively for farming. It mentions agricultural and agri-business as one of its activities. Its MOA reveals that the respondent company was incorporated with a host of business objectives unrelated to agriculture, such as manufacturing or selling of all kinds of machines, purchasing, selling, taking on lease any movable/immovable property, patent licences, among many others. The mere presence of agricultural objectives in a company's MOA does not establish that such activities were, in fact, its sole or predominant operation, nor does it rule out the pursuit of other commercial objectives expressly permitted by the very same document. 71. Moreover, after perusing the documents relied upon by the respondent-company, viz., (i) Certificate of 'Agricultural Income Tax Officer' dated 12.10.1979, (ii) Audited Balance Sheets dated 25.07.1952, (iii) Auditors' Certificates dated 25.07.1952, 30.12.1971, 09.08.2007, 27.09.2007, and 11.04.2008. (iv....
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....y of a certain new and important matter or evidence, which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed. A review of a judgment is a drastic step, and a reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or a grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import, are obviously insufficient, as was rightly held in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674]. The provision is not meant to give a second chance to the aggrieved party who has lost their case due to their own negligence. 76. Now, if we apply this principle to the facts of the present case, it cannot be believed that crucial documents such as the 1951 Resolution and Audited Balance Sheets dated 25.07.1952, relied upon by the respondent-company in the 2008 review, were not within its possession and knowledge earlier. The respondent-company failed to produce such documents despite being afforded several opportunities during the....
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....t the words "any other sufficient reason" means "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously", meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably, Chhajju Ram has been consistently followed by this Court in number of decision starting with Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos V. Mar Poulose Athanasius. .......... 106. Moving on further, we find that the attempt of the review petitioners has been to draw inspiration from the ground "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Rule 1. There have been decisions of this Court which have construed the words "any other sufficient reason" expansively, like Netaji Cricket Club and Jagmohan Singh, whereas there are decisions, including Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos, Shatrunji, Kamlesh Verma and S. Madhusudhan Reddy, that have followed Chhajju Ram explaining that the ground "any other sufficient reason" means "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. 107. However, with utmost respect, we do not find any of those decisions, which have taken an expansive view, looking at such ground in the manner we propose to look, for recording ....
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.... to be a sufficient reason in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC 189]. Additionally, an order arising out of a lack of jurisdiction was held to be a sufficient reason in Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb [(1999) 4 SCC 396]. However, in the case at hand, there exists no such "sufficient reason" within the meaning of Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the CPC. 81. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the respondent-company failed to satisfy any of the conditions for review as also contemplated under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. Consequently, even assuming for argument's sake that the Revenue Officer possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a review, which he demonstrably did not have, as already held above, the review order of 2008 was devoid of any legal foundation. The review was thus fundamentally misconceived, contrary to settled principles governing the exercise of review power 82. As discussed above, the power of review is to be exercised on the limited grounds recognised under law, as postulated under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. In the present case, however, it is evident that the trigger for reopening the earlier vesting order of 1971 was not the ex....
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....series of Court cases, non-payment of compensation, and the respondent-company's continued possession of the land apart from the potential to generate employment from the proposed project. None of these reasons, in our view, constitutes a legally sustainable ground to justify reopening a concluded determination after such an inordinate lapse of time. Non-distribution of land or continued physical possession by the respondent company cannot confer upon it any right, title, or interest once vesting has taken place by operation of law. Similarly, non-payment of compensation, even if assumed, does not invalidate vesting but merely gives rise to a statutory entitlement to compensation. Significantly, the record does not substantiate the assertion of any pending litigation that prevented distribution of the land, particularly when the writ petition challenging the vesting order was dismissed on 23.09.1975, and subsequent attempts to revive the proceedings failed on 11.03.1987 and 07.02.2002. There was thus no subsisting judicial impediment as far as the respondent-company was concerned. The proposed project of the respondent- company, which had the potential to generate employment, canno....
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....for the same, is without merit, because it is a wellestablished law that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. The Court in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1954) 1 SCC 710] held as follows: "6. ...It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties..." 89. In the instant case, as the Revenue Officer did not have the jurisdiction to review the earlier vesting determination, the 2008 review order strikes at the very root of the matter and is a non-curable defect. Importantly, "competence....