TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (1) TMI 1701
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....ona Realties Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, "the Developer"), for the purchase of a residential flat (Flat No. 5102) in the "Lodha Venezia" project at Mumbai. The total consideration agreed was Rs.5.46 crores, against which an advance payment of Rs.1.08 crores was made to the Developer. 3.2. Pursuant to the execution of the Agreement to Sell, the Appellants paid stamp duty of Rs.27,34,500, as mandated under the Act. The said Agreement was registered on 18.09.2014, upon payment of an additional registration charge of Rs.30,000. 3.3. Sometime thereafter, on 05.11.2014, the Developer informed the Appellants of unavoidable delays tied to issues involving adjacent slums, thereby making it impossible to hand over possession of the flat by 31.03.2017, the date earlier envisaged. The Developer offered three options to the Appellants: (i) transfer the booking to another project, (ii) opt for cancellation with a refund along with interest at 12% per annum, or (iii) continue with the present booking but with a revised possession timeline. 3.4. Constrained by the uncertainty over timely possession, the Appellants chose to cancel the booking. Consequently, a Deed of Ca....
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....ccrued on the date of execution (17.03.2015), thus invoking the unamended two-year window, and (ii) the CCRA had no statutory power of review to recall its initial order granting refund. 3.9. By the impugned judgment dated 18.04.2024, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding, in essence, that the date of registration (28.04.2015) triggered the Appellants' claim, which fell under the amended provision stipulating a six-month limitation. The High Court further opined that, in the specific facts, the CCRA's recall could not be struck down solely on the ground of no express power of review. 4. Aggrieved with the dismissal of their writ petition, the Appellants have now approached this Court by way of the present appeal. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the Appellants and the Respondents, the primary issue for consideration before us is whether the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Act governs the Appellants' claim for stamp duty refund, particularly when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the amendment but registered thereafter. 6. Section 48(1) of the Act reads as follows: ....
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....ration v. Commissioner of Central Excise [(2015)7 SCC 58], this Court has held that amendment to provision as to limitation is inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the amendment has reduced the period earlier provided. The relevant paras of this judgement have been extracted hereunder: "53. Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has strongly contended before us that the present appeal must attract the limitation period as on the date of its filing. That being so, it is clear that the present appeal having been filed before Cestat only on 23-5-2003, it is Section 128 post amendment that would apply and therefore the maximum period available to the appellant would be 60 plus 30 days. Even if time taken in the abortive proceedings is to be excluded, the appeal filed will be out of time being beyond the aforesaid period. 54. It is settled law that periods of limitation are procedural in nature and would ordinarily be applied retrospectively. This, however, is subject to a rider. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266], this Court held : (SCC p. 844, para 5) 5. "On the....
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.... limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act-subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266]. The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages. In March 1967 the Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of limitation. The respondent filed the application in July 1967. It was held th....
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....ssession, and were in no way remiss or at fault. 11. Denying a legitimate refund solely on technical grounds of limitation, especially when the timing of registration fell close to the legislative amendment, fails to strike the equitable balance ordinarily expected in fiscal or quasi-judicial determinations. A measure of discretion or consideration for good faith conduct is not alien to statutory processes that safeguard citizens from unjust enrichment by the State. It has been laid down by this Court in Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps [2024 SCC OnLine SC 979] that the limitation provision in stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should not be enforced so as to oust the remedy when the applicant is otherwise not blameworthy. The relevant paras of the same have been reproduced hereunder: "14. In Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private Limited^3, wherein the issue of refund of stamp duty under the same Act was in question, this Court has observed and held inter alia as under: "29. This case reminds us of the observations made by M.C. Chagla, C.J. in Firm Kaluram Sitaram v. D....
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....as played on her by the Vendor which led to the cancellation of the conveyance deed." 12. We also find merit in the Appellants' submission that the CCRA, having once granted a refund by its order dated 08.01.2018, lacked any express statutory power to review or recall that decision. A quasi judicial authority can only exercise such powers as the statute confers. There is no provision in the Act enabling the CCRA to sit in review of its own orders. In the absence of any enabling clause, the subsequent orders dated 03.03.2018, 16.04.2019, and ultimately 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained solely because the Appellants participated in the proceedings. 13. We are unable to concur with the High Court's reasoning that the Appellants "submitted themselves" to the authority's review process or somehow acquiesced in the second decision. Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver. The law does not permit a statutory functionary to assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of how the parties engage in subsequent litigation. Hence, we see clear infirmity in the High Court's endorsement of the CCRA's review-like exercise. 14. In ....