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2025 (12) TMI 1665

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.... Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant and the accused were known to each other. The accused issued a cheque of Rs.2,50,000/- in favour of the complainant to discharge his liability. The complainant presented the cheque in his bank account in Punjab National Bank, Branch at Theog, but it was dishonoured with the endorsement "funds insufficient." The complainant sent a notice to the accused on 21.06.2016 through registered post. The notice was served upon the accused, but he failed to repay the amount despite receiving the notice. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action as per the law. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW1), Rahul Ranta (CW2) and Ankush Chauhan (CW3) to prove his case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the cheque bea....

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....splaced the cheque, which was misused by the complainant, was highly probable. The statement of the complainant was contradictory, and the service of the notice upon the accused was not proved. Therefore, it is prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr I.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Vivek Singh Attri, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant. 10. Mr I.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below relied upon the presumption of service, which could only arise after 30 days from the date of dispatch of the notice. The accused had a right to repay the amount within 15 days of receipt of the notice. The complaint was filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of service of the notice; hence, the complaint was premature. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Govind Ram Vs. State of H.P. & Anr. [2025:HHC:33346] in support of his submission. 11. Mr Vivek Singh Attri, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant, submitted that the complainant has the right to file a fresh complain....

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....en considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher ....

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.... Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ... " 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in ....

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.... jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 19. The ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under :- "5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC 300, this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker, for payment to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of....

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....nder Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence." 21. A similar view was taken in N. Vijay Kumar v. under: Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as PKWman "6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable defence." 22. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: "ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE 15. In the present case, the cheque in ques....

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....o the cheque. 27. The complainant asserted that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement "insufficient funds." The complainant's version was proved by Rahul Ranta (CW2), who stated that the cheque was dishonoured because the accused did not have sufficient money in his account. He produced the statement of account (Ex. R), which shows that the balance in the account was zero on 07.06.2016. Thus, the complainant's version that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement "funds insufficient" was duly proved on record. 28. The complainant stated that he had issued a notice (Ex.CW1/D) asking the accused to repay the money within 15 days of its receipt. The accused stated on oath that he had received a notice (Ex. D1/DW1) which was inside the envelope (Ex. D2/DW1). The envelope (ExD2/DW1) mentions the Registered Letter No. RE748272497IN, which is the same number that has been mentioned in the postal receipt (Ex.CW1/E). Thus, the envelope (Ex.DW2/DW1) proves that the letter sent vide postal receipt (Ex.CW1/E) was delivered to the accused. 29. The accused claimed that he had received the notice (Ex. Di/DW1) mentioning the name of Amar Singh, s/o Laxmi Singh, as t....

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....nt case, no payment was made, and the plea that notice was not received by the accused will not help him. 32. It was submitted on behalf of the accused that the complaint was premature. This submission cannot be accepted. A stamp of Post Office Narkanda regarding the delivery, dated 23.06.2016, has been put on the envelope, which means that the letter was delivered on 23.06.2016. The accused had 15 days to pay the amount after the receipt of the notice. Complainant could have filed the complaint within one month thereafter. In the present case, the complaint was filed after the expiration of 15 days and within the period of one month; therefore, it cannot be said to be premature. 33. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that all the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act, were duly satisfied and learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 34. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 ....